



# Report on the Quality of Hungarian Legislation – 2011-2015

*Budapest, February 2016*

The Corruption Research Center Budapest (CRCB) was created in November 2013 in response to the growing need for independent research on corruption and quality of government. Hence, the Center was established as a non-partisan research institute independent of governments, political parties or special interest groups. The aims of the Center are to systematically explore the causes, characteristics, and consequences of low quality of government, corruption, and regulatory failure using an inter-disciplinary approach. The Center also aims to help citizens to hold governments accountable through the use of robust evidence.

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## Introduction

The CRCB now presents the third report on the quality of Hungarian legislation which analyses the 2014-2015 new tendencies<sup>1</sup>. Our report for 2015 is not a simple repetition and it is not an update. Compared to last year's report we extended and deepened our analysis in several areas. We do not only analyse the activities of the Parliament by statistical methods (i), occurrences of public consultations (ii), the process of drafting a law and of conducting impact assessment (iii), but we put/included the following new topics into our analysis: deeper statistical analysis of amending laws (iv) and a brief comparative analysis of public consultations models in three European countries: Estonia, Hungary and the UK (v).

The main novelty of our work is the use of objective indicators and features to assess the quality of legislation in Hungary. For this we use publicly available data that can be found on the websites of the Hungarian government and the Hungarian Parliament<sup>2</sup>, and other online sources. We completed the results obtained from quantitative data with qualitative information. Based on the publicly available data we are primarily interested in finding out what happened in 2013-2015 in the areas examined and to what extent the legislative procedure makes it possible for stakeholders to be informed and take part in the process of the preparation of laws (i), to what extent preliminary impact assessments and analyses support the laws made by the Hungarian Parliament (ii), and to what extent the approved laws can contribute to legal certainty (iii).

Where it is necessary and possible, we look at previous years as well (as far back as 1990), thereby putting our results into a broader context.

In the first part of the report we collect and analyse data about so-called impact assessment sheets. Next we devote a section to analysing the data related to public consultations. We then turn to the statistical analysis of the law-making process and afterwards we compare the public consultation models of Estonia, Hungary and the

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<sup>1</sup> The first report see <https://bit.ly/2kAbRX1> and <https://bit.ly/2U6Q2NV> ; and the extended version of the second report see <https://bit.ly/1q8oGXQ>.

<sup>2</sup> See <http://www.parlament.hu/> and <http://kormany.hu/> .

United Kingdom. The most important conclusions of the analysis are summarised at the end of the report.

In the appendix of the report we present the most important and relevant statistical data, the list of public consultations and impact assessment sheets we examined, and an overview of the laws passed in 2013-15.

## 1. Impact Assessments in Hungary 2011-2015

### 1.1. Rules of Impact Assessments' Procedure

In Hungary the impact assessment procedure of legislation are regulated by the 2010 law „On Legislation.”<sup>3</sup> They can be split into preliminary and ex-post impact assessments. The preliminary impact assessments are required to analyse the expected outcomes of a proposed law and the consequences if the law were not implemented. An ex-post impact assessment reviews the results and outcomes, both expected and observed, of an existing law. Impact assessments are the responsibility of the ministry or ministries associated with specific laws.

The rules regulating preliminary impact assessments are outlined with more detail in the 2011 „KIM Regulation.”<sup>4</sup> According to the law a summary sheet have to be filled about the main expected impacts of the planned regulation regarding competitiveness, administrative burden, social inclusion, fiscal effects, and effects on health and the environment, among others. Positive and negative effects are to be explored and examined, quantitatively if possible. The impact assessment's sheet should be accompanied documentation for all calculations included, along with methodology and other relevant information.

### 1.2. Empirical Analysis

#### 1.2.1 Preparatory document packages

The documents related to the preparatory phase of a law are available on the government website<sup>5</sup>. Ideally these zipped document packages contain the draft law, the impact assessment(s) and a summary of the electronically submitted opinions from the general public consultation procedure.

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<sup>3</sup> In Hungarian: jogalkotásról szóló 2010. évi CXXX. Törvény, see:

[http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy\\_doc.cgi?docid=A1000130.TV](http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1000130.TV)

<sup>4</sup> In Hungarian: 24/2011. (VIII.9.) KIM rendelet, see:

[http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy\\_doc.cgi?docid=A1100024.KIM](http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1100024.KIM)

<sup>5</sup> Current period: <http://www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?type=302#!DocumentBrowse>

Previous periods: <http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/dok?type=302#!DocumentBrowse>

We could identify and download 329 document packages between 2011 and 2015. This is a small number compared to the number of accepted and published laws between 2011 and 2015: 666<sup>6</sup>. The ratio of document packages and published laws reached its minimum in 2014 (17%) after a drastical downturn – probably because of the elections –, but there was a remarkable upturn in 2015 (56%).


The situation is probably even worse than this discrepancy indicates, because there is not any indication in the preparatory packages about the future life of the bill, so these numbers can contain also rejected bills. The website of the Parliament does not make it easy to match the preparatory documents and the final, published laws either, as there is not any mutual, unambiguous identification number for these two kinds of documents. We attempted to match the document packages to published laws using the title of the bill, the date of publication and the name of the ministry that submitted the draft – in 2015 we managed to link 71 document packages (72%) to final laws.

Consequently, the values in Figure 1.2.1.1 should be considered as an optimistic estimate for the portion of laws with a preparatory document package published on the government's website.

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<sup>6</sup> We took into account only bills that were submitted by the government and the ministries, because only in this case is compulsory to prepare impact assessment.

**Figure 1.2.1.1: Number of published laws and preparatory document packages, 2011-2015**



Note: Grey - number of published laws Orange - number of preparatory document packages

We took into account only bills that were submitted by the government and the ministries, because only in this case is compulsory to prepare impact assessment.

Year	Published laws	Preparatory document packages	%
2011	144	95	66.8
2012	155	73	47.1
2013	156	76	48.7
2014	83	14	16.9
2015	128	71	55.5
Total	666	329	61.2

Source: calculations by CRCB

The existence of preparatory document packages does not mean automatically that they also include impact assessments. First of all, none of the downloaded packages contained an extensive, detailed study about the predicted impacts of the proposed bill. Instead of this the standard form of impact assessments is the “impact assessment sheet” which is a two page long chart. (See Annex A3. for example)


We identified 381 impact assessment (AI) sheets in the preparatory document packages. These 381 sheets are connected only to 182 bills because there are bills



that have more than one impact assessment sheets and there are bills that have none. The maximum number of sheets connected to a bill is 24.<sup>7</sup>

In 2015 less than the quarter (21%) of the preparatory document packages contained at least one impact assessment sheet. There were no significant changes regarding this ratio since the sharp decline between 2012 and 2013, however it slightly improved in 2015. These tendencies suggest that the elections held in 2014 did not really affect the ratio, but a systematic change could happen in 2013 concerning the preparation of impact assessment sheets.

**Figure 1.2.1.2.: Rate of preparatory document packages that contain impact assessment sheet(s), 2011-2015, %**



Case numbers: 2011: 95 2012:73 2013:76 2014:14 2015: 71, Total: 329  
Source: calculations by CRCB

These sheets are mixed in PDF and Excel format. Because of differences in the format we were able to retrieve information from only 350 files. Hereafter the content of these sheets will be analysed.


<sup>7</sup> This is a draft about the amendment of certain laws regarding healthcare and health insurance (“Az egyes egészségügyi és egészségbiztosítási tárgyú törvények módosításáról”)  
<http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/d7/20000/eg%C3%A9szs%C3%A9gbiztos%C3%ADt%C3%A1si%20tv%20hv-lapok.zip#!DocumentBrowse>

### *1.2.2. Working days spent on impact assessment sheets*

The number of working days spent on preparing impact assessment sheets was 3.5 days/sheet on average. This seems extremely short a time for a well-founded, solid analysis. However, it is also possible that ministry officials misunderstood this question in some cases and they indicated only the time they needed actually to fill out the sheet.

The mean of the number of days spent on the preparation of these sheets was slightly higher in 2015 than it was between 2012 and 2014. The standard deviation was also significantly higher in 2015 than it was in the previous three years, but the median value did not change, suggesting that a few extremely long preparation periods could lead to a higher average value in 2015. All in all, the extremely short preparation periods remained typical in 2015.

Figure 1.2.2.1.: Distribution of IA by number of working days spent on preparing it, 2011-2015



	N	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
2011	2	15.50	15.50	20.51	1.00	30.00
2012	85	3.65	1.00	5.14	0.02	15.00
2013	109	2.19	1.00	3.10	0.04	17.00
2014	42	2.00	1.00	1.41	1.00	5.00
2015	98	5.12	1.00	19.08	0.08	120.00
Total	336	3.48	1.00	10.91	0.02	120.00

Source: calculations by CRCB

Note: the measurement unit is day, however on some impact assessment sheets the preparation period was given in minutes or hours – this causes fractions.

### 1.2.3 Topics of the impact assessment – Competitiveness

#### *Competitiveness in general*

Only 69 impact assessment sheets indicate positive or negative impacts on competitiveness in general.

**Table 1.2.3.1.: Impact on competitiveness in general, 2011-2015**

	pcs	%
Decrease	2	0.6
Does not change	278	80.1
Increase	67	19,3
Total	347	100.0

Source: calculations by CRCB

The year of 2014 was an outlier regarding this aspect too, as positive or negative impacts were indicated only on 7% of the sheets. In 2015 this ratio was 26%, what is similar to the ratio measured in 2013 (23%).

**Table 1.2.3.2.: Impact on competitiveness in general by years, 2011-2015**

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Decrease		1.1%			
Does not change	66.7%	87.1%	77.3%	92.9%	74.4%
Increase	33.3%	11.8%	22.7%	7.1%	25.6%

Source: calculations by CRCB

### *Employment*

Only 37 of the impact assessment sheets (10.6%) indicate a non-zero impact on employment. When a positive impact is indicated, the exact values for these effects are indicated only in six cases and they are labelled as either “significant” or “it cannot be estimated” in seven cases.

In 2014 there were no impact assessment sheets indicating impact on employment, however in 2013 18% and in 2015 14% of the sheets indicated a non-zero impact.

**Table 1.2.3.2.: Impact on employment in general by years, 2011-2015**

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Does not change	100%	95.7%	82%	100%	87%
Increase	0%	4.3%	18%	0%	13.6%

Source: calculations by CRCB

### *Administrative burden*

The predicted administrative burden of the draft bill in question was analysed in 237 cases (74.8%) according to the sheets. Influenced groups are indicated in significantly fewer cases (see in Table 1.2.3.1). Quantified values are required in the sheets only regarding the competitive sector. Among these we found we found only 14 exact values without any indication if these values apply for one person or for a group together.

Increasing or decreasing impacts were reported for the competitive sector in 29 cases (29%) in 2015, however in 2014 only one sheet (2%) contained data about these impacts. Regarding public administration, this ratio was 39% in 2015 and 27% in 2014. But concerning administrative burdens for citizens, this ratio was similar in 2014 and 2015. (15% and 13%).

**Table 1.2.3.2.: Impact on administrative burden, 2011-2015**

		Administrative burden		No answer/Does not change
		Increasing	Decreasing	
2011	Competitive sector	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (100%)
	Public administration	1 (33%)	0 (0%)	2 (66%)
	Citizens	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (100%)
2012	Competitive sector	4 (4%)	4 (4%)	85 (91%)
	Public administration	18 (19%)	8 (8%)	67 (72%)
	Citizens	9 (9%)	8 (8%)	76 (81%)
2013	Competitive sector	9 (7%)	5 (4%)	99 (87%)
	Public administration	25 (22%)	9 (7%)	79 (69%)
	Citizens	3 (2%)	11 (9%)	99 (87%)
2014	Competitive sector	1 (2%)	0 (0%)	41 (97%)
	Public administration	3 (7%)	8 (19%)	31 (73%)
	Citizens	0 (0%)	6 (14%)	36 (85%)
2015	Competitive sector	16 (16%)	13 (13%)	70 (70%)
	Public administration	20 (20%)	18 (18%)	61 (61%)
	Citizens	4 (4%)	8 (8%)	87 (87%)
Total	Competitive sector	30 (9%)	22 (6%)	298 (85%)
	Public administration	67 (19%)	43 (12%)	240 (69%)
	Citizens	16 (5%)	33 (9%)	301 (86%)

Source: calculations by CRCB

#### 1.2.4 Topics of the impact assessment – Social Inclusion

Instead of disadvantaged groups all influenced groups are discussed in this section, including ‘persons under 18’, ‘anglers’, and ‘family doctors’. As a consequence this section fails to give information on social inclusion impacts, as usually understood, of the analysed bill. Besides, the effects are indicated only as yes-or-no information. Short written explanations are included in only 104 cases.

**Table 1.2.4.1.: Impact on social inclusion, 2011-2015**

	Advantage	Disadvantage	No answer
First group	128 (37%)	32 (9%)	190 (54%)
Second group	81 (23%)	21 (6%)	248 (71%)
Third group	47 (13%)	16 (5%)	287 (82%)

Source: calculations by CRCB

#### 1.2.5 Topics of the impact assessment – Budget

The budget section is the most frequently completed part of the impact assessment sheets. However, even this means only 93 valid values in 350 forms.

**Table 1.2.5.1.: Number of valid values in the budget section 2011-2015**

	In the analysed period	Current year	Next 2/4 year
Decreasing effect on the budget balance	84 (24%)	41 (12%)	63 (18%)
Coverage of the balance decreasing effect in the budget	27 (8%)	19 (5%)	23 (7%)
Increasing effect on the budget balance	40 (11%)	16 (5%)	39 (11%)
Taking into consideration the increasing effect on the budget balance	1 (0.3%)	1 (0.3%)	-
Total effect	93 (27%)	40 (11%)	83 (24%)
Total effect compared to the adopted budget	93 (27%)	38 (11%)	83 (24%)

Source: calculations by CRCB

### 1.2.6. Topics of the impact assessment – Sustainable development, Health and Other effects

The impact assessment sheets give information about the presence of these effects (yes or no) and a short written explanation. The explanation section is filled out in generally if there is a significant effect according to the yes-no section. However these explanations say quite little: elementary statistics on the character lengths of these texts are given in the table below.

It is also worthy of note that the rate of sheets mentioning impacts on health is quite high (39%). This is because of the high rate of impact assessment sheets related to bills about health care. It seems that EMMI (Ministry of Human Resources, Emberi Erőforrások Minisztériuma) submitted bills more often than other ministries. EMMI is mentioned among the submitters in 39% of all sheets in 2011-2015.

**Table 1.2.6.1.: Impact on environment, health and other impacts 2011-2015**

	Yes	No	Written explanation (if yes)	Length of explanation mean	Length of explanation min	Length of explanation max
Impact on environment	27 (8%)	321 (92%)	22	342	27	1347
Impact on health	135 (39%)	215 (61%)	129	234	27	959
Other impact	39 (13%)	266 (87%)	39	591	27	3209

Note: length is indicated in number of characters  
Source: calculations by CRCB




### *1.2.7 Aggregated results*

In order to aggregate the results mentioned above we created an index that shows the ratio of filled-out cells on impact assessment sheets. We consider text cells filled-out if the cell contains relevant text. Specifically we check if cells are empty or if it contains only irrelevant characters (e.g: “-“). We do not take into consideration yes-no questions because they are always filled out. We consider numeric cells filled-out if they contain a non-zero numeric value. The possible maximum number of filled-out cells is 34. As Figure 1.2.7.1. shows, the average rate of filled-out cells are low (16%).

There was a distinct improvement in the ratio of filled-out cells between 2014 (and the previous three years) and 2015 regarding both the average and the median values. The analysis of the averages in the quantiles between 2011 and 2015 also suggests that an enhancement happened in the preparation of the impact assessment sheets in 2015, as the means were higher in every quantile groups than in 2014 (Table 1.2.7.1). The preparation of the impact assessment sheets became thorougher in the last year in comparison with the former four years, but the average ratio was still only 23% after the increasement. So our overall impression, that these sheets have a mainly formal role in the procedure of legislation, did not change.

**Figure 1.2.7.1.: Distribution of the ratio of filled-out cells in impact assessment sheets 2011-2015**



	N	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
2011	3	0.14	0.09	0.11	0.06	0.26
2012	93	0.15	0.09	0.13	0.00	0.68
2013	113	0.17	0.12	0.17	0.00	0.76
2014	42	0.15	0.09	0.14	0.00	0.50
2015	99	0.23	0.18	0.15	0.00	0.65
Total	350	0.18	0.12	0.15	0.00	0.76

Source: calculations by CRCB

**Table 1.2.7.1.: Averages of the ratio of filled-out cells in impact assessment sheets in the quantile groups, 2011-2015**

	Quantile group based on the ratio of filled out cells				
	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
2011	0.0	0.06	0.09	0.26	0.0
2012	0.02	0.06	0.10	0.20	0.38
2013	0.00	0.04	0.11	0.28	0.45
2014	0.00	0.03	0.09	0.22	0.40
2015	0.06	0.13	0.18	0.27	0.50
Total	0.02	0.08	0.12	0.25	0.44

Source: calculations by CRCB

## 2. Public Consultation 2011-2015

There are three forms of public consultation in Hungary: a consultation process regulated by the law (i); informal public consultations with stakeholders selected by the government (ii); and forced consultations by stakeholders and citizens (iii).

In the first case (i) public consultations are carried out according to rules set by the government, and accordingly they can be analysed on the basis of information and governmental documentations available on the government's web page. The analyses of these can be found in points 2.2 and 2.3.

In the second case (ii) consultations take place because the government after careful consideration informally invites handpicked representatives of stakeholders, in most cases professional representatives and trade associations, or sometimes leaders of big multinational companies. The government sets up 'workgroups' in the law making process, and the stakeholders participate in their meetings. Only the members of these workgroups are informed about the creation of these groups, about who are invited, about their stated opinion and about what is said at the meetings. Citizens might have access to certain pieces of information (e.g. who and which organizations took part/were allowed to take part in the process and what standpoint they represented) only when the job of the workgroup is done and the bill has been submitted. This type of law making process with professional/technical associations, interest groups/alliances and corporate groups formed and supported by the government usually precedes formal, law regulated public consultations.<sup>8</sup>

The third form of consultation (iii), the so-called 'forced consultations' are characterized by the following features: the people concerned (entrepreneurs, professional alliances, citizens) can openly express their opposing views concerning the bill in the form of

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<sup>8</sup> According to press/media coverage in case of the new public procurement law (Hungarian Act CXLIII. of 2015) for example, the government negotiated with professional allies, and with entrepreneurial alliances for almost one year before the publication of the bill for formal consultation. Then the Hungarian government provided only nine working days for citizens to have a formal public consultation.

street demonstrations<sup>9</sup>, or they can publish their standpoint online or in printed media or at other fora (in the form of a joint announcement or manifesto)<sup>10</sup>, or they organize public professional debates, consultations where experts can overtly state their criticism concerning the bill, and where governmental and non-governmental experts can meet and exchange ideas<sup>11</sup>. These 'forced consultations' are generated by the dissatisfaction of those concerned by the formal and informal consultations.

To demonstrate the informal and forced consultations we selected 40 laws out of the accepted 175 laws in 2015 that we assume have significant economic impacts. Laws that have indicative influence on economic interest groups, thus it can be presumed that informal and forced consultations did have a role in the law making process. The media representation of these forms is analysed briefly in point 2.1.

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<sup>9</sup> Demonstrations at the end of 2014 against the internet tax bill serve as a good example for this. See: Impact Assessments Public Consultation and Legislation in Hungary 2011-2014, CRCB, 2015, pp. 48-53. [http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/legislation\\_2014\\_report\\_150630.pdf](http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/legislation_2014_report_150630.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> See the joint announcement of LIGA trade unions and VOSZ (National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers) against the law banning Sunday trading (T/2413) ([http://hirposta.hu/cikk/4585278/Vasarnapi\\_zarva\\_tartas\\_nepszavazas\\_es\\_Alkotmanybirosagi\\_dontes\\_varhato/](http://hirposta.hu/cikk/4585278/Vasarnapi_zarva_tartas_nepszavazas_es_Alkotmanybirosagi_dontes_varhato/))

<sup>11</sup> See e.g. the lectures on Paks organised by Energiaklub Climate Policy Institute <http://energiaklub.hu/hir/paks-ii-nelkul-a-vilag> and the 'Pakskontroll' web page created and operated by them <http://www.pakskontroll.hu/en>.

## 2.1. The media representation of the informal and forced consultations


For analysis of the media representation of informal and forced consultations in Hungary we selected 40 laws adopted in 2015. For this we used Google.com (google search) and the ‘hirkereso.hu’ Hungarian news portal to find news articles that are related to these laws.

**Table 2.1.1.: Main statistics of media representation of informal and forced consultations, 2015**

	Mean	Median	St.dev	Min	Max	Case Num.
Articles found	4.25	2.0	5.88	0	29	40
Time passed between the first article and the presentation of the bill (days, articles are prior to bill)	-37.38	-21.5	53.07	-16.5	-2	8
Time passed between presentation of the bill and first article (days, bill is prior to first article)	32.29	16.0	31.31	1	95	17
Time passed between first article and last one (days)	91.96	42.0	97.37	0	277	25


Source: calculations by CRCB

**Figure 2.1.1.: Distribution of analysed bill by time period of first article on informal or forced consultations and the presentation of the bill, 2015**



Source: calculations by CRCB

**Figure 2.1.2.: Distribution of analysed bill by time period of first and last articles on informal or forced consultations, 2015**



On average we found that around four articles were released about them. Although the standard deviation is quite big, there are acts without articles and there is one law with 29 articles (T/2250, the bill about the Paks II. Nuclear Power Plant). We were also interested in how fast the informal consultation started after the date of the presentation of bill. The median is more informative here, according to it 14 days passed after the presentation of the bill. But this varies very much too. We also found that there were seven laws about which articles were released even before the bill was presented. Finally, we looked at the time for how long the public was paying attention to them. It was around 100 days on average, but this also varies between 0 and 277 days<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> The database of the analysis see [http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/legislation\\_2015\\_40bills.xlsx](http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/legislation_2015_40bills.xlsx)



## 2.2. Rules of formal public consultation in Hungary

The current public consultation process in Hungary is regulated by the 2010 „Law on the participation of the community in the preparation of laws” (2010 / CXXX Law).<sup>13</sup> According to this law, draft laws must be made available to the public and put to debate and discussion with the broader community, with the exception of specific laws like the annual budget or legislation deemed urgent. The consultation types can be either „general,” meaning that anyone can contribute opinions or thoughts on the government’s website, or „direct,” meaning that only specific interest groups, presumably to be affected by the law under consideration, will be invited to contribute their opinions. „General” consultations are to be held whenever there is a public consultation process. Our research is focused on the public consultations found on the government’s website. From them we get a broad view of how these consultations work, and note the characteristics of debates of laws that are eventually passed and the successes and failures of this system.

The next phase of a consultation involves the response of the government minister responsible for the preparation of the specific piece of legislation. The minister is required to summarize the feedback given by citizens, providing reasons for why specific suggestions are not carried out, and to post this analysis on the government website alongside a list of reviewers.

According to the Office of National Economic Planning („Nemzetgazdasági Tervezési Hivatal”) the following rules and regulations, among others, must be followed in a general public consultation:<sup>14</sup>

- The consultation must be carried out at such point in the lawmaking process that it may influence the opinions of lawmakers.
- The planned legislative timeframe must leave room for the public to formulate useful opinions and suggestions. Experience shows that the more time is allowed, the better the feedback. (However, a legal minimum is not defined.)

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<sup>13</sup> In Hungarian: „2010. évi CXXX. törvény a jogszabályok előkészítésében való társadalmi részvételről.” See: [http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy\\_doc.cgi?docid=A1000131.TV](http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1000131.TV)

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.nth.gov.hu/hu/media/download/206>


- The documentation released in conjunction with a public consultation should be easily understandable, concise and jargon-free.
- The framework must help the people quickly recognize and decide whether a specific consultation and the associated published documentation are relevant to their lives. To this end, the creation of a public information table summarizing the different consultations is necessary.

The official procedure of general public consultation consists of the solicitation of public input via email after a preparatory document package appears on the government's website. The deadlines are indicated on this website. There is no legal minimum defined for the period of submitting opinions but tight deadlines definitely limit the possibility to draw up and submit opinions.

### **2.3. Empirical analysis**

The average number of days a consultation was open varied between 4 and 8 days in 2011-2015. In the case of nine bills the deadline for giving opinions was the same day as the day the bill appeared on the website. Between 2013 and 2014 the consultation periods became considerably shorter and this tendency did not stop in 2015 – the median value was 5 days in 2014 and only 3.5 days in 2015. Regarding the averages in the quantiles no significant changes can be revealed between 2014 and 2015, however the shortening of these periods between 2013 and 2014 is clearly visible (Table 2.3.1.).

**Figure 2.3.1.: Distribution of consultation procedures according to the number of days between date of opening the public consultation and deadline for submitting views 2011-2015**



Source: calculations by CRCB

**Table 2.3.1.: Main statistics of public consultations' deadlines (the number of days between date of package and deadline for submitting views) 2011-2015**

	Number of preparatory packages	Mean	Median (days)	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
2011	65	7.66	6.00	6.05	0	35
2012	66	6.94	5.50	6.77	1	43
2013	74	7.19	6.00	5.52	0	31
2014	13	4.38	5.00	2.96	0	12
2015	60	4.70	3.50	3.52	0	13
Total	278	6.57	5.00	5.63	0	43

Source: calculations by CRCB

Note: 3 negative values excluded from data and in 48 cases no deadline was given on the site


**Table 2.3.2.: Averages of public consultations' deadlines (the number of days between date of package and deadline for submitting views) in the quantile groups, 2011-2015**

	Quantile group based on the number of days between date of package and deadline for submitting views				
	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
2011	1	4	7	10	17
2012	1	4	6	7	17
2013	1	4	6	9	16
2014	0	2	4	5	10
2015	1	2	4	7	10
Total	1	4	7	10	17

Source: calculations by CRCB

If opinions arrived to a specific bill, the content of the suggestions and the ministries' reaction to them is published in a summary. Probably partly because of the tight deadlines and the passive way the ministries solicit feedback, the number of these summaries is very low. Only 25 document packages include a summary of the public consultation for a total of 7.6% of all packages. In 2014 none of the packages contained summary, and in 2015 these documents were included in only 4% of the packages. There may be a correspondence between the shortening deadlines and the infrequently published summaries.

**Figure 2.3.2.: Rate of packages that contain summary of the public consultation, 2011-2015, %**



Case numbers: 2011: 95 2012:73 2013:76 2014:14 2015: 71, Total: 329


Source: calculations by CRCB

### 3. Analysis of Hungarian Legislation 2006-2015

#### 3.1. Numer of laws

In this section we describe some indicators regarding the characteristics of legislation. The quantity of new bills and laws per year has a significant effect on their quality because it determines the time available for preparation, development of impact assessments and for public consultation. Figure 3.1.1. shows that between 2011 and 2013 a comparatively high number of bills were passed and published by the Hungarian Parliament reaching a peak in 2012. However in 2014 this number was dropped, as in election years usually less law is published. But this slowdown proved to be temporary, because in 2015 the number of published laws soared, but did not reach the level of the period between 2011 and 2013.

**Figure 3.1.1.: Number of published laws per year and government 1990-2015**



Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed.


Election years: 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014

Source: calculations by CRCB

It is relatively hard to draw clear-cut conclusions regarding the quality of legislation of the Hungarian governments from Figure 3.1.1. as the underlying length of legislative periods varied per prime minister. In order to make comparisons clearer Figure 3.1.2 shows the monthly average of published laws in each government cycle. It is clearly

notable that in the era of the second Orban-government, elected in 2010, the average number of newly published laws per month increased significantly. However, in the first twenty months of the third Orban-government this average became lower.

**Figure 3.1.2.: Number of published laws under each government, monthly average 1990-2015**



Note: In the last examined period (OV (3)) only 20 months were analysed (May 2014- Dec 2015).  
Source: calculations by CRCB


### 3.2. The length of preparation and debate

The growing number of new laws passed has caused the time available for preparation, debate and decision-making to decrease in the period of the second and third Orban-government. The average number of days between the introduction of a bill and the publication of the final law in the official journal was between 31 and 48 during the years of the second Orban-government (2010-2014) – in 2010, it was only 31 which is the lowest value during the analysed period (2006-2015). The second lowest value was reached in 2015 with 41 days. In the first twenty month of the Orban government elected in 2014 the average number was 46 days, what is the second lowest value in comparison to the former governments (3.2.1.).

The decrease of the days between the introduction and the final act in the Orban-era since 2010 is more conspicuous if we are looking at the median instead of the average – so when we are looking at the “value in the middle”, compared to which half of the laws were published faster and half of them slower. The few laws with extremely short or long legislative process less affect this value. The lowest value was reached in 2014,


before the election with 15.5 days, however there was clear breakpoint at the change of government in 2010: in the former period the medians were between 39 and 59, but afterwards these values were varying between 15.5 and 37. All in all, the median number of days between introduction and publication of a bill were 10-30 days lower during the years of the second and third Orban government, than during the years of the previous governments (3.2.2.).

**Figure 3.2.1.: Average number of days between introduction of a bill and publication of the law in the official journal, 1998-2015, calendar days**



Note: In the last examined period (OV (3)) only 20 months were analysed (May 2014- Dec 2015).  
Source: calculations by CRCB

**Figure 3.2.2.: Median number of days between introduction a bill and publication of the law in the official journal, 1998-2015, calendar days**



Note: In the last examined period (OV (3)) only 20 months were analysed (May 2014- Dec 2015).  
Source: calculations by CRCB

### 3.3. Bills submitted by Member of Parliament

There is an important difference between bills submitted by Members of Parliament (MPs) and those submitted by ministries or committees of the government. In the case of MPs' bills, certain phases of the decision making process can be skipped. These phases are, for example, ministerial and public consultations, which are normally part of the standard procedure of law making. What is cause for concern regarding MPs' bills is that it is not clear who, which organisations and whose interests had an influence on the bill. This process is markedly less transparent than the alternative.

While governing through bills submitted by MPs could be faster, the public consultations and professional debates are more limited and it increases the risk that important interests and professional considerations will not have an influence on the final decision. This could result in passing inadequate, erroneous regulation – sometimes maybe just because of incomplete information. In general terms, the increasing rate of MPs' bills could increase also the risk of government failure.<sup>15</sup>

Figure 3.3.1. shows that since 2010 a higher number of bills submitted by MPs have been passed compared to the former government periods<sup>16</sup> that also translates into a considerably higher proportion of these laws under the second Orbán government compared to the previous governments.


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<sup>15</sup> About the reasons of government failures see: Besley, T. 2006: Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government, Oxford University Press, New York.

<sup>16</sup> The data analysed in the following sections are available for us basically only for 2006-2015, so the analysis is limited to this period and thereafter "2006/2" implies the period after the election in 2006. In order to make comparisons in a broader sense possible, our dataset was extended to laws from 1996 and 2001 concerning chapter 3.3. and 3.4



**Figure 3.3.1.: The ratio of published laws by type of submitter per year, 1996, 2001, 2006-2015**




Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed.

Source: calculations by CRCB

The share of bills submitted by deputies of the ruling parties also reached a peak in 2010, until the first year of the second Orban-government. A probable cause of this is that in the first months after the change of government the bureaucracy was not altered. In 2011 there was a sharp decline regarding this rate, however it remained high comparing to the period 1996-2009, except for the first months of 2014 that can be explained by the elections (3.3.2.). In the former periods the ratio was stagnating between 6-11 percents, however in 2009 it started to rise. In the year 2014-2015 the rate of bills submitted by deputies was significantly higher (19-25%) than in the year 1996 or 2001 or in the period 2006-2009.

**Figure 3.3.2.: Share of bills submitted by MPs of ruling parties, 1996, 2001, 2006-2015, %**



Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed.

Source: calculations by CRCB

### 3.4. The share of “junk laws”


A passed and published law can be modified if needed. Modifications could become necessary, on the one hand, because of the pressure from economic and social changes typical of turbulent times such as the financial crisis of 2009-2010. But on the other hand, poor preparation could also result in quick amendments when the shortcomings and negative effects of the law emerge after it comes into force. So quick amendments of laws may refer to their low – “junk” – quality.

To ensure comparability, Figure 3.4.1. shows the rate of laws that needed to be modified within one year after their publication in the official journal. In this way the results aren’t influenced by the fact that earlier laws are more probable to have been amended simply because of the longer time passed since they were published. It is clearly visible that the number of laws modified within one year was extraordinarily high in 2011 and 2012. This applies also for the rate of these modified laws (Figure 3.4.2.). The low number of laws modified within one year in the first half of 2014 can be probably explained by the elections held in April 2014. However, the rate of laws modified within one year in the second half of 2014 reached the rate of 2013. The

preliminary results about 2015 suggest that the number and the proportion of the modified laws may become higher than in the previous two years.

Taking into account the earlier periods of 1996 and 2001, the rate of laws modified within one year did not reach the level measured between 2010 and 2013, but was higher than between 2006 and 2010. All of the laws published in 2001 and modified within one year, were modified in 2002 after the general elections.<sup>17</sup>

**Figure 3.4.1.: Number of laws modified within one year, 1996, 2001, 2006-2015**



Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed. A list of prime ministers is available in Appendix 1.


Concerning 2001, all laws' full texts were missing; therefore amending laws published in 2001 could only be studied based on their titles. Usually, not all of the amendments are listed in the titles of amending laws.

The preliminary results for the last examined period (2015) are based on the amendments published until 31<sup>st</sup> December 2015.

Source: calculations by CRCB

<sup>17</sup> However, it is important to consider the fact that we have no full texts available of the laws published in 2001, therefore might not all amendments have been collected from this period.

**Figure 3.4.2.: Rate of laws modified within one year compared to all published laws, 1996, 2001, 2006-2015, %**



Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed. A list of prime ministers is available in Appendix 1.

Concerning 2001, all laws' full texts were missing; therefore amending laws published in 2001 could only be studied based on their titles. Usually, not all of the amendments are listed in the titles of amending laws.


The preliminary results for the last examined period (2015) are based on the amendments published until 31<sup>st</sup> December 2015.

Source: calculations by CRCB

### 3.5. Improvised law making

In addition we should note that the share of the amending acts in the total number of bills seems to show some improvement since the second Orban-government came to power – this implies that the number of the amending acts became higher in the period between 2010 and 2014 than it was before because of the growing number of published laws. We should note that there was a break in the last months of the second Orban-government in 2014 that was probably influenced by the elections. During the years of the third Orban-government the share of amending acts in total bills was the highest in the studied period of 2006-2015 (3.1.9.).

**Figure 3.5.1.: Share of amending acts in total bills, 2006-2015, %**



Note: In the last examined period (OV (3)) only 20 months were analysed (May 2014- Dec 2015).

Source: calculations by CRCB


The amending acts can modify several laws at the same time, so the number of amendments included in these bills can better characterize the intensity of altering the legal environment. The number of amending acts modifying several<sup>18</sup> laws published within one year<sup>19</sup> reached a peak in 2012. After 2012 this number declined, however considering such amendments regarding laws published within two years the decline

<sup>18</sup> At least two.

<sup>19</sup> This restriction is needed because the data available only since 2006. The analysis considers the amending acts that change several laws that were published maximum 365 days (or 730 in the case of the longer period) before the given amending act was published.

between 2012 and 2013 was much slighter. To the contrary, there was a significant decline between 2013 and 2014 and after the decline there was no remarkable increase concerning the number of amending acts in the period of 2014-2015. It should be highlighted that Figure 3.5.2. is based only on the amending acts, not on all the published laws like the previous figures.

**Figure 3.5.2.: Number of amending acts modifying several laws, 2007-2015**



Note: When data concerning one year are represented in two parts, an election took place or the prime minister was changed.

Number of amending acts modifying at least two laws. This restriction is needed because the data available only since 2006. The analysis considers the amending acts that change at least two laws that were published maximum 365 days (or 730 in the case of the longer period) before the given amending act was published.

Source: calculations by CRCB

## 4. Public consultation in the UK and Estonia in comparison with the Hungary

### 4.1. Rules of public consultation in the UK

In the United Kingdom the Code of Practice on Consultation<sup>20</sup> states that drafts should be provided for public consultation when there are enough information about the policy but not everything is decided yet. Therefore participants can influence the final version of the act. The Code directly says that no consultation should be held during election period, in 2015 until the 7<sup>th</sup> of May the whole year counted as campaign period. For the duration of the consultation it is suggested that it will not be less than 12 weeks. Consultations should be clear on the process. It is important that information is provided on the issue, so people can decide if it concerns them and also clear questions should be given to enquirers to make it easier to send in the opinions. It should be understandable which parts can be influenced by responders and which is already decided on. All assumptions made by the government and also prior cost-benefit analysis (if possible) should be provided as well. The consultation should be well targeted and easily accessible to those who are potentially affected by the new legislation. The responses should be summarized within a reasonable time and feedback is needed to be provided after the suggestions were taken into consideration. In the United Kingdom 39 bills were granted the Royal Assent in 2015. For the further analysis of the consultations we used the official site of the UK government<sup>21</sup>.

### 4.2. Rules of public consultation in Estonia

The Estonian Planning Act<sup>22</sup> declares that consultations should be held on national and county level plans, on general plans and also on details of any plan. There are two types of consultations one is on introduced starting points and contents of the plan. Here responders actively participate in the development of the final draft. Others will be held after the law is accepted to collect the observations of the effect of the act. The

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<sup>20</sup> [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/100807/file47158.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/100807/file47158.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?publication\\_filter\\_option=consultations](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?publication_filter_option=consultations)

<sup>22</sup> [https://et.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avalik\\_arutelu](https://et.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avalik_arutelu)

discussion is always required during the planning process. Public consultations are a part of the environmental impact assessment procedures. For the analysis of Estonian consultations we used the official site where Estonians can participate in public consultations<sup>23</sup>.

### 4.3. Empirical analysis

For both the UK and Estonia all of the consultations provided a short description of the concerned issue upon which citizens can decide whether they are interested in participating in the consultation or not<sup>24</sup>. In the UK the way of providing a participant's opinion differs among the different consultations, they can either provide it via an online form or email or post. In Estonia they can directly comment on the online surface of the consultation. These comments are available for everyone. In Hungary the general public consultation consists of the solicitation of public input via email after a preparatory document package appears on the government's website.

In both UK and Estonia after the consultation is opened they indicate the deadline for sending in the opinions. In Hungary, the deadline is indicated on government's website, where the preparatory packages can be downloaded. The average number of days a consultation was opened in 2015 was 74 in the case of the UK and 18 for Estonia. None of the consultations were opened for less than a week. In Hungary this average was 5 days.


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<sup>23</sup> <https://www.osale.ee>

<sup>24</sup> The sources and methodology can be found in the appendix



**Figure 4.3.1.: Distribution of consultation procedures according to the number of days between date of opening the public consultation and deadline for submitting views for the UK, Estonia and Hungary in 2015**



Source: calculations by CRCB

**Table 4.3.1.: Frequency table of public consultations' deadlines (the number of days between date of package and deadline for submitting views) UK, Estonia and Hungary**

	days	frequency
Estonia	7	1
Estonia	8	2
Estonia	12	1
Estonia	13	1
Estonia	16	1
Estonia	21	1
Estonia	22	1
Estonia	26	1
Estonia	29	2
Estonia	31	1
UK	55	1
UK	56	1
UK	58	1
UK	78	1
UK	84	3
UK	92	1
Hungary	0	4
Hungary	1	8
Hungary	2	9
Hungary	3	10
Hungary	4	2
Hungary	5	6
Hungary	6	4
Hungary	7	5
Hungary	8	2
Hungary	9	3
Hungary	10	2
Hungary	12	1
Hungary	13	3

Source: calculations by CRCB


**Table 4.3.2.: Main statistics of public consultations' deadlines (the number of days between date of package and deadline for submitting views) UK, Estonia and Hungary**

	Number of preparatory packages	Mean	Median (days)	Std dev.	Min.	Max.
UK	8	73.9	81.0	15.0	55	92
Estonia	12	18.5	18.5	9.0	7	31
Hungary	71	4.7	3.5	3.5	0	13

Source: calculations by CRCB

After the consultation is closed the institution responsible for collecting the recommendations provides a summary of them in the UK and Estonia. In the UK these were available for 5 out of 8 consultations (62%) and for the remaining ones they indicated that the responses are being evaluated at the time. For Estonia only 2 out of 12 consultations contained the summary of the responses but the reason for this is that, surprisingly, for 8 consultations no response had been received. In Hungary the summary was available for 3 out of 71 consultations, however there is no information whether there were feedbacks or not.

**Figure 4.3.2.: Number of packages that contain summary of the public consultation, UK, Estonia and Hungary**



Case number: UK: 8, Estonia: 12, Hungary: 71  
Source: calculations by CRCB

Impact assessment was available for 4 British and 7 Estonian consultations (for approximately half of them) in both countries. Official responses and further considerations dependent on the summary of the consultation outcomes were only available in the UK and just for three of the consultations. This is surprising because according to the Code of Practice on Consultation this should be obligatory for every consultation. Also only three of the British consultations mention the costs of the implementation of the laws. In Hungary impact assessment sheets were available for 56 consultations (for nearly 80% of them).

**Table 4.3.3.: Main characteristics of public consultation procedures in 2015, UK, Estonia and Hungary**

	Estonia	UK	Hungary
Surface for consultations	internet	internet	internet
Way to respond	comments	email or online surface or mail	mostly email
Is consultation compulsory	yes	no	yes
Direct questions	no	yes	?
Straightforward how to participate	yes	yes	yes
Deadlines indicated	yes	yes	yes
On the same site?	yes	yes	no
Opinions publicly available	yes	no	no
Average length of consultation (days)	74	18	5
Number of preparatory packages	12/12	8/8	71/71
Summary of responses	2/12	5/8	3/71
Impact assesment available	7/12	4/8	56/71

Source: collection and calculations by CRCB

A very important observation is that in Estonia comments are available for anyone to read, this way it can generate an actual discussion. Out of 12 only 8 of them received any feedback and the others received 2, 3, 4 and 10. I may not seem a lot but at least they have the possibility which they may use more actively later. What is different in the UK consultations is that they provide direct questions (though individual opinion is encouraged) to answer. This can help people to express their opinion but it can also lead theirs if the wording is intended to.

## 5. Conclusions

1. The years of 2010-14 were a very turbulent period from the point of view of Hungarian legislation. In this period the Hungarian Parliament adopted 894 laws (on average 178,8 laws per year), while in the first five years after the collapse of the communist regime (1990-94) the newly and democratically elected Parliament adopted 425 laws (on average 85 laws per year). Thus, the period from 2010 to 2014 was a new legislative transition, a new “regime change” in Hungary.

2. The results of the analysis point out that the year 2015 was a return to the period of 2010-13 after the year of general elections (2014) from many aspects (number and quality of impact assessments, the number of adopted laws per year, number of bills submitted by the Members of Parliament, share of laws modified within one year, etc.). From this point of view the year of general elections (2014) was rather an outlier.

3. The share of published laws with preparatory document packages in 2015 (56%) was very similar to that of the 2010-13 (47-67%) period’s level. The quality and validity of impact assessment sheets are questionable. The sheets are poor in factual, exact data. The median number of working days spent on preparing impact assessment sheets was one day only (!), the average was 5.1 days. This seems extremely short a time for a well-founded, solid analysis. Interesting that the expected effects to employment or to competitiveness is neutral or positive for all adopted laws. The overwhelming majority of cells of impact assessment was empty in 2015. The median value of ratio of filled out cells was 0.18 in 2015. The data show a distinct improvement in the ratio of filled-out cells from 2014 (and the previous three years) to 2015 regarding both the average and the median values.

In 2015 the lack of impact assessment studies was endemic. There are not any detailed, well-founded, data-based impact assessment studies in the preparatory document packages, there are only formal impact assessment sheets for the most part. The lack of deep and empirically grounded analyses of potential economic and social effects of a bill characterised almost every case. Additionally, even the elaborated

studies suffer from an acute lack of transparency. In 2015 the Hungarian Government did not publish any assessment studies related to adopted laws.

4. The public consultation was only formally present in 2015. Citizens and stakeholders had chance to formulate their opinion and to effectively review bills only in a minority of cases. The deadlines for sending in opinions in the public consultations were extremely tight, in some cases the deadline and the date of the preparatory package were the same. The average number of days a consultation was open varied between 4 and 8 days in 2011-2015 and the median value was 5 days in 2014 and only 3.5 days in 2015. The public consultations in Hungary organized and canalized by the Hungarian Government are purely formal and empty procedures and they have nothing to do with the collection of stake-holders' opinion. The Estonian or UK practice of public consultancy contrasts sharply with the Hungarian one.

5. There was no significant change in 2015 regarding the quality of legislation. The number of adopted laws increased to 175 from 97 in 2014. The analysis shows that in 2015 the time spent on the preparation of bills and on the debate of bills in the general assembly did not change significantly compared to the previous year. Also the share of bills submitted by MPs is at the same level as it was in the previous four years. This also means that there was a high ratio of bills which avoided professional consultations by relevant ministries.

6. The data analysis shows the share of "junk laws", – i.e. the published laws with considerable faults, which needed to be modified within one year of their publication – did not change in 2014 and most likely will not change in 2015. The high number of laws submitted by MPs and hasty preparation of laws ("frantic law making") have the following consequences: less professionally elaborated bills (i), non-transparent preparation of bills, with disordered influences (ii), greater possibility of influence of business groups (rent seeking) (iii), rising risk of corruption in connection with legislation and of regulatory capture (iv); distortion of legal certainty (v).

## Annex

### A1. Prime Ministers in Hungary, 1990-2015

Start date	End date	Prime minister	Party
May 23. 1990	Dec 12. 1993	Antall, József	MDF
Dec 12. 1993	Jul 15. 1994	Boross, Péter	MDF
Jul 15. 1994	Jul 6. 1998	Horn, Gyula	MSZP
Jul 6. 1998	May 27. 2002	Orbán, Viktor	Fidesz
May 27. 2002	Sept 29. 2004	Medgyessy, Péter	MSZP
Sept 29. 2004	Jun 9. 2006	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	MSZP
Jun 9. 2006	Apr 14. 2009	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	MSZP
Apr 14. 2009	May 29. 2010	Bajnai, Gordon	MSZP
May 29. 2010	June 6 2014	Orbán, Viktor	Fidesz
June 6 2014		Orbán, Viktor	Fidesz

Notation: ----- : general elections

## A2. Analysis of Legislation 2006-2015

**Table A2.1.: Number of published laws per year and government 1990-2015**

Year	Prime Minister	Number of published laws
1990	Antall, József	77
1991	Antall, József	93
1992	Antall, József	89
1993	Antall, József – Boross, Péter	116
1994	Boross, Péter	55
1994	Horn, Gyula	50
1995	Horn, Gyula	125
1996	Horn, Gyula	131
1997	Horn, Gyula	159
1998	Horn, Gyula	35
1998	Orbán, Viktor	58
1999	Orbán, Viktor	125
2000	Orbán, Viktor	145
2001	Orbán, Viktor	121
2002	Orbán, Viktor	10
2002	Medgyessy, Péter	58
2003	Medgyessy, Péter	133
2004	Medgyessy, Péter	86
2004	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	54
2005	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	189
2006	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	57
2006	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	78
2007	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	184
2008	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	114
2009	Gyurcsány, Ferenc	22
2009	Bajnai, Gordon	141
2010	Bajnai, Gordon	44
2010	Orbán, Viktor	146
2011	Orbán, Viktor	213
2012	Orbán, Viktor	226
2013	Orbán, Viktor	212
2014	Orbán, Viktor	16
2014	Orbán, Viktor	97
2015	Orbán, Viktor	175

Source: calculations by CRCB

Notation: ----- : general elections



**Table A2.2.: Number of published laws under each government, monthly average 1990-2015**

Prime Minister	Monthly average of published laws
Antall J. - Boross P.	8,6
Horn Gy.	10,4
Orbán V. (1)	9,8
Medgyessy P.	10,7
Gyurcsány F. (1)	15,0
Gyurcsány F. (2)	11,4
Bajnai G.	14,2
Orbán V. (2)	17,3
Orbán V. (3)	13,6

Source: calculations by CRCB

**Table A2.3.: Average number of days elapsed between introduction and publication of a bill, 2006-2015**

Year	Average number of days between introduction and publication of a bill
2006/1	52,9
2006/2	42,0
2007	54,1
2008	66,0
2009	87,5
2010/1	70,6
2010/2	30,9
2011	41,8
2012	46,3
2013	40,8
2014/1	48,0
2014/2	54,1
2015	40,7

Source: calculations by CRCB

**Table A2.4.: Median number of days elapsed between introduction and publication of a bill, 2006-2015**

Year / government	Median number of days between introduction and publication of a bill
2006/1	41,5
2006/2	39,0
2007	49,0
2008	48,0
2009	59,0
2010/1	55,0
2010/2	28,5
2011	35,5
2012	34,0
2013	35,0
2014/1	15,5
2014/2	37,0
2015	36,0

Source: calculations by CRCB

**Table A2.5.: The ratio of published laws by type of submitter per year, 2006-2015**

Year	MP		Committee		Government (Ministries)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
2006/1	4	8%	2	4%	46	89%
2006/2	9	11%	4	5%	68	84%
2007	19	10%	9	5%	156	85%
2008	14	12%	4	4%	96	84%
2009	36	22%	4	3%	123	76%
2010/1	11	27%	2	5%	28	68%
2010/2	75	50%	5	3%	70	47%
2011	59	28%	9	4%	144	68%
2012	66	29%	4	2%	155	69%
2013	54	26%	2	1%	156	74%
2014/1	3	19%	0		13	81%
2014/2	24	25%	3	3%	70	72%
2015	40	23%	7	4%	128	73%

Source: calculations by CRCB

**Table A2.6.: Share of bills submitted by deputies of ruling parties, 2006-2015, %**

Year	Share of bills submitted by deputies of ruling parties (%)
2006/1	7,7%
2006/2	8,6%
2007	7,6%
2008	10,5%
2009	20,9%
2010/1	26,8%
2010/2	49,3%
2011	27,8%
2012	29,3%
2013	24,5%
2014/1	18,8%
2014/2	24,7%
2015	22,9%

Source: calculations by CRCB

**Table A2.7.: Number of laws modified within one year, 2006-2015**

Year	Number of laws modified within one year
2006/2	8
2007	8
2008	9
2009	15
2010/1	7
2010/2	17
2011	56
2012	49
2013	27
2014/1	
2014/2	13
2015*	17

Source: calculations by CRCB

\* The preliminary results for the last examined period (2015) are based on the amendments published until 31<sup>st</sup> December 2015.

### A3. One example of impact assessment sheet

HATÁSVIZSGÁLATI LAP			
Iktatószám:	45085-3/2014/JOGI	Dátum:	2014. szeptember. 10
A hatásvizsgálat elkészítésére fordított idő:	1 munkanap	Kapcsolódó hatásvizsgálati lapok:	-
Hatásvizsgálatba bevont személyek, szervezetek:	-	Vizsgált időtáv:	2015-2018.

Előterjesztés címe:	Előterjesztés az egyes egészségügyi és egészségbiztosítási tárgyú törvények módosításáról	Előterjesztő:	EMMI
Intézkedés megnevezése:	A létfontosságú rendszerek és létesítmények azonosításáról, kijelöléséről és védelméről szóló 2012. évi CLXVI. törvény módosítása		
Előterjesztés szükségessége:	A gyógyszer-nagykereskedelmi tevékenység hazánk egészségügyi biztonsága, illetve a lakosság ellátása szempontjából kiemelten fontos, ezért az ellátás biztonságának szempontjából fontos azonosítani valamennyi olyan szereplőt, amelyek tevékenységének kiesése komoly fennakadásokkal jár.		
Utolsó módosítás dátuma:	-	Következő módosítás várható dátuma:	-
Előzmények:	-		

Végrehajtás feltételei		
Az intézkedés alkalmazásához szükséges személyi, szervezeti, tárgyi és pénzügyi feltételek adottak?	igen	A végrehajtás feltételei adottak, a tevékenység besorolása nem jár többletfeladattal.

I. VERSENYPÉSSÉG	
1. Miként járul hozzá az intézkedés az ország versenyképességének javításához?	Nem változik érdemben

KÖZGAZGATÁSI TERHEK ÉS ELLENŐRZÉSI TERHELMEK			
2. Az intézkedés hozzájárul a foglalkoztatás növeléséhez?	nem	Hány fővel?	
3. Megtörtént-e az intézkedés adminisztratív terhekre gyakorolt hatásainak vizsgálata?	igen		

Piaci szereplők esetén			
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Növekednek	0 Ft mértékben
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Csökkennek	0 Ft mértékben
Közigazgatási szereplők esetén		Lakossági és egyéb nem piaci szereplők esetén	
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Növekednek	<input type="checkbox"/> Növekednek
	<input type="checkbox"/>	Csökkennek	<input type="checkbox"/> Csökkennek

## II. TÁRSADALMI FELZÁRKÓZÁS

1. Érintett csoportok				
	Csoport megnevezése	Csoport mérete (fő)	Előny - Hátrány	
			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1.	Gyógyszernagykereskedők	300	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2.	-	0	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.	-	0	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

2. Hatások összefoglalója	
Kérjük mutassa be az érintett csoport/ok társadalmi helyzetére gyakorolt hatásokat! (max. 8 mondat)	

## III. STABIL KÖLTSÉGVETÉS

Költségvetési hatások			
	A vizsgált időszakban	Az aktuális évben	További négy évben
Az intézkedés költségvetési egyenlegrontó hatása	0 Ft	0 Ft	0 Ft

Az intézkedés egyenlegrontó hatásának fedezete a költségvetésben	0 Ft	0 Ft	0 Ft
Az intézkedés költségvetési egyenlegjavító hatása	0 Ft	0 Ft	0 Ft
Az intézkedés egyenlegjavító hatásának figyelembevétele a költségvetésben	0 Ft	0 Ft	
<b>Teljes hatás</b>	0 Ft	0 Ft	0 Ft
<b>Teljes hatás az elfogadott költségvetéshez képest</b>	0 Ft	0 Ft	0 Ft

IV. FENNTARTHATÓ FEJLŐDÉS	
Vannak-e az intézkedésben foglaltaknak jelentősnek ítélt környezeti vagy természeti hatásai?	nem
Hatások összefoglalója	
.....	

V. EGYÉB HATÁSOK	
Vannak-e az intézkedésben foglaltaknak jelentősnek ítélt egészséghatásai?	igen
A gyógyszernagykereskedelmi tevékenység révén az egészségügyi biztonság szintje emelkedik.	
Vannak-e az intézkedésnek további hatásai?	nem
.....	

Jóváhagyta:	Dr. Beneda Attila	.....
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