


Why is it Necessary for Hungary to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office?

Some Empirical Evidence and Considerations*

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1. Stricter controls can raise both the objective and perceived probability of detection—and thereby deter corrupt behavior. The potential offenders feel more likely to be caught.
2. Hungary’s situation is unique: (i) Hungary is not an EPPO member; (ii) the risk of corruption associated with EU funds is high (Fig.1); (iii) the value and proportion of EU funds is also high (Fig. 2). Strengthening the control of EU subsidies spending is a pay-off, as the benefits for EU taxpayers would outweigh the associated costs.
3. OLAF audits and the European Commission’s anti-corruption measures have contributed to a decline of corruption risk in EU-funded procurement (Fig. 3). At the same time, however, political favoritism has intensified, with key actors within the Orbán regime securing an increasingly large proportion of EU subsidies (Fig. 4-6).



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