



CORRUPTION
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New Trends in Corruption Risk and Intensity of Competition in the Hungarian
Public Procurement from January 2005 to April 2020

Flash Report 2020:1

May, 2020

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The research is supported by Hungarian citizens, Hungarian companies, and foundations.

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Abstract

This report examines Hungarian public procurement data in the period between 2005 and 2020. Data from 248,404 contracts were used for the analysis, which focuses on information about corruption risk, intensity of competition and political favouritism.

The results show that in the first four months of 2020, corruption risk in Hungarian public procurement reached the highest level since 2005; by April 30, the share of contracts without competition was 41 percent. The control of corruption risk stabilized at a low level in 2018 and 2019. The intensity of competition in EU-funded projects has been higher than in tenders financed by Hungarian taxpayers since 2016, one year after the first discovery of anomalies in EU-funded public tenders and subsequent OLAF investigations. The share of public procurements won by crony companies within the total public procurement value has increased significantly since 2011. The risk of corruption in contracts won by these companies before parliamentary elections is significantly reduced. This appears clearly in the period between May 2017 and August 2018. At that time, there were few tenders won by crony companies without competition. This trend can also be seen in the period between September and December 2013. Subsequently, after Fidesz won the parliamentary elections, the crony companies began to win again with higher corruption risk. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the share of non-competitive contracts from among all contracts won by crony companies increased from an already-high percentage.

JEL classification: D22, D72, H57, L13

Keywords: public procurement, intensity of competition, corruption risk, political favouritism

Main findings

Fig. 2.3





Fig. 3.2



In the first four months of 2020, corruption risk in Hungarian public procurement reached the highest level since 2005: by April 30, the share of contracts without competition was 41 percent [Fig. 2.3]. In 2018 and 2019, the control of corruption risk stabilized at a low level after a temporary strengthening in 2016 and 2017. There is no change in this in 2020 [Fig. 3.2].

Fig. 5.3.





Fig. 6.4.



However, in EU-funded projects, the intensity of competition has been higher than in tenders financed by Hungarian taxpayers since 2016, one year after the

first discovery of anomalies in EU-funded public tenders and subsequent OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office) investigations¹ [Fig. 5.3].

The share of public procurements won by crony (MGTS+, acronym of Mészáros, Garancsi, Tiborcz, and Simicska, see footnote 4) companies within the total public procurement sphere has increased significantly since 2011 [Fig. 6.4].

Fig. 7.1





Fig. 7.5



The distribution of contract by size shows that the MGTS+ companies tend to prefer participating and winning large tenders. The public procurement contracts won by them are typical of higher value than those won by ordinary Hungarian companies [Fig. 7.1].

Corruption risk in public procurement contracts won by MGTS+ companies before the Hungarian parliamentary elections in April 2018 significantly decreased. This appears clearly in the period between May 2017 and August 2018 [Fig. 7.5]. At that time, few tenders were won by MGTS+ companies without competition. This trend can also be seen in the period between September and December 2013. Subsequently, after Fidesz won the parliamentary elections in April 2014, MGTS+ companies began to win again in the context of greater corruption risk: 51-67 percent of contracts from January 2019 to December 2019 were won by MGTS+ companies without competition.

During the recent COVID-19 pandemic, the share of non-competitive contracts from among all contracts won by MGTS+ companies rose from 51 percent to 68 percent, a significant increase, particularly given the extremely high rate at the start of the pandemic.

¹ See Kerner, Zs. 2018. Így csalt Orbán vejének cége – megszereztük az OLAF jelentését [This is how Orbán's son-in-law cheated - we have the OLAF report]. 24.hu, <https://bit.ly/3q6xpVT>

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Introduction

In this report, we present the first results of ongoing research by the Corruption Research Center Budapest (CRCB). This research project is supported by Hungarian citizens, Hungarian companies and foundations.

The researchers of CRCB were the first in Hungary to analyse the risk of corruption in public procurement, including the impact of political relations, using official sources and objective data. We began exploring this research topic using our methodology in the summer of 2010. [See the publications listed in Section “Previous reports and analysis”.] We think it is worth addressing this area even though, according to the administrative data available in Hungary, corruption in public procurement was an unknown phenomenon in Hungary: between 2009 and 2015 as there was no court judgment in such a case [1]. Nonetheless, we believe the absence of a legal decision in this field does not mean that public procurement corruption did not exist in Hungary.

The research strategy and objective indicators we recommend, namely, analysis based not on perception but a well-structured objective database where the pieces of data originate from an administrative data source, provide an excellent method for the analysis of corruption risk, problems of collusion, and, in a broad sense, the analysis of anomalies and restrictions of market competition [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17].

Our studies have pointed out that there are a lot of fundamental problems in the Hungarian public procurement database, data collected, managed and disclosed by the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority: inconsistent data, missing data, reparable and irreparable errors are characterized by Hungarian public

procurement data [2] [3] [4] [6] [7] [8] [9] [17]². Other analyses funded by the EU support these results³.

In addition, our research results in both 2013 [5] and 2018 [18] have demonstrated that in Hungary the restriction of market competition in public procurement due to political favouritism is not excluded: the analysis of public procurement data from 2009-2011 already indicated the prevailing political favouritism [5]. This result was confirmed by our subsequent study [18].

In a subsequent study, we recommended using objective indicators based on microdata to examine the institutional convergence of the new EU member states and four Southern European EU member countries [19].

This current flash report deals with data from January 2005 to April 2020. We provide figures from some of the more important results of our ongoing research, and we add some brief interpretative remarks to them.

This report includes data from the 5,649 most recent public procurement contracts, from January to April 2020. As a result, we are able to report on how corruption risk in the Hungarian public procurement changed during the first two months of the COVID-19 pandemic (March-April). We also provide results concerning how the strength of political favouritism has changed over the first months of 2020 and to what extent the Hungarian crony system [18] has used public tenders during the pandemic to allocate additional resources within their own network.

As we have done previously, in this paper, the companies owned by the entrepreneurs close to Fidesz, including those belonging to Viktor Orbán's family, or his close friends and acquaintances, are called *MGTS+ companies*⁴.

² Due to the results presented in one of our studies [9], the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority (HPPA) filed a same lawsuit against us three times in 2018 (see all documents of this lawsuit here: <http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2159>). In that study, we criticized the HPPA's data disclosure practices and found that while, for example, data on public contracts can be downloaded from the Zambian public procurement authority website in a structured format (see [here](#)), there is no way to do this from the Hungarian website. Finally, in March 2018, the Hungarian court convicted the CRCB of for violating the reputation of HPPA and ordered it to pay a 1,1 million forint (HUF) (approx. 3,980 USD) fine. We should add that CRCB's counterclaim refuted the HPPA's allegations in a detailed, professional analysis: <https://bit.ly/2XidDyk>. After that, we launched a crowdfunding campaign in Hungary on October 2, 2019, which we successfully closed on December 21. We collected a total of HUF 1,127,000 (approx. 3,980 USD) from a total of 120 supporters, including Hungarian citizens, Hungarian companies and foundations. We want to thank them again for their help. Their support has helped us to carry out the present research.

³ See Czibik, A., Tóth, B and Fazekas, M. 2015. Constructing Public Procurement Databases from Administrative Records. With examples from the Hungarian public procurement system of 2009-2012. Government Transparency Institute Reports GTI-R/2015:02. Budapest: GTI. <https://bit.ly/2Lac6Yk> and Skuhrovec, J, Ríha, J. and Palanský M. 2018. D2.7 Data validation results. Digiwhist Project. <https://bit.ly/2IZB5KZ>.

⁴ The name of MGTS is an acronym and reflects the first letters of the family names Lőrinc Mészáros, István Garancsi, István Tiborcz, and Lajos Simicska. To the group of companies owned

Findings and comments

The trend in the number of public procurement contracts from 2005 to 2020 shows that in all years of Hungarian general elections (2006, 2010, 2014, and 2018), more public procurement contracts were awarded than in previous and subsequent years [Fig. 1.1]. This result provides empirical evidence for the prevalence of political cycles⁵ in Hungarian public procurement. These political cycles are not reflected in changes to the aggregate value of public tenders, but in the number of contracts awarded. More contracts can satisfy and pay more actors, and so we assume that politicians in the government expect this policy increases their chances of winning general elections.

After a decline in corruption risk in 2016-17, there was an increase in 2018 and 2019. The share of contracts awarded without competition grew in these two years. This trend continued, and even intensified, in 2020 and remained at this high level during the COVID-19 pandemic [Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.2].

In the first four months of 2020, corruption risk in Hungarian public procurement reached the highest level since 2005. By April 30, the share of contracts without competition was 41 percent [Fig. 2.3]. While there was a relatively low level of corruption risk in EU-funded tenders, the corruption risk in public procurement financed by Hungarian taxpayers has been steadily increasing since 2016. This latter trend intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic [Fig. 2.4].

From 2017 to 2019, the share of the aggregated value of contracts without competition increased from 17 percent to 26 percent of total contract value [Fig. 2.5]. However, in the first four months of 2020, there was a slight decline to 23 percent. In 2018-2020, the control of corruption risk was minimal following a temporary increase in 2016 and 2017. [Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3.2].

The share of public procurement documents on which at least one important piece of information (name of the winner, name of the issuer, the number of bidders, net contract value, estimated value) is missing also increased substantially from 2018 to 2019 [Fig. 4.1]. From 2015 to 2020, the occurrence of missing data is slightly more frequent in tenders with higher corruption risk than those with lower corruption risk [Fig. 4.2].

by them, we have added companies owned by other entrepreneurs close to Fidesz leaders or close to friends of Viktor Orbán. The list of MGTS+ companies is presented in Annex 2.

⁵ On political cycles in connection to public procurement see: Alesina, A., Roubini, N. and Cohen, G. D. 1997. *Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. <https://bit.ly/2XaO1mH>

The increase in the share of contracts with missing data can clearly be attributed to the fact that since 2018, contract award notices (in Hungarian: "*Tájékoztató az eljárás eredményéről*") have increasingly not included data on the estimated value of the contract [Fig. 4.4]. This lack of data makes it impossible to calculate important indicators of corruption. Accordingly, based on the reported data, after 2018, it is no longer possible to estimate the value of the rent from corrupt activities and the direct social losses due to corruption⁶.

According to the index of competition intensity (OIIC) calculated on the basis of the number of bidders, the strength of intensity of competition in public procurement has been declining since 2016. This trend continued in the first four months of 2020 [Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2].

The strength of intensity of competition in EU-funded projects has been higher than in tenders financed by Hungarian taxpayers since 2016, one year after the first discovery of anomalies in EU-funded public tenders and subsequent OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office) investigations⁷ [Fig. 5.3].

From January to April 2020, MGTS+ companies won⁸ 87 contracts [Fig. 6.1]. The value of public procurement contracts, including framework agreements won by these companies in 2020, can be estimated at HUF 255 billion [USD 847 million] [Fig. 6.2].

The share of public procurements won by MGTS+ companies within the total public procurement value has increased significantly since 2011, even if we exclude framework agreements [Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.4]. Between 2005 and 2010, when Fidesz was not in power in Hungary, MGTS+ companies gained only 0.4-1.8 percent of the public procurement value, but in 2013, after Fidesz formed government in 2010, they gained 17 percent and in 2019, 21 percent of the total value of public tenders without framework agreements. In the first four months of 2020, the share of net contract value in tenders won by MGTS+ companies continued to grow and approached 27 percent [Fig. 6.3].

Nonetheless, this trend did not prevail every year. The share of MGTS+ companies' public procurement contracts decreased significantly in the years of the general elections, 2014 and 2018. In addition, a significant decrease can be observed in 2015, the year of G-Day⁹. At that time, the share of MGTS+ companies fell to 4.8 percent of the public procurement value calculated with framework agreements and to 5.6 percent of the value without framework agreements. The two individual years - 2014 and 2015 - can presumably be

⁶ For an estimate of the direct social losses due to corruption see [16].

⁷ See Kerner, Zs. 2018. Így csalt Orbán vejének cége – megszereztük az OLAF jelentését [This is how Orbán's son-in-law cheated - we have the OLAF report]. 24.hu, <https://bit.ly/3q6xpVT>

⁸ The MGTS+ companies won contracts alone or with consortium partners.

⁹ G-Day refers to the day (February 6, 2015) when Lajos Simicska's fall out with Viktor Orbán was made public. See <https://bit.ly/3emeXHT>, <https://bit.ly/2Mbig0R> and <https://bit.ly/2Zi5Enw>.

explained by the general elections and the consequences of G-Day, with the exclusion of Lajos Simicska (Viktor Orbán's old friend) from the list of political cronies. Election years may be crucial because at these times politicians in government are more cautious and more reluctant to engage in political favouritism, in order to increase their chances of re-election.

The distribution of contract by size shows that the MGTS+ companies tend to participate primarily in large tenders. The public procurement contracts won by them are typically of higher value than those won by ordinary Hungarian companies [Fig. 7.1 and Fig. 7.2]. This phenomenon is also evident in the first four months of 2020 [Fig. 7.3].

The MGTS+ companies, as winners, are associated with high corruption risk. Between 2011 and 2020, except for 2017 and 2018, 30-70 percent of the tenders won by MGTS+ companies had no competition, while for the ordinary Hungarian companies, this rate ranges from 20 to 35 percent [Fig. 7.4]. This latter result might be a sign of political favouritism, which can only be confirmed by further analyses.

In 2020, during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, the risk of corruption in contracts won by MGTS+ companies increased further: at that time, MGTS+ companies won 68 percent of their contracts without competition.

Looking at the trend in corruption risk in four-month increments [Fig. 7.5], we can make two interesting observations. First, the risk of corruption in contracts won by MGTS+ companies before the parliamentary elections is significantly reduced. This appears clearly in the period between May 2017 and August 2018. At that time, there were few tenders won by MGTS+ companies without competition. (This can also be seen in the period between September and December 2013.) Subsequently, after Fidesz won the parliamentary elections, from September 2018 to December 2019, MGTS+ began to win again in the context of higher corruption risk: 51-67 percent of contracts won by MGTS+ companies were without competition.

Second, in the first four months of 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the share of non-competitive contracts from among all contracts won by MGTS+ companies rose from the high level of 51 percent to 68 percent, a significant increase, particularly given the extremely high rate at the start of the pandemic.

We can see a similar trend toward corruption if we look at the proportion of contracts awarded with at least four competitive bids. This ratio can be interpreted as the ability of authorities (issuers) to control corruption risk during the procurement process. If the proportion of tenders with at least four bidders is high, it is stronger; if it is low, it is less so.

Data from 2011 to 2020 show that MGTS+ companies typically win public procurements in which the control of corruption risk was weaker than with the contracts won by other Hungarian companies [Fig. 7.6]. Thus, there is likely a negative correlation between the chance of MGTS+ firms winning and the control of corruption risk. The MGTS+ firms have a high chance of winning in tenders in

which the level of control of corruption risk is weak. This can also be observed from the examination of data by four-month increments. This data show that while the control of corruption risk in the contracts won by ordinary Hungarian companies between January and April 2020 strengthened somewhat, in the case of MGTS+ companies, we can see an inverse trend: it slightly decreased [Fig. 7.7]. The COVID-19 pandemic may have helped the MGTS+ companies to win tenders with weaker control of corruption risk.

Figures

1. Number of Contracts and the Net Contract Value

Fig. 1.1: Number of contracts in the Hungarian public procurement system, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N =248,404




Fig. 1.2: Net contract value of Hungarian public procurement by year, from January 2005 to December 2019, with framework agreement, N = 239,865, Billion HUF




Fig. 1.3: Net contract value of Hungarian public procurement by year from January 2005 to April 2020, without framework agreement, N = 248,404





Fig. 1.4: Net contract value of Hungarian public procurement by four-month increments, from January 2005 to April 2020, without framework agreement, N =220,030



2. Corruption Risk

Fig. 2.1: Trend in corruption risk: share of contracts without competition in the Hungarian public procurement from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 245,541, %




Fig. 2.2: Trend in corruption risk: share of contracts without competition in the Hungarian public procurement by months, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 245,541, %




Fig. 2.3: Trend in corruption risk: share of contracts without competition in the Hungarian public procurement by four-month increments, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 245,541, %




Fig. 2.4: Trend in corruption risk: share of contracts without competition in the EU-funded and non-EU-funded contracts, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 241,098, %





Fig. 2.5: Trend in corruption risk: Share of net contract value of tenders without competition in total net contract value, from January 2005 to April 2020, without framework agreement, N = 220,030, %



3. Control of Corruption Risk

Fig. 3.1: Trend in control of corruption risk: share of contracts with more than three bidders in the Hungarian public procurement, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 245,541, %




Fig. 3.2: Trend in control of corruption risk: share of contracts with more than three bidders in the Hungarian public procurement by months, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 245,541, %




Fig. 3.3: Trend in control of corruption risk: share of contracts with more than three bidders in EU-funded and non-EU-funded contracts by years, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 241,098, %





Fig. 3.4: Trend in control of corruption risk: share of net contract value of tenders with more than three bidders in total net contract value, form January 2005 to April 2020, without framework agreement, N = 220,030, %



4. Missing Data

Fig. 4.1: Lack of transparency: share of contract with missing values in the Hungarian public procurement, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 248,404, %




Fig. 4.2: Lack of transparency: share of contract with missing values in contracts with high and low corruption risk in the Hungarian public procurement, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 248,888, %




Fig. 4.3: Lack of transparency: share of contract with missing values in EU-funded and non-EU-funded contracts in the Hungarian public procurement, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 243,722





Fig. 4.4: Lack of transparency: share of contract where the estimated value is missing and one of other main indicators is missing in the Hungarian public procurement, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 243,722



5. Intensity of Competition

Fig. 5.1: Intensity of competition in the Hungarian public procurement, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, ($0 \leq \text{OIIC} \leq 1$), $N = 245,541$




Fig. 5.2: Intensity of competition in the Hungarian public procurement by months, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, ($0 \leq OIIC \leq 1$), $N = 245,541$





Fig. 5.3: Intensity of competition in EU-funded and non-EU-funded contracts in the Hungarian public procurement, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, ($0 \leq \text{OIIC} \leq 1$), $N = 241,098$



6. The Role of Crony (MGTS+) Companies

Fig. 6.1: Number of contracts won by MGTS+ companies in the Hungarian public procurement, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 227,332




Fig. 6.2: Total net contract value in tenders won by MGTS+ companies in the Hungarian public procurement, from January 2005 to April 2020, in Billion HUF, N = 239,865




Fig. 6.3: Share of net contract value in tenders won by MGTS+ companies in total net value of tenders in the Hungarian public procurement, from January 2005 to April 2020, without framework agreement, N = 220,030, %





Fig. 6.4. Share of net contract value in tenders won by crony MGTS+ companies in total net value of tenders in the Hungarian public procurement, from January 2005 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 239,865, %



7. The MGTS+ Companies: Some Features

Fig. 7.1. Distribution of contracts by logarithm of net contract value (Inncv) in contracts won by MGTS+ companies and won by ordinary Hungarian companies, from January 2011 to April 2020, with framework agreement, N = 177,646




Fig. 7.2. Distribution of contracts by logarithm of net contract value (Inncv) in contracts won by MGTS+ companies and won by ordinary Hungarian companies, from January 2011 to April 2020, without framework agreement, N = 163,396




Fig. 7.3. The role of MGTS+ companies during the COVID-19 crisis: distribution of contracts by logarithm of net contract value (lnncv) in contracts won by MGTS+ companies and won by ordinary Hungarian companies, from January 2020 to April 2020, without framework agreement, N = 5,196




Fig. 7.4. The MGTS+ companies and corruption risk: share of contracts without competition in the Hungarian public procurement, from January 2011 to April 2020, in the tenders won by MGTS+ companies compared to those won by ordinary Hungarian companies, by year from January 2011 to April 2020, without framework agreement, N = 163,396




Fig. 7.5. The MGTS+ companies and corruption risk: share of contracts without competition in the Hungarian public procurement, in the tenders won by MGTS+ companies compared to those won by ordinary Hungarian companies by four-month increments, from January 2011 to April 2020, without framework agreement, N = 163,396




Fig. 7.6. The MGTS+ companies and control of corruption risk: share of contracts with more than three competitors in the Hungarian public procurement, in the tenders won by MGTS+ companies compared to those won by ordinary Hungarian companies, from January 2005 to April 2020, without framework agreement, N = 163,396





Fig. 7.7. The MGTS+ companies and control of corruption risk: share of contracts with more than three competitors in the Hungarian public procurement, in the tenders won by MGTS+ companies compared to those won by ordinary Hungarian companies by four-month increments, from January 2005 to April 2020, without framework agreement, N = 163,396



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Annex

A1. List and Definition of Indicator Used

Net contract value (NCV)

NCV = contract value in HUF without VAT

Contract without competition (Single Bidder)

Single Bidder (SB) [0,1]

SB = 1, if there was only one bidder for the contract
0, if there was more than one bidder for the contract

Type of funding

EU [0,1]

EU = 1, if the tender was funded by EU funds
0, if the tender was funded by Hungarian taxpayers

Control of Corruption Risk

MTTB [0,1]

MTTB = 1, more than three bidders competed for the contract
0, no more than three bidders competed for the contract

Missing Data

MISS_D [0,1]

MISS_D = 1, there was missing data in the field of
"winner name" or in
"issuer name" or in
"net contract value" or in
"estimated value" or in
"number of bidders".
0, there was no missing data in any of the above fields.

Intensity of Competition (OIIC)

OIIC = 0, if there was only one bidder
1/4, if there were 2 or 3 bidders
1/2, if there were from 4 to 6 bidders
3/4, if there were from 7 to 16 bidders
1, if there were at least 17 bidders

Crony (MGTS+) Companies

MGTS_PLUS [0,1]

MGTS_PLUS =

1, if one of the winners is one of the MGTS+ companies

0, if the winner (or all the winners in case of consortium) is/are other ordinary company/ companies

A2. List of MGTS+ Companies

4iG Nyrt.
Aranykorona Zrt.
Duna Aszfalt Út és Mélyépítő Kft.
Elios Innovatív Energetikai Zrt.
E-OS Energiakereskedő Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Zrt.
ES Holding Zrt.
Euro Publicity Kft.
Fejér-B.Á.L. Építő és Szolgáltató Zrt.
Heti Válasz Lap- és Könyvkiadó Szolgáltató Kft.
Homlok Zrt.
Közgép Építő-, és Fémszerkezetgyártó Zrt.
Közüphídkorr Kft.
Lounge Design Szolgáltató Kft.
MAHIR Cityposter Kft.
MAHIR Kiállítás és Rendezvény Szervező és Kivitelező Kft.
Magyar Vakond Út és Építőipari Kft.
Market Építő Zrt.
Market Épületszerviz Kft.
Mészáros és Mészáros Ipari, Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft.
MET Magyarország Energiakereskedő Zrt.
Mobil Adat Kft.
Nemzet Lap-es Könyvkiadó Kft.
Network 360 Reklámügynökség Kft.
New Land Média Reklám, Szolgáltató és Kereskedelmi Kft.
PBE Energiamenedzsment Kft.
PBE Építő Kft.
Publimont Hirdetésszervező Kft.
R-Kord Építőipari Kft.
Trinity Communications Kft.
Vakond Via Építő és Szolgáltató kft.
Vasútvillamosító Kft.
V-Híd Építő Zrt.
Vivienviz Kft.
West Hungaria Bau Kft.
Young and Partners Kommunikációs Kft.

A3. List of Tenders Analysed

<http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2464>

The list of tenders provides contract level data. In the dataset there are two cases:

1. one tender one contract
2. one tender more than one contract.

A4. Selected News Articles on the New Hungarian Economic Elite

BBJ. 2019a. Competition Office clears Közgép-Duna Aszfalt merger. Budapest Business Journal, September 19, 2019. <https://bit.ly/2TDsLVI>

BBJ. 2019b. Mészáros firm among winners of massive rail contract. Budapest Business Journal, April 29, 2019. <https://bit.ly/2yCcIR0>

BBJ. 2012. Young and Partners win HUF 400 mln contract to organize events for PM's Office. Budapest Business Journal, April 2, 2012. <https://bit.ly/36v6rmr>

Buckley, Neil and Byrne, Andrew. 2017. Viktor Orban's oligarchs: a new elite emerges in Hungary. Financial Times, December 21, 2017. <https://on.ft.com/2ZxjoLg>

Bruckner, Gergely and Kovács, Zoltán. 2019. Circles close to Fidesz to acquire Deutsche Telekom subsidiary T-Systems. index.hu, July 12, 2019. <https://bit.ly/36tdmwu>

Csurgó, Dénes – Záborszky, Ede – Hollik, Ágnes. 2019. Government lets go of EU funds for suspicious projects tied to PM's son-in-law. index.hu, February 13, 2019. <https://bit.ly/3en7Qyu>

Dunai, Márton. 2018. How Viktor Orban will tap Europe's taxpayers and bankroll his friends and family. reuters.com, March 15, 2018. <https://reut.rs/2yD0Zle>

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Jávör, Bence. 2018. Mysterious €11 Million Cost Overrun on Huge Indoor Sports Complex in Orbán's Hometown. index.hu, November 14, 2018. <https://bit.ly/2WZCojL>

Kingsley, Patrick and Novak, Benjamin. 2018. The Website That Shows How a Free Press Can Die. The New York Times, November 24, 2018. <https://nyti.ms/2Mbuo9n>

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Kovács, Zoltán. 2019a. Defunct Hungarian political daily Magyar Nemzet rebooted as propaganda. index.hu, February 2, 2019. <https://bit.ly/3gksr89>

Kovács, Zoltán. 2019b. Fidesz's media empire just became even more centralised. index.hu, March 8, 2019. <https://bit.ly/2A5ki78>

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- Lyman, Rick. 2014. Oligarchs of Eastern Europe Scoop Up Stakes in Media Companies. The New York Times, November 26, 2014. <https://nyti.ms/36zhfjx>
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<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/foldeket-vett-utat-epitett-nagyon-nyomul-pakson-az-orban-rokonok-uzlettarsa/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/egyre-szorosabb-a-kapocs-orban-testvere-es-az-allami-palyazatokon-tarolo-vallalkozo-kozott/>

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<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/igy-lett-nyeresegeesebb-az-orban-banya-mint-barmelyik-komoly-versenytarsa/>

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<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/a-szerb-kozvilagitast-is-letaroljak-az-elios-cegek-a-szabalytalan-magyar-modszerrel/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/igy-folyik-tovabb-a-kozpenz-meszaros-lorinctol-az-orban-csaladhoz/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/felszabaditotta-az-orban-csalad-cegeit-a-simicskaval-vivott-haboru/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/hogyan-tartuk-fel-simicska-bukasanak-titkait/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/hogyan-talaltunk-ra-a-letelepedesi-uzlet-zuros-szereploire/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/feltarul-simicska-bukasanak-titkos-tortenete/>

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<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/meszaros-lorinc-kore-elkezdte-atvenni-az-egykori-simicska-birodalmat/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/kiszivargott-dokumentumok-is-bizonyitjak-hogy-habony-kore-benne-volt-a-kotvenyuzletben/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/orosz-befolyas-ala-kerult-egy-magyar-ceg-es-most-ujabb-munkat-kaphat-paks2-korul/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/meszaros-lorinc-uzlettarsa-bejelentkezett-paks2-ket-nagyverteku-megbizasara/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/nagy-a-forgalom-az-orban-banyanal-es-gyakran-feltunnek-meszaros-lorinc-uzlettarsanak-kamionjai-is/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/tiborc-ingatlanos-cege-bekoltozott-garancsiekelokelo-budai-villajaba/>

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<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/habony-hongkong-asia-frontier-limited/>

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<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/orban-viktor-testvere-benne-van-egy-offshore-hatteru-cegben-amely-kazahsztanban-es-csecsenfoldon-is-feltunt/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/mozgasok-az-orban-vallalkozasoknal-ifjabb-orban-gyozo-kiszallt-az-uj-cegebol-az-apja-pedig-feltunt-ket-masikban/>

<https://www.direkt36.hu/en/felszabadította-az-orban-csalad-cegeit-a-simicskával-vivott-haboru/>

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