The New Trends of Corruption Risk in Hungarian Public Procurement from January 1998 to September 2025

CRCB Statistical Flash Report 2026:1

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Contents

1. Introduction

1.1. In the following report, we examine recent trends in corruption risk in Hungarian public procurement[1], drawing on data covering the period from January 1998 to September 2025.

1.2. The CRCB downloaded documents titled "Information on the outcome of the procedure" *(in Hungarian: "Tájékoztató az eljárás eredményéről")* from the website of the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority (HPPA) in TXT, DOC, or HTML formats—using automated data extraction tools (scraping, crawling) from January 1998 until July 2023. Following the HPPA's decision to block machine-based data downloads in the second half of 2023, beginning in August 2023 we have manually downloaded all public procurement documents published in HTML format. Our analysis includes all contract award notices of the type "Information on the outcome of the procedure" ("*Tájékoztatás az eljárás eredményéről*").

2. Trends

2.1. In 2024, the number of contracts did not change significantly compared to previous years. The number of EU-funded contracts decreased, while the number of nationally funded contracts increased (Fig. 1).

2.2. The net nominal value of contracts increased compared to 2023. The increase was largely due to an increase in nationally funded contracts (Fig. 2).

2.3. The corruption risk (CR, the rate of contracts awarded without competition, with a single bid) [2] increased in the first nine months of 2025 after declining in 2024. The increase can be observed in both EU-funded and nationally funded contracts. The downward trend in the corruption risk of EU-funded contracts reversed and, after 2023, rose again above the critical value (0.1) set by the European Commission (Fig. 3).

2.4. In addition to the high risk of corruption, the net nominal value of contracts awarded without competition also increased significantly in 2024, particularly in EU-funded public procurement (Fig. 4).

2.5. Between 2022 and 2024, the corruption risk associated with ministry procurements fell significantly below the EU's critical threshold. Meanwhile, a slight increase was observed in military procurements. In January-September 2025, the corruption risk rose sharply in both groups, reaching 0.395 for ministries and 0.616

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[1] We analyze public procurement contracts. During the report each contract or identifiable part of a contract (or contract lot) is counted as a contract. Accordingly, the analyzed data is at the contract level and within that at the lot level. The Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) of the European Commission applies the same logic. See: https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/ted-csv?locale=en.

[2] The minimum value of the corruption risk is 0, and the maximum value is 1 (0 ≤ CR ≤1), For the definition of variable used see Annex 1.

for military procurement. This means that defense procurement had the fourth-highest corruption risk in 2025, after 2015, 2016, and 2018 (Fig. 5a).

2.6. Since 2015, the corruption risk associated with Hungarian State Railways' procurements has exceeded the average value for all public procurements in Hungary by 0.15-0.29 points. There was no change in this in either 2024 or 2025 (Fig. 5b). Among Hungarian state organizations, the highest corruption risk can be observed in the public procurement of the National Communications Authority. With a few exceptions, almost all procurement takes place without competition. The NCA also peaked in this area in 2025, with a corruption risk of 0.992: of the 254 contracts awarded that year, there were only two or three bids in one case, and in 253 cases there was no competition. This result may be the highest level of corruption risk in the history of the European Union.

2.7. Both at Hungarian hospitals and universities, the corruption risk declined in 2024 and 2025. The trend observed since 2021 continued in both groups (Fig. 5c).

3. Kleptocracy

3.1. In 2024 and 2025, the number of public procurement contracts won by companies affiliated with the top 13 actors of Orbán's kleptocracy (see Annex 3 and Annex 4) continued to decline (Fig. 6). This trend started in 2021. The nominal net value of contracts won by this group of companies increased slightly in 2024 (Fig. 7).

3.2. The share of contracts won by companies affiliated with the top 13 actors decreased in 2024, relative to the total number of contracts. The same trend was observed in the total net value of contracts (Fig. 8 and Fig. 9). The only increase was in EU-funded contracts, where the share of companies affiliated with the top 13 actors rose from 9.6 percent to 11.6 percent from 2023 to 2024.

3.3. While the relative weight of companies affiliated with the top 13 actors declined in terms of both the number of contracts awarded and total net contract value, the corruption risk associated with contracts linked to these firms increased substantially. Specifically, corruption risk rose from an already elevated level of 0.45 in 2023 to 0.67 in 2024, and increased further to 0.72 in January–September 2025. By contrast, the corruption risk of public procurement contracts awarded to other Hungarian companies remained largely stable over the same period (0.298 in 2023, 0.027 in 2024, and 0.291 in January–September 2025; see Fig. 10).

The increase in corruption risk of contracts won by companies affiliated with the top 13 actors was particularly pronounced in EU-funded contracts, where the indicator rose sharply from 0.025 in 2023 to 0.542 in 2024 and 0.568 in January–September 2025. In contrast, for nationally funded contracts, corruption risk remained persistently high, fluctuating around the record level observed in 2023 (0.736 in 2023, 0.689 in 2024, and 0.753 in January–September 2025; see Figs. 11 and 12). Consistent with these trends, the total value of high–corruption-risk contracts awarded to the top 13 actors also increased in 2024 (Fig. 13).

3.4. Both the Bidding Success Ratio (won bids / total bids submitted) and the Odds of Winning (won bids / [total bids submitted – won bids + 1]) declined in 2024 relative to 2023. Nevertheless, by 2025, both indicators are expected to increase for contracts financed by EU funds as well as for those funded from national sources (see Figs. 14 and 15). The intensity of political favoritism is illustrated by the fact that, in 2025, the Odds of Winning for companies affiliated with the top 13 actors reached 2.4—four times the median value (0.6) observed among other Hungarian companies. Even larger disparities emerge in the case of EU-funded contracts: in 2025, the Odds of Winning for companies linked to the top 13 actors rose to 4.125, which is more than eight times higher than the corresponding value for other Hungarian firms.

These patterns indicate that increasing political favoritism, coupled with rising corruption risk, substantially enhances the likelihood that companies affiliated with the top 13 actors will secure public procurement contracts in 2025. Although these companies captured a smaller share of Hungary's overall public procurement volume that year, they did so amid intensifying political favoritism.

3.5. The high odds of winning are associated with outstanding corruption risk (Fig. 16a). This is particularly true for nationally funded procurement, i.e., procurement financed by Hungarian taxpayers (Fig. 16c). In Figures 16a-c, the years 2011-2025, i.e., the years of the kleptocratic system, are shown in orange, while the preceding period (2005-2010) is shown in blue. It is clear that while the companies associated with the Top 13 actors tended to be positioned higher and to the right in the kleptocratic system, in the preceding period they were positioned lower and to the left: the political connections at their disposal typically helped them to win public procurement contracts between 2011 and 2025, with a high odds of winning and a high risk of corruption.

3.6. While the companies affiliated with the Top 13 actors won the same amount of large and small value contracts as other Hungarian companies from 2005 to 2010, in the subsequent period, from 2011 to 2025, they won contracts of greater value to a greater extent than other Hungarian companies (Fig. 17a-b).

3.7. This growing difference is even more pronounced in the value of EU-funded contracts and contracts won with a high risk of corruption: while there was little difference between the companies affiliated with the Top 13 actors and other Hungarian companies in the period 2005-2010, from 2011 to 2025 the former won much higher value public procurement contracts with a high risk of corruption (Fig. 18a-b and Fig. 19a-b).

4.   Conclusions

4.1. As elections approach, corruption risks in Hungarian public procurement increase. The corruption risk increased in the first nine months of 2025 after declining in 2024. The increase can be observed in both EU-funded and nationally funded contracts.

4.2. The results presented in Sections 3. provide clear evidence of the role of political favoritism in Hungary. Specifically, the post-2011 success of companies affiliated with the Top 13 actors in the public procurement market is driven less by market competition and more by political advantages. From 2023 onward, political favoritism appears to have intensified: in 2024–2025, corruption risks increased, and in 2025, the odds of winning rose markedly for companies linked to the leading actors of the kleptocratic system.

5. Figures

Fig. 1. Number of Contracts by Funding Type, 1998-September 2025.

Notes: all contracts: contracts or contract lots; with framework agreements; N=373,262.
Source: CRCB'a own calculations

Fig. 2. Net Contract Value (*NCV*) by Funding Type, 2005-September 2025.

Notes: net contract value (NCV), HUF billion; with framework agreements; only cases where NCV < 50 HUF billion;
N=332,280.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 3. Corruption Risk (*CR*) by Funding Type, 1998-September 2025.

Notes: with framework agreements; EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; N=373,262.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 4. Net Contract Value with High Corruption Risk (*NCV_CR1*) by Funding Type, 2005-September 2025.

Notes: Net contract value with high corruption risk (NCV_CR1); HUF billion; with framework agreements; only cases where the NCV_CR1<50 HUF billion; N=332,280.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 5a. Corruption Risk (*CR*) at the State Organizations: Ministries and Hungarian Armed Forces (HAF), 1998-September 2025.

Notes: Hungarian Armed Forces ('Magyar Honvédség'); with framework agreements;
EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; 0≤CR≤1; N=373,262.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 5b. Corruption Risk (*CR*) at the State Organizations: Hungarian State Railways (HSR) and National Communication Authority (NCA), 1998-September 2025.

Notes: Hungarian State Railways: 'Magyar Államvasutak';
National Communications Authority: 'Nemzeti Kommunikációs Hivatal'; with framework agreements;
EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; 0≤CR≤1; N=373,262.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 5c. Corruption Risk (*CR*) at the State Organizations: Hospitals and Universities, 1998-September 2025.

Notes: with framework agreements; EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; 0≤CR≤1; N=373,262.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 6. Number of Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy by Funding Type, 1998-September 2025.


Notes: number of contracts or contract lots; with framework agreements; N=373,262.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 7. Net Contract Value in Public Procurement Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy by Funding Type, 2005-September 2025.

Notes: with framework agreements; only cases where the net contract value < 50 HUF billion; N=332,280.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 8. Share of Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy in All Contracts by Funding Type, 1998-September 2025.

Notes: with framework agreements; TOP13: Top 13 actors of Orban's kleptocracy. N=373,262.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 9. Share of Net Contract Value Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy in Total Net Contract Value by Funding Type, 2005-September 2025.

Notes: with framework agreements; TOP13: top 13 actors of Orban's kleptocracy; only cases where the net contract value < 50 HUF billion; N=332,280.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 10. Corruption Risk (*CR*): Contracts Awarded to Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy (TOP13) Versus Other Hungarian Companies (OHC) Without Political Ties or With Weak Political Ties, 1998–September 2025.

Notes: with framework agreements; EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; TOP13: companies affiliated with the top 13 actors of Orbán's kleptocracy
OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; N=373,262.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 11. Corruption Risk (*CR*) in EU-Funded Contracts: Contracts Awarded to Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy (TOP13) Versus Other Hungarian Companies (OHC) Without Political Ties or With Weak Political Ties, 2005-September 2025.

Notes: with framework agreements; EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; TOP13: top 13 actors of Orbán's kleptocracy
OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; 0≤CR≤1; N=333,292.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 12. Corruption Risk (*CR*) in Nationally Funded Contracts: Contracts Awarded to Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy (TOP13) Versus Other Hungarian Companies (OHC) Without Political Ties or With Weak Political Ties, 2005-September 2025.

Notes: with framework agreements; EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; TOP13: top 13 actors of Orbán's kleptocracy
OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; 0≤CR≤1; N=333,292.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 13. Net Contract Value with High Corruption Risk in Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy by Funding Type, 2004-September 2025.

Notes: number of contracts or contract lots; with framework agreements;
only cases where the net contract value < 50 HUF billion and contracts with single bidder; N=332,280.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 14. Bidding Succes Ratio (*BSR*) of Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy by Funding Type and Year, 2005-September 2025.

Notes: number of contracts or contract lots; with framework agreements;
BSR: bidding succes ratio: number of contracts or contract lots awarded / number of bids submitted; 0≤BSR≤1; N=333,292.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 15. Annual Odds of Winning (*OW*) of Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy by Funding Type, 2005-September 2025.

Notes: number of contracts or contract lots; with framework agreements;
OW (odds of winning: number of contracts or contract lots awarded (W) by the group of companies affiliated with the top 13 actors / (number of bids lost by the same group of companies +1); 0≤OW≤W; N=333,292.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 16a. Annual Odds of Winning (*OW*) and Corruption Risk (*CR*) in Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy, January 2005-September 2025.

Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded (W) by the group of companies affiliated with the top 13 actors / (number of bids lost by the same group of companies +1);
the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (1.28877 and 0.40135 respetively);
0≤CR≤1; 0≤OW≤W; N=333,292.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 16b. Annual Odds of Winning (*OW*) and Corruption Risk (*CR*) in EU-funded Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy, 2005-September 2025.

Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded (W) by the group of companies affiliated with the top 13 actors / (number of bids lost by the same group of companies +1);
the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (1.04255 and 0.31429 respetively);
0≤CR≤1; 0≤OW≤W; N=333,292.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 16c. Annual Odds of Winning (*OW*) and Corruption Risk (*CR*) in Nationally Funded Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy, 2005-September 2025.

Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded (W) by the group of companies affiliated with the top 13 actors / (number of bids lost by the same group of companies +1);
the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (1.67939 and 0.52266 respetively);
0≤CR≤1; 0≤OW≤W; N=333,292.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 17a. Histogram of ln of Total Net Contract Value in Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies (OHC), 2005-2010

Note: with framework agreements; only cases where the net contract value < 50 HUF billion.
OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; N=62,448.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 17b. Histogram of ln of Total Net Contract Value in Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies (OHC), 2011-2025

Note: with framework agreements; only cases where the net contract value < 50 HUF billion.
OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; N=269,832.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 18a. Histogram of ln of Total Net Contract Value in EU-funded Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies (OHC), 2005-2010.

Note: with framework agreements; only cases where the net contract value < 50 HUF billion.
OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; N=24,405.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 18b. Histogram of ln of Total Net Contract Value in EU-funded Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies (OHC), 2011-2025.

Note: with framework agreements; only cases where the net contract value < 50 HUF billion and contracts with single bidder;
OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; N=85,151.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 19a. Histogram of ln of Total Net Contract Value in Contracts with High Corruption Risk and Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies (OHC), 2005-2010.

Note: with framework agreements, only cases where the net contract value < 50 HUF billion;
OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; N=19,269.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 19b. Histogram of ln of Total Net Contract Value in Contracts with High Corruption Risk and Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top 13 Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies (OHC), 2011-2025.

Note: with framework agreements; only cases where the net contract value < 50 HUF billion;
OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; N=79,968.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Annex

A1. Definition of Variables Used

[1] w: number of contracts awarded (winning bids);

[2] NCV_i: Net value of the i-th contract awarded (winning bid) in HUF;
where $0 < NCV_i \leq HUF\ 50\ billion$, otherwise missing value;

[3] cr_i [0,1]: the corruption risk indicator for the i-th contract awarded (winning bid); its value is

   1, if there was no competition for the i-th contract (winning bid), one bid was received during the procedure, and
   0, if several bids competed;

[4] b_i: the number of valid bids submitted during the procedure for the i-th contract awarded (winning bid);

[5] $CR = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{w} cr_i}{w}$,   where $0 \leq CR \leq 1$;

[6] $OW = \frac{w}{\sum_{i=1}^{w} b_i - w + 1}$ where $0 \leq OW \leq w$;

[7] $BSR = \frac{w}{\sum_{i=1}^{w} b_i}$ where $0 \leq BSR \leq 1$;

[8] $NCV\_CR1 = \sum_{i=1}^{w} NCV_i * cr_i$ where $0 \leq NCV\_CR1 \leq \sum_{i=1}^{w} NCV_i$;

[9] $lnNCV_i$: logarithm of net value (NCV) of the i-th contract awarded (winning bid) in HUF.

All variables listed [1-9] can be interpreted in any group g of contracts (winning bids) and time period t (month, quarter, half-year, year, etc.)

A2. Data Disclosure: A Long Way from the ChileCompra

A1.1 Since the second half of 2023, the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority (HPPA) has rendered the automatic downloading of Hungarian public procurement data impossible. This decision effectively ends a 25-year practice: from January 1998 until mid-2023, public procurement documents could be downloaded automatically in DOC or HTML formats using scripted procedures (scraping or crawling). The authority justified the change by claiming that the restriction *"helps protect our website from malicious activity."*[3] (See Fig. A2.1).

Fig. A2.1. Disclosure of Public Procurement Data: Hungary

Source: https://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/ertesito/2025/239/targy/portal_666/

A2.2. This decision represents a setback to the transparency of Hungarian public procurement data. It increases both the difficulty and the cost of constructing a structured public procurement database and of analyzing the information contained in documents published by the HPPA. In effect, this measure introduces additional barriers to rigorous analysis of public procurement processes. Not only does it fail to provide access to tender data in a structured and analyzable format—an approach adopted by leading public procurement authorities in Chile, Canada, and New Zealand (see Figures A2.2a–c)—but it also prevents the automatic software-based downloading of data published in unstructured (HTML) form[4].

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[3] See: https://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/ertesito/2025/239/targy/portal_666/

[4] When we last published a comparative analysis of the data disclosure practices of public procurement authorities worldwide (https://www.crcb.eu/?p=1563) and highlighted the relatively poor performance of the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority (HPPA), the HPPA responded by filing a lawsuit against the CRCB (https://www.crcb.eu/?p=1927). In contrast, the Chilean public procurement authority (ChileCompra) publicly reported on our research findings on its official website: *"Buena evaluación obtuvo Chile en el informe sobre prácticas de publicación de datos de contratación pública alrededor del mundo para el 2018, elaborado por el*

A2.3. Hungary has not only failed to converge toward the transparency standards of the leading countries in public procurement transparency; it has, in fact, fallen substantially further behind them[5].

Fig. A2.2a. Disclosure of Public Procurement Data: Canada

Source: https://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/a1acb126-9ce8-40a9-b889-5da2b1dd20cb

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[5] The data for the years 1998–2003 are not accessible even through the HPPA's official query interface (https://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/adatbazis/keres/hirdetmeny/). As a result, systematic analysis of early Hungarian public procurement data is severely constrained. Fortunately, the Corruption Research Center Budapest (CRCB) retains data for the 1998–2004 period, as these documents were still available on the HPPA website in DOC format in 2012, when they could be downloaded and archived.

Fig. A2.2b. Disclosure of Public Procurement Data: Chile

Por transparencia en las compras públicas, los archivos descargables de órdenes de compra contienen todas las órdenes de compra en los estados enviada al proveedor, en proceso, aceptada, solicitud de cancelación y recepción conforme, incluso aquellas que son excluidas del procesamiento efectuado por ChileCompra, con la finalidad de obtener la fuente de información oficial a partir de la que se construyen las cifras oficiales de compras públicas afectas a la Ley N°19.886.**Las órdenes de compra son excluidas desde nuestra fuente de información oficial por tener errores en los montos o en el tipo de moneda**. Por lo tanto, al hacer cálculos sobre los datos íntegros, las cifras pueden diferir de los datos procesados. Para obtener el listado de aquellas órdenes de compra excluidas en los procesamientos del ChileCompra, puedes revisar la sección de datos complementarios.

DESCARGA DE REPORTES   **DESCARGA MASIVA POR URL**

Utiliza los filtros y descarga de forma masiva archivos comprimidos en formato .zip que contienen reportes que incluyen toda la información de todos los organismos del Estado que transan en Mercado Público, tanto para órdenes de compra como licitaciones.

TIPO DE REPORTE   **AÑO**   **MES**

Licitaciones   2025   Octubre

Copia la siguiente URL en tu navegador o descarga directamente el archivo

https://transparenciachc.blob.core.windows.net/lic-da/2025-10.zip

Descargar archivo

? Conoce como se construye esta URL   👁 Vista previa del reporte

Si deseas descargar las órdenes de compra de algún proveedor en específico, puedes hacerlo a través de la herramienta disponible en Mercado Público.

Source: https://datos-abiertos.chilecompra.cl/descargas

Fig. A2.2c. Disclosure of Public Procurement Data: New Zealand

Data is provided for provided for the period 1 July 2019 to 10 April 2025. The report is updated quarterly.

Data is also provided for the period 29 July 2014 (the date of the first award notice on GETS) to 30 June 2019. This is a stand-alone 'historic data' report – separate from our quarterly updated report.

To make this data open and more usable we consulted with stakeholders and agreed the format for these reports. A schema is also provided to help you navigate and interpret the data.

Please note, the file format does not support number format types. To view the full New Zealand Business Number (NZBN) you will need to change the 'Supplier NZBN' field to a number.

Providing this information as open data fulfils one of New Zealand's commitments under the Open Government Partnership and the related National Action Plan 2018–2020.

Data files

- GETS award notices [CSV, 16 MB]
- GETS region by tender [CSV, 745 KB]
- GETS supplier data [CSV, 2 MB]
- GETS product categories [CSV, 2 MB]
- GETS schema and documentation [XLSX, 13 KB]

Historic data files

- GETS award notices historic [CSV, 7.3 MB]
- GETS region by tender historic [CSV, 349 KB]
- GETS supplier data historic [CSV, 745 KB]
- GETS product categories historic [CSV, 989 KB]

Source: https://www.mbie.govt.nz/cross-government-functions/new-zealand-government-procurement-and-property/open-data

A2.4. The contrast between countries that are leaders in public procurement transparency—most notably Chile, which stands out for its high level of openness—and Hungary is clearly illustrated by the stark differences in the amount of effort required to construct an analyzable data table from information published by the respective public procurement authorities. ChileCompra has enabled monthly download of Chilean public procurement data in CSV format since 2007, specifically at *the submitted bid level*. This makes available a data table containing approximately 78 million records (submitted bids) within almost 11 million selected bids by the Chilean contracting authorities between January 2007 and November 2025. This practice makes ChileCompra unique in the world[6].

Regarding the Chile data, compiling an analyzable, consolidated table covering 2007-2025 requires approximately 4–5 working hours. In contrast, downloading, cleaning Hungarian data and organizing it into a structured data table requires several times this amount of work. Fig. A2.3a presents an excerpt from the data table containing Chilean public procurement data for the period 2007–2025 in Stata (DTA) format, while Fig. A2.3b presents the corresponding Hungarian public procurement data for 1998–2025 in the same (DTA) format.

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[6] See: The World Bank. (2001). *Technological innovation in public sector reform: Chile's public procurement e-system.* The World Bank PREMnotes. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/811861468231856838/pdf/21710-BRI-REPLACEMENT-premnote50-PUBLIC.pdf; Lipson, R. (2016, November 18). *Chilecompra: Using Technology to Deliver Better Value for Public Money.* Harvard University, Technology and Operation Management. https://d3.harvard.edu/platform-rctom/submission/chilecompra-using-technology-to-deliver-better-value-for-public-money/; Bajpai, R., Myers, C. B. (2020). *Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency: The Fight Against Corruption (Vol. 1 of 2).* World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/235541600116631094; OECD. (2025). *Digital Government in Chile: Strengthening the Management of Digital Investments*, OECD Digital Government Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d1b72d93-en; Guillermo Burr, G., Montalvo, R. F. (2025, May 22). *Beneficial ownership in Chile's public procurement reform*. Open Ownership. https://www.openownership.org/en/publications/beneficial-ownership-in-chiles-public-procurement-reform/
Neumann, G. (2025, September 9). *Best practices in procuring AI: Lessons from Chile*. Open Contracting Partnership. https://www.open-contracting.org/2025/09/09/best-practices-in-procuring-ai-lessons-from-chile/ ;
Brown, S. (2025, November 4). Companies disclose their real owners to participate in Chile's procurement market as part of groundbreaking reform. Open Contracting Partnership. https://www.open-contracting.org/2025/11/04/chile-companies-disclose-their-real-owners/

Fig. A2.3a. Example of a Public Procurement Database: Chile

Note: The database was created by the CRCB in Stata DTA format based on the CSV datafiles table published by the ChileCompra.

Fig. A2.3b. Example of a Public Procurement Database: Hungary

Note: The database was created by the CRCB in Stata DTA format based on DOC and HTML files provided by the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority (HPPA).

Accordingly, the first step of contract value analysis—namely, a construction of histograms of net contract value—can be carried out much more quickly and with substantially less effort in the case of Chile (See Fig. A2.4a) than in Hungary. As a result, analyzing Chilean public procurement data is relatively straightforward, enabling the detection of anomalies such as corruption or collusion with ease. This is not the case for Hungarian public procurement data, where such analyses (See Fig. A2.4b) remain considerably more resource-intensive and complex. Thus, any analysis that helps anti-corruption policies is limited in Hungary, which naturally restricts their emergence.

Fig. A2.4a. Histogram of ln of Net Contract Value (*LNNCV*) in Chile, 2007-2025.

Notes: from January 2007 to November 2025 (except March and April 2014); N= 10,566,710; the ln of net contract value (*LNNCV*) is in CLP; 0<*LNNCV*<25.

Source: CRCB's own calculation based on ChileCompra data.

Fig. A2.4b. Histogram of ln of Net Contract Value (*LNNCV*) in Hungary, 2005-2025.

Notes: from January 2005 to September 2025; N= 362,014; the ln of net contract value (*LNNCV*) is in HUF; 5<*LNNCV*<25.

Source: CRCB's own calculation based on DOC or HTML files provided by HPPA.

A2.5. It is an excellent idea and an important step in curbing corruption that the ChileCompra website allows users to search for contracting authorities with a high proportion of tenders involving no more than two bidders (see Fig. A2.5). We argue that not only the objective probability of detection matters for corrupt behavior, but also *the subjective probability* that individual economic actors assign to being caught when deciding whether to engage in corrupt transactions[7]. If they see that anomalies are relatively easy to detect, they are more likely to refrain from participating in them for that reason alone. The ChileCompra's data disclosure practice supports this mechanism.

A2.6. The richness of the data published by ChileCompra is well illustrated by the fact that in the dataset each contracting authority has a separate numerical identifier, making it easy to produce a dataset at the contracting authority level (where one record represents one authority) and thus analyze corruption exposure indicators by authority.

Figure A2.6 shows the logarithm of the corruption risk (*CR*) indicator on the horizontal axis. *CR* shows the annual ratio of contracts awarded to a single bidder in all contracts awarded in a given year by a contracting authority, based on data from January 2007 to November 2025. The higher this ratio, the higher the corruption risk at the given

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[7] See: Tóth, I. J., Hajdu, M, & Vida, M. (2026). EU Anti-corruption Policies: Methods, Results and Challenges. In I. P. Székely, & P. T. Halmai. (Eds.), *Future European Integration Challenges and Opportunities.* Palgrave Macmillan (under publication).

authority and year. The vertical axis shows the odds of winning (*OW*) for the same period, also broken down by authority and year: the number of rejected bids for a selected bid at a given authority and year. The higher this ratio, the weaker the competition was in the public procurement procedures announced by the given authority. Each point in the figure represents the position of a contracting authority in a given year according to the two indicators examined. In the figure, we have marked in red the authorities that ranked in the top 5 percent for both indicators in a given year. It is worth taking a closer look at their public procurement activity for that year and investigate them. Such an analysis, which is very easy to perform using the excellent data provided by ChileCompra, helps target audits and can thus be an effective aid in detecting anomalies.

If we are only interested in the data for one year, for example 2025, it is easy to produce a graph for 2025 alone, which can be used as a basis for the 2026 audit steps (See A2.7).

Fig. A2.5. Query the list of contracting authorities on the ChileCompra website according to the proportion of tenders conducted with a maximum of two bidders.

Notes: https://www.mercadopublico.cl/Home/IndicadorDeGestion?esNuevaHome=true

Fig. A2.6. Logarithm of Corruption Risk (ln*CR*) and Logarithm of Odds of Winning (ln*OW*) by Contracting Authorities and Years in Chile,
from January 2007 to November 2025.

- contracting authorities with upper 5% corruption risk & odds of winning
- contracting authorities with lower 95% corruption risk or odds of winnig

Notes:
Corruption Risk (CR): the proportion of non-competitive contracts awarded by a given contracting authority
in a particular year, relative to the total number of contracts awarded by that authority in the same year; 0≤CR≤1;
Odds of Winning (OW): number of bids selected (W) by the contracing authority
in the given year / (number of bids not selected by the contracting authority in the given year + 1); 0≤OW≤W;
the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines are at the median values (-3.618508 and -1.424145 respetively);
only for contracing authorities that selected more than 12 bids in a given year; N=14,978.
Source: CRCB's own calculations based on ChileCompra data

Fig. A2.7. Logarithm of Corruption Risk (ln*CR*) and Logarithm of Odds of Winning (ln*OW*) by Contracting Authorities and Years in Chile,
from January 2025 to November 2025.

- contracting authorities with upper 5% corruption risk & odds of winning
- contracting authorities with lower 95% corruption risk or odds of winning

Notes:
Corruption Risk (CR): the proportion of non-competitive contracts awarded by a given contracting authority
among all contracts it awarded between January 2025 and November 2025; 0≤CR≤1;
Odds of Winning (OW): number of bids selected (W) by the contracing authority from January 2025 to November 2025
/ (number of bids not selected by the contracting authority from January 2025 to November 2025 + 1); 0≤OW≤W;
the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines are at the median values (-3.678977 and -2.021703 respetively);
only for contracing authorities that selected more than 12 bids from January 2025 to November 2025; N=872.
Source: CRCB's own calculations based on ChileCompra data

A2.7. The risk of corruption in Chilean public procurement is at the same level as in Finland and Sweden, the least corrupt countries in the European Union (see Figure A2.8). It is likely that the integrity of the Chilean state, including the excellent work of ChileCompra and its commitment to transparency, plays a role in this.

Fig. A2.8. Corruption risk (*CR*) in Chile, Finland, and Sweden, from 2006 to 2025

Notes: with framework agreements; data for Finland, and Sweden from the Tenders Electronic Daily, data for Chile from the ChileCompra; 0≤CR≤1; N(Chile)=10,862,747; N(Finland)=91,371; N(Sweden)=203,847.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

A3. The Top 13 Actors

A3.1. Ties Between Top 13 Actors and Political Actors

Type of relationships	Actors	Actors
social relations, friendship	**Viktor Orbán**	Lőrinc Mészáros
social relations, friendship	**Viktor Orbán**	Lajos Simicska
social relations, friendship	**Viktor Orbán**	István Garancsi
social relations friendship	**Viktor Orbán**	László Szíjj
kinship / family relationship	**Viktor Orbán**	István Tiborcz
subordination and superordination	**Viktor Orbán** →	Antal Rogán
subordination and superordination	**Viktor Orbán** →	Péter Szijjártó
kinship / family relationship	Lőrinc Mészáros	Zsolt Homlok
social relations, friendship	**Péter Szijjártó**	László Szíjj
social relations, friendship	**Péter Szijjártó**	Gyula Balásy
social relations, friendship	**Péter Szijjártó** **Antal Rogán**	Tibor Kuna
social relations, friendship	**Antal Rogán**	Csaba Csetényi
social relations, friendship	**Antal Rogán**	Gyula Balásy
social relations, friendship	László Szíjj	Lőrinc Mészáros
social relations, friendship	László Szíjj	Károly Varga
social relations, friendship	István Tiborcz	Lajos Simicska
social relations, friendship	István Tiborcz	Endre Hamar
social relations, friendship	István Tiborcz	Attila Paár
business relations	László Szíjj	Károly Varga
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	László Szíjj
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	Zsolt Homlok
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	Károly Varga
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	István Garancsi
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	Lajos Simicska
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	István Tiborcz
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	Gellért Jászai
business relations	István Tiborcz	Lajos Simicska
business relations	István Tiborcz	Endre Hamar
business relations	István Tiborcz	Attila Paár
business relations	István Tiborcz	Gellért Jászai

Notes: business relations: direct or indirect joint ownership or business transactions between owned companies or joint participation in a consortium for a public tender; names in bold: political actors and member of the Fidesz government; →: direction of subordination relationship;
Viktor Orban: Prime Minister of Hungary and leader of the Fidesz political party;
Péter Szijjártó: Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary;
Antal Rogán: Minister of the Prime Minister's Cabinet Office.

A4. List of Companies Affiliated with Top 13 Actors

	Company name [owner or front with political ties]
1	4iG ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros and Gellért Jászai (since 2019)]
2	CLH Hűtés- és Klímatechnikai ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros, László Szijj, Károly Varga (from June 2015 to September 2018), Attila Paár (from September 2018)]
3	Euro General ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros and his family (since March 2015)]
4	Europublicity ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2019), Lőrinc Mészáros (2019-2020)]
5	Fejér B.A.L. ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros and his family]
6	Mediaworks ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros (since 2017)]
7	Mészáros és Mészáros ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros]
8	Publimont ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2019), Lőrinc Mészáros (2019-2020)]
9	R-Kord ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros]
10	V-Híd ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros and Zsolt Homlok (since 2018)]
11	Vivienvíz ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros]
12	ZAEV ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros (since 2019)]
13	Market Építő ltd. [István Garancsi]
14	Market Épületszervíz ltd. [István Garancsi]
15	MET Magyarország ltd. [István Garancsi]
16	Mobil Adat ltd. [István Garancsi]
17	Visual Europe ltd. [István Garancsi]
18	Elios ltd. [István Tiborcz, son-in-law of Viktor Orbán]
19	PBE Energiamenedzsment ltd. [István Tiborcz and Endre Hamar]
20	PBE Epitő ltd. [István Tiborcz and Attila Paár]
21	E-OS Energiakereskedő ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2018)]
22	Közgép ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2019), László Szíjj (since 2020)]
23	Közgéphídkorr ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2018)]
24	Mahir Cityposter kft. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2018)]
25	Mahir Kiallítás kft. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2018)]
26	Nemzeti Lapkiadó ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2018)]
27	Lounge Design ltd. [Gyula Balásy]
28	New Land Media ltd. [Gyula Balásy]
29	Network 360 ltd. [Csaba Csetényi]
30	Sistrade ltd. [Endre Hamar]
31	EUPRO Projektmenedzsment ltd. [Endre Hamar]
32	Homlok Építő ltd. [Zsolt Homlok, son-in-law of Lőrinc Mészáros]
33	Vasútvill ltd. [Zsolt Homlok, son-in-law of Lőrinc Mészáros]
34	West Hungária Bau ltd. [Attila Paár]
35	Magyar Epítő ltd. [Laszlo Szijj (from 2015 to June 2017) Attila Paár (since June 2017)]
36	Duna Aszfalt ltd. [László Szíjj]
37	Hódút ltd. [Károly Varga and László Szíjj]
38	Vakond Via ltd. [Károly Varga and László Szíjj]

39	Vakond ltd. [Károly Varga and László Szíjj]
40	Magyar Vakond ltd. [Károly Varga and László Szíjj]
41	Trinity International Communications ltd. [Tibor Kuna]
42	Young & Partners ltd. [Tibor Kuna]

Source: CRCB

A5. HUF / EUR Exchange Rates by Year

Year	EUR 1 =
1998	HUF 251.43*
1999	HUF 252.80
2000	HUF 260.04
2001	HUF 256.69
2002	HUF 247.96
2003	HUF 253.51
2004	HUF 251.68
2005	HUF 246.56
2006	HUF 250.85
2007	HUF 251.31
2008	HUF 251.25
2009	HUF 280.58
2010	HUF 275.41
2011	HUF 279.21
2012	HUF 289.42
2013	HUF 296.92
2014	HUF 308.66
2015	HUF 309.90
2016	HUF 311.46
2017	HUF 309.21
2018	HUF 318.87
2019	HUF 325.35
2020	HUF 351.17
2021	HUF 358.52
2022	HUF 391.33
2023	HUF 380.98
2024	HUF 395.20
2025	HUF 400.16

Notes: *: EUR/HUF exchange rate in 1th January 1999; annual average exchange rates calculated from daily average exchange rates. Source of daily data: https://www.mnb.hu/arfolyam-lekerdezes

A6. List of Contracts Analyzed

See at https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3968 the attached CSV file.