

Corruption Risk in Hungarian Public Procurement: Trends, Top Actors and State Organizations, 1999-2025

CRCB Statistical Flash Report 2026:2

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Contents

1.	Introduction	4
2.	Trends.....	5
3.	Kleptocracy	5
4.	State Organizations and State-owned Companies	7
5.	The Case of Companies of Gyula Balásy.....	8
6.	Conclusions.....	9
7.	References.....	10
8.	Figures	13
9.	Tables	45
	Annex.....	47
	A1. Definition of Variables Used.....	48
	A2. The Top Actors	49
	A3. List of Companies Affiliated with Top Actors	50
	A4. HUF / EUR Exchange Rates by Year.....	52
	A5. Analyzed State Organizations and State-Owned Companies	53
	A6. Some of the Billboards from the Orbán Government’s Propaganda Campaigns	63
	A7. List of CRCB publication on Political Favoritism, Cronyism and Kleptocratic System in Hungary 2016-2026	77
	A8. List of Contracts Analyzed.....	79

1. Introduction

1.1. In the following report, we examine recent trends in corruption risk in Hungarian public procurement¹, drawing on data covering the period from January 1999 to December 2025. We added new data (data of contracts from September 2025 to December 2025) to the recent analysis², recalculated the figures and added new points to the statistical analysis.

1.2. The purpose of this statistical overview of Hungarian public procurement is to show, based on empirical evidence, the trends in corruption risk in Hungarian public procurement and to point out how Orbán's kleptocratic regime uses political favoritism to fuel the building and expansion of this system. One of its most important features and mechanisms of this regime is using the EU subsidies and Hungarian taxpayer money to achieve its two objectives: (i) to establish and finance an autocratic regime; (ii) to generate financial gains for the leaders of the kleptocratic regime (Orbán and his family), as well as for politically loyal actors.

1.3. As early as 2017, the CRCB identified four key actors in Orbán's kleptocratic regime (see [1], [2] and [3] in Annex 7). This group, labeled MGTS, was named after its members: Lőrinc Mészáros, István Garancsi, István Tiborcz, and Lajos Simicska. Thereafter, in 2022, the scope of analysis was expanded to include a total of 12 and in 2025, 13 individuals, incorporating additional actors connected to them, as well as certain members of the Orbán government with documented close personal and business ties (See [11], [12] and [13] in Annex 7).

1.4. The statistical analysis provides clear evidence of political favoritism. CRCB research has shown that public procurement contracts awarded to companies linked to these politically connected actors are associated with higher corruption risks and lower levels of competition compared to those awarded to other Hungarian firms. It also shows that, prior to the Orbán regime, the odds of winning for these companies did not differ significantly from those of other firms; however, after 2010, their odds became systematically higher than those of other Hungarian companies.

1.5. The CRCB downloaded documents titled "Information on the outcome of the procedure" (in Hungarian: "Tájékoztató az eljárás eredményéről") from the website of the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority (HPPA) in TXT, DOC, or HTML formats—using automated data extraction tools (scraping, crawling) from January 1999 until July 2023. Following the HPPA's decision to block machine-based data downloads in the second half of 2023³, beginning in August 2023 we have manually downloaded all public procurement documents published in HTML format. Our

¹ We analyze public procurement contracts. During the report each contract or identifiable part of a contract (or contract lot) is counted as a contract. Accordingly, the analyzed data is at the contract level and within that at the lot level. The Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) of the European Commission applies the same logic. See: <https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/ted-csv?locale=en>.

² See: CRCB. (2026). *The New Trends of Corruption Risk in Hungarian Public Procurement from January 1998 to September 2025*. CRCB. <https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3968>.

³ See Annex 2 in CRCB (2026).

analysis includes all contract award notices of the type "Information on the outcome of the procedure" ("*Tájékoztató az eljárás eredményéről*").

2. Trends

2.1. In 2025, the number of contracts did not change significantly compared to previous years. The number of EU-funded contracts decreased, while the number of nationally funded contracts increased (Fig. 1). The number of framework agreements has not changed significantly either (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3).

2.2. In 2025, the net nominal value of contracts increased compared to 2024. The increase was largely due to an increase in nationally funded contracts (Fig. 4).

2.3. The corruption risk (*CR*, the rate of contracts awarded without competition, with a single bid)⁴ increased in 2025 after declining in 2024. The increase can be observed in both EU-funded and nationally funded contracts. The downward trend in the corruption risk of EU-funded contracts reversed and, after 2023, rose again above the critical value (0.1) set by the European Commission (Fig. 5). The greatest increase is seen in the services sector (Fig. 6), which is linked to the 2026 elections and the launch of (anti-EU and anti-Ukraine) hate campaigns in support of the Orbán government and the Fidesz (see A6.10., A6.11., A6.12., and A6.13. in Annex 6).

2.4. In addition to the high risk of corruption, the net nominal value of contracts awarded without competition also increased significantly in 2024 and in 2025, particularly in Nationally funded contracts (Fig. 7).

3. Kleptocracy

3.1. In 2025, the number of public procurement contracts won by companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy (see Annex 2 and Annex 3) did not change (Fig. 8). The nominal net value of contracts won by this group of companies decreased in 2025 (Fig. 9).

3.2. The share of contracts won by companies affiliated with the top actors increased in 2025, relative to the total number of contracts (Fig. 10). The inverse trend was observed in the total net value of contracts (Fig. 11).

3.3. The corruption risk associated with contracts linked companies affiliated with top actors increased substantially in 2024. This trend continued in 2025 (Fig. 12). In 2024, the corruption risk rose from an already elevated level of 0.45 in 2023 to 0.66 in 2024, and increased further to 0.71 in 2025. By contrast, the corruption risk of public procurement contracts awarded to other Hungarian companies remained largely stable over the same period: 0.3 in 2023, 0.26 in 2024, and 0.29 in 2025.

⁴ The minimum value of the corruption risk is 0, and the maximum value is 1 ($0 \leq CR \leq 1$), For the definition of variable used see Annex 1.

3.4. The increase in corruption risk of contracts won by companies affiliated with the top actors was particularly pronounced in Construction and Services (See Fig. 13a-c).

3.5. The EU-funded contracts the corruption risk rose sharply from 0.028 in 2023 to 0.5 in 2024 and 0.48 in 2025 (Fig. 14a). In contrast, for nationally funded contracts, corruption risk remained persistently high, fluctuating around the record level observed in 2023 (0.70 in 2023, 0.68 in 2024, and 0.75 in 2025; see Fig. 14b). Consistent with these trends, the total value of high-corruption-risk contracts awarded to the top actors also increased in 2024 and decreased in 2025 (Fig. 15).

These patterns indicate that increasing political favoritism, coupled with rising corruption risk, substantially enhances the likelihood that companies affiliated with the top actors will secure public procurement contracts in 2025. Although these companies captured a smaller share of Hungary's overall public procurement volume that year, they did so amid intensifying political favoritism.

3.6. To calculate the companies' odds of winning, we selected a sample of contracts awarded annually that included those won by the top 2% of companies by the number of contracts or by the value of the largest contracts (see Fig. 16). The total value of these contracts accounted for 60–80 percent of all contracts awarded annually between 2008 and 2025 (See Fig. 17.). Using this method, we can calculate the odds of winning for 1,952 companies over the period from 1999 to 2025.

3.7. The comparison of the periods before the Orbán regime (1999-2010) and during the Orbán regime (2011-2026) shows that, in general, the odds of winning were higher during the latter period. This suggests that there were fewer bidders in public procurement during the Orbán regime than before, i.e., the intensity of competition was lower, and the corruption risk was higher (Fig 18 and Fig. 19).

3.8. The odds of winning and corruption risk for companies affiliated with top actors were the same as for other companies from 1999 to 2010, but during the Orbán regime, the former group had substantially higher odds of winning and corruption risk (See Figs. 20a-b, and Fig. 21).

3.9. Companies affiliated with top actors won the highest-value contracts during the Orbán regime, compared with other Hungarian companies, especially those with high corruption risk (See Fig. 22a-b, Fig. 23a-b, and Fig. 24a-b).

4. State Organizations and State-owned Companies

4.1. It is important to analyze corruption trends and the functioning of the kleptocratic system, particularly in relation to public procurement contracts issued by government organizations and state-owned enterprises. In this study, we examine contracts issued by 374 such contracting authorities over the period 1999–2025. These contracting authorities account for 10-20 percent of total contracts from 2005 to 2025 (See Fig. 25 and Fig. 26).

4.2. The corruption risk of contracts issued by these institutions is substantially higher than that of all contracts (See Fig. 27), and political favoritism is concentrated within them: companies affiliated with top actors typically win public procurement contracts issued by these institutions. The share of net contract value from contracts won by top actors was between 22 and 55 percent since 2016 (See Fig. 28).

4.3. The companies affiliated with top actors won contracts with the substantially highest corruption risk issued by state institutions, as is the case with public procurement in general (see Fig. 29). The level of corruption risk for those contracts exceeded a record 0.9 in 2024 and 2025. It means that in 90 percent of the contracts awarded to companies affiliated with top actors, there was no competition.

4.4. The destructive effect of Orbán's kleptocratic regime on the intensity of competition and corruption risk is particularly strong in this subsample: the odds of winning and the corruption risk were higher in 1999-2010 than in 2011-2025 (See Fig. 30).

4.5. Besides this general destructive effect, there are large differences among state institutions: a significant gap emerged in 2024-2025 between the best and the worst group. This heterogeneity points out that not all state institutions are captive to the kleptocratic system; furthermore, after 2023, as the system began to decline—a trend fueled in part by the freezing of EU subsidies—several institutions were able to distance themselves from it (See Fig. 31a-c). The National Communication Office (nkh in the Fig. 31b.) has the worst score: it is characterized by extremely weak competitiveness (the highest odds of win) and nearly maximum corruption risk. By contrast, among the highest-performing state institutions (See Fig. 31c), we observe, inter alia, the Office of the National Assembly (ors_h), the Ministry of Defence (hm), and the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (nmh_hat).

4.6. Among public institutions, the destructive impact is clearly evident in universities, courts, hospitals, and government offices: a decline in competitiveness and an increased risk of corruption under Orbán's kleptocratic regime (Fig. 32a-h).

5. The Case of Companies of Gyula Balásy

5.1. In the following section, we briefly analyze the public procurement activities of two companies (New Land Media Ltd. and Lounge Design Ltd.) that are affiliated with one of the top actors (Gyula Balásy). These companies are examples of extreme behavior, the highest corruption risk, and the odds of winning during the Orbán regime. They have strong ties to the National Communication Office (NCO), one of the important offices of the Orbán government, which is dedicated to organizing the Orbán Government's hate propaganda (see Annex 6). The propaganda is one of essential tool to maintain the power of the informational autocracy (Guriev & Treisman, 2019; Guriev & Treisman, 2020). The Orbán regime shows a perfect example of such autocracy and the actors behavior. The links between the propaganda machine and the level of corruption risk are well documented by the contracts awarded by the Hungarian National Communication Office to Balásy's companies during the Orbán regime.

5.2. The number of contracts won by Balásy's companies has risen significantly, from 0 to 150 per year in the Orbán regime, between 2012 and 2025 (Fig. 33a).

5.3. Balásy's companies (New Land Media Ltd. and Lounge Design Ltd.) almost exclusively won contracts awarded by the NCO (Fig. 33a).

5.4. The corruption risk of contracts awarded by NCO and won by these companies is extremely high (with absurd maximum or close to the maximum level). These high levels are unique in the EU, and perhaps worldwide (Fig. 33b).

5.5. The level of odds of winning of these companies is also absurdly high (30-50 while the companies with market competition, without political ties, achieve only a 0.6 median value of odds of winning, i.e., they won six contracts and lost 9 bids. The Balásy's companies reach the highest odds of winning for contracts awarded by NCO; for instance, in 2024, this level was 140, which is 233 times higher than the median odds of winning for competitive companies without political ties ($140/0.6=233.3$). This extreme level also provides evidence that the rule of law in Hungary is severely damaged (Fig. 33c).

5.6. The amount of net contract value awarded by NCO rose significantly from 2015 to 2025. Especially in 2024 and 2015, the Orbán governments spent an exceptionally large amount of taxpayer money on propaganda (683 and 742 € million per year, respectively). This could be interpreted as a sort of panic: they expect to lose the elections on April 12. (Fig. 33d). This method is nothing other than the Russians' standard propaganda technique (Paul & Matthews, 2116). It is very likely that the Russian experts suggested it to the Orbán government as well.

6. Conclusions

6.1. The year 2025 stands out as particularly notable under the Orbán regime, as companies linked to top actors secured public procurement contracts with significantly higher corruption risks (CR and CRX) and significantly lower competition intensity (NBIDX). This also means that political favoritism—the preferential treatment of actors close to Orbán—was most pronounced in 2025, during the Orbán regime (See Figs. 35a-d).

6.2. The estimation results show that before the Orbán regime (2005-2010), the top actors won contracts with corruption risk, competition intensity, and odds of winning similar to those of other Hungarian companies. During Orbán’s kleptocratic regime, however, these top actors won contracts with significantly higher corruption risk and lower competition intensity. Their odds of winning were also significantly higher than those of other Hungarian companies (See Figs. 36a-c).

6.3. The results presented in Section 3 provide clear evidence of the role of political favoritism in Hungary. Specifically, the post-2011 success of companies affiliated with the top actors in the public procurement market is driven less by market competition and more by political advantages. From 2023 onward, political favoritism appears to have intensified: in 2025, corruption risks increased, and the odds of winning rose markedly for companies linked to the top actors of the kleptocratic system.

6.4. Finally, the database created by the CRCB allows us to estimate how much money EU taxpayers have contributed, through EU subsidies, to the establishment, maintenance, and development of Orbán’s kleptocratic regime (See Figs. 37a-b). This estimation was made possible by the municipal elections in 2019 and 2022, which served as a natural experiment: in many municipalities, Fidesz lost, and the opposition parties won. After the regime change at the municipal level, we were able to compare contract prices in the public procurement market (Tóth & Hajdu, 2026).

6.5. In the estimations, we defined the kleptocratic rent ratio as the percentage by which the actual contract price under the Orbán regime exceeds the market price. We calculated this only in cases where there was no competition in the public procurement process or where one of the winning bidders was a company linked to top actors in the regime. We conducted interviews with municipal experts about the last municipal elections, in which Fidesz was replaced by an opposition party or a coalition of opposition parties. We calculated only 20%, 30%, and 40% kleptocratic rent ratios. The experts surveyed reported even larger price differences during the interviews (Tóth & Hajdu, 2026).

Thus, we made conservative estimates of the contributions of EU taxpayers through EU funds to the building, maintenance, and development of Orbán’s kleptocratic regime since its inception in 2011. Based on estimates, the EU taxpayers' contribution ranges from 3.6 to 6.2 EUR billion from 2011 to 2025 (See Table 1.2). This accounts for about 1/3 of all contributions channeled by public procurement to financing the Orbán regime. The rest of the money was financed by Hungarian taxpayers.

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
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
8. Figures

Fig. 1. Number of Contracts by Funding Type, 1999–2025.




Notes: all contracts: contracts or contract lots with framework agreements; N=379,094.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 2. Number of Framework Agreements by Funding Type, 2005–2025.




Notes: FWA: framework agreements; N=379,094.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 3. Share of Framework Agreements by Funding Type, 2005—2025.




Notes: FWA: framework agreements; N=379,094.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 4. Net Contract Value (NCV) by Funding Type, 2005—2025.




Notes: net contract value (NCV), EUR billion; with framework agreements;
N=337,465.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 5. Corruption Risk (CR) by Funding Type, 1999–2025.




Notes: with framework agreements; EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $N=366,415$.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 6. Corruption Risk by Economic Sector, 2005–2025.




Notes: with framework agreements; EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $N=366,415$.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 7. Net Contract Value with High Corruption Risk (NCV_CR1) by Funding Type, 2005–2025.



Notes: Net contract value with high corruption risk (NCV_CR1); EUR billion; with framework agreements; N=337,465.
 Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 8. Number of Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy by Funding Type, 1999–2025.




Notes: number of contracts or contract lots with framework agreements; N=379,094.
 Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 9. Net Contract Value in Public Procurement Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy by Funding Type, 2005—2025.



Notes: with framework agreements; only cases where the net contract value < 50 HUF billion; N=332,280.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 10. Share of Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy, 1999—2025.




Notes: with framework agreements. N=379,094.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 11. Share of Net Contract Value Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy in Total Net Contract Value by Funding Type, 2005—2025.




Notes: with framework agreements; N=337,465.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 12. Corruption Risk (CR) of Contracts Awarded to Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy Versus Other Hungarian Companies (OHC) Without Political Ties or With Weak Political Ties, 1999—2025.



Notes: with framework agreements; EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy
OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; N=366,415.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 13a. Corruption Risk (CR) in Manufacturing by the Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies, 2005—2025.



Notes: with framework agreements; only in years where the number of contracts > 25;
EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission;
top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $N=366,415$.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 13b. Corruption Risk (CR) in Construction by the Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies, 2005—2025.




Notes: with framework agreements; only in years where the number of contracts > 25;
EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission;
top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $N=366,415$.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 13c. Corruption Risk (CR) in Services by the Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies, 2005–2025.




Notes: with framework agreements; only in years where the number of contracts > 25;
EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission;
top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $N=366,415$.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 14a. Corruption Risk (CR) in EU-Funded Contracts: Contracts Awarded to Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy Versus Other Hungarian Companies (OHC) Without Political Ties or With Weak Political Ties, 2005–2025.



Notes: with framework agreements; EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission;
top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy;
OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $N=366,415$.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 14b. Corruption Risk (CR) in Nationally Funded Contracts: Contracts Awarded to Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy Versus Other Hungarian Companies (OHC) Without Political Ties or With Weak Political Ties, 2005—2025.




Notes: with framework agreements; EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $N=366,415$. Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 15. Net Contract Value with High Corruption Risk in Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy by Funding Type, 2005—2025.




Notes: net value of contracts or contract lots with framework agreements; $N=337,465$. Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 16. Number of Contracts in Top 2% Sample, 2008–2025.




Notes: Number of contracts in Top 2% sample; with framework agreements; N=379,094.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 17. The Share of the Net Value of Contracts in the Top 2% Sample Relative to the Total Net Value of All Contracts




Notes: with framework agreements; N=337,465.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 18. Odds of Winning and Awarded Net Contract Value of Companies in Top 2% Sample by Periods, 1999–2025.




Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded to the company in the given year / (number of bids lost by the same company in the same year + 1); the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (1.29 and -0.31 respectively); only companies that won more than 12 contracts per year were included; $0 \leq OW \leq W$; $N=4,187$. Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 19. Odds of Winning and Corruption Risk of Companies in Top 2% Sample by Periods, 1999–2025.




Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded to the company in the given year / (number of bids lost by the same company in the same year + 1); the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (-1.16 -0.31 respectively); only companies that won more than 12 contracts per year were included; $0 \leq OW \leq W$ and $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $N=3,440$. Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 20a. Odds of Winning and Awarded Net Contract Value in Contracts Won by the Top Actors of Orbán’s Kleptocracy in Top 2% Sample, 1999–2010.




Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded to the company in the given year / (number of bids lost by the same company in the same year +1); the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (1.20 and -0.60 respectively); only companies that won more than 12 contracts per year were included; $0 \leq \text{OW} \leq \text{W}$; $N=733$.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 20b. Odds of Winning and Awarded Net Contract Value in Contracts Won by the Top Actors of Orbán’s Kleptocracy in Top 2% Sample, 2011–2025.




Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded by the group of companies / (number of bids lost by the same group of companies +1); the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (1.32 and -0.24 respectively); only companies that won more than 12 contracts per year were included; $0 \leq \text{OW} \leq \text{W}$; $N=3,454$.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 21. Mean of In Odds of Winning (InOW) by Period and Political Ties in Top 2% Sample, 1999–2010.




Note: with framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; $0 \leq \text{InOW} \leq W$; N=3,440.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 22a. Histogram of In of Total Net Contract Value in Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies (OHC), 2005–2010




Note: with framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; N=62,448.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 22b. Histogram of In of Total Net Contract Value in Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies (OHC), 2011–2025




Note: with framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; N=274,739.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 23a. Histogram of In of Total Net Contract Value in EU-funded Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies (OHC), 2005–2010.




Note: with framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; N=24,405.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 23b. Histogram of In of Total Net Contract Value in EU-funded Contracts Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies (OHC), 2011–2025.




Note: with framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; N=86,007.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 24a. Histogram of In of Total Net Contract Value in Contracts with High Corruption Risk and Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies (OHC), 2005–2010.




Note: with framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; N=19,263.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 24b. Histogram of In of Total Net Contract Value in Contracts with High Corruption Risk and Won by Companies Affiliated with the Top Actors of Orbán's Kleptocracy and Other Hungarian Companies (OHC), 2011–2025.




Note: with framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; OHC: other Hungarian companies without political ties or with weak political ties; N=81,513.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 25. Number of Contracts Issued by State Organizations and State-owned Companies, 1999-2025.




Notes: number of contracts or contract lots with framework agreements; N=65,489.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 26. Share of Contracts Issued by State Organizations and State-owned Companies in All Issued Contracts, 2005-2025.




Notes: share of contracts or contract lots with framework agreements; N=65,489.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 27. Corruption Risk (CR) in Contracts Issued by State Organizations and State-owned Companies, 1999-2025.




Notes: contracts or contract lots with framework agreements;
top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy;
EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; N=366,415.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 28. Share of Contracts and Share of Net Contract Value Won by Top Actors in Contracts Issued by State Organizations or State-owned Companies, 2008-2025.




Notes: with framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; N=65,489.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 29. Corruption Risk (CR) in Contracts Won by Top Actors and Issued by State Organizations or State-owned Companies, 1999-2025.




Notes: contracts or contract lots with framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; only in years when the number of contracts won by top actors > 10; 0 ≤ CR ≤ 1; N=366,415.
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 30. Corruption Risk (CR) and Odds of Winning (OW) in the Sample of State Organizations and State-owned Companies, 1999-2025.



Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded by the given contracting authority / (number of bids submitted to the contracts issued by the same authority + 1); the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (-1.22 and -0.63 respectively); only organizations that awarded more than 12 contracts per year were included; $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $0 \leq OW \leq W$; $N=1,197$. Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 31a. Corruption Risk (CR) and Odds of Winning (OW): the State Organizations and State-owned Companies with the Worst and the Best Scores, 2024-2025.



Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots issued by the given contracting authority / (number of bids submitted to the contracts issued by the same authority + 1); $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $0 \leq OW \leq W$; $N=28$. Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 31b. Corruption Risk (CR) and Odds of Winning (OW): the State Organizations and State-owned Companies with the Worst Scores, 2024-2025.




Fig. 31c. Corruption Risk (CR) and Odds of Winning (OW): the State Organizations and State-owned Companies with the Best Scores, 2024-2025.






Fig. 32a. Corruption Risk (CR) and Odds of Winning (OW): Ministries, 1999-2025.



Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded by ministries / (number of bids submitted to the contracts issued by ministries + 1); the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (-1.22 and -0.63 respectively); $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $0 \leq OW \leq W$; $N=1,197$; Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 32b. Corruption Risk (CR) and Odds of Winning (OW): Universities, 1999-2025.



Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded by universities / (number of bids submitted to the contracts issued by universities + 1); the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (-1.22 and -0.63 respectively); $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $0 \leq OW \leq W$; $N=1,197$; Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 32c. Corruption Risk (CR) and Odds of Winning (OW): County Government Offices, 2012-2025.




Fig. 32d. Corruption Risk (CR) and Odds of Winning (OW): Courts, 1999-2025.






Fig. 32e. Corruption Risk (CR) and Odds of Winning (OW): Hospitals, 1999-2025.




Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded by hospitals / (number of bids submitted to the contracts issued by hospitals + 1); the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (-1.22 and -0.63 respectively); $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $0 \leq OW \leq W$; $N=1,197$;
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 32f. Corruption Risk (CR) and Odds of Winning (OW): Agencies, 1999-2025.




Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded by agencies / (number of bids submitted to the contracts issued by government agencies + 1); the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (-1.22 and -0.63 respectively); $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $0 \leq OW \leq W$; $N=1,197$;
Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 32g. Corruption Risk (CR) and Odds of Winning (OW): Authorities, 1999-2025.




Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded by authorities / (number of bids submitted to the contracts issued by authorities + 1); the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (-1.22 and -0.63 respectively); $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $0 \leq OW \leq W$; N=1,197; Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 32h. Corruption Risk (CR) and Odds of Winning (OW): Government Offices, 1999-2025.




Notes: OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded by government offices / (number of bids submitted to the contracts issued by government offices + 1); the vertical and horizontal blue dashed lines show the median values (-1.22 and -0.63 respectively); $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; $0 \leq OW \leq W$; N=1,197; Source: CRCB's own calculations

Fig. 33a. Number of Contracts Awarded by the NCO and Won by Companies Affiliated with Gyula Balásy, 2012-2025




Note: with framework agreements; NCO: National Communication Office; NLM: New Land Media Ltd.; LD: Lounge Design Ltd.; N=2,208.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 33b. Corruption Risk (CR) of Contract Awarded by NCO and Won by Companies Affiliated with Gyula Balásy, 2015-2025"




Note: with framework agreements; CR: corruption risk; NCO: National Communication Office; NLM: New Land Media Ltd.; LD: Lounge Design Ltd.; EU's critical threshold: critical value of corruption risk (0.1) set by the EU Commission; only those years in which there were more than 12 contracts are taken into account; $0 \leq CR \leq 1$; N=2,208.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 33c. Odds of Winning (OW) of Companies Affiliated with Gyula Balásy, 2017-2025




Note: with framework agreements; OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded to the company in the given year / (number of bids lost by the same company in the same year +1); NCO: National Communication Office; NLM: New Land Media Ltd.; LD: Lounge Design Ltd.; only those years in which there were more than 12 contracts are taken into account; $0 \leq OW \leq W$; $N=2,083$.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 33d. The Net Contract Value Awarded by NCO and Won by Companies Affiliated with Gyula Balásy (€ million), 2012-2025




Notes: EUR million; with framework agreements; NCO: National Communication Office; NLM: New Land Media Ltd.; LD: Lounge Design Ltd. $N=2,212$
Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 35a. Impact of Top Actors on Corruption Risk (CR), 2005-2025




Note: without framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; results from logit estimations [variables included in the models: tops_, eu, lti, Inncv, sector, year]; N=264,666. Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 35b. Impact of Top Actors on Corruption Risk (CRX), 2005-2025




Note: without framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; results from logit estimations [variables included in the models: tops_, eu, lti, Inncv, sector, year]; N=264,666. Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 35c. Impact of Top Actors on Intensity of Competition (*NBIDX*), 2005-2025




Note: without framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; results from ordered logit estimations [variables included in the models: tops_, eu, lti, lnncv, sector, year]; N=264,666. Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 35d. Impact of Top Actors on Corruption Risk (*CR*) in the Sample of State Organization and State-owned Companies, 2011-2025




Note: contracts awarded by state organizations; without framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; results from logit estimations [variables included in the models: tops_, eu, lti, lnncv, sector, year]; the year 2019 is excluded due to extremely high standard error; N=44,15. Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 36a. Impact of Top Actors on Corruption Risk (*CR* and *CRX*) Before and During the Orbán's Kleptocratic Regime




Note: without framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; results from logit estimations [variables included in the models: tops_, eu, lti, Inncv, sector, year]; N=264,666; Source: CRCB's own calculation.

Fig. 36b. Impact of Top Actors on Intensity of Competition (*NBIDX*) Before and During the Orbán's Kleptocratic Regime




Note: without framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; results from ordered logit estimations [variables included in the models: tops_, eu, lti, Inncv, sector, year]; N=264,666; Source: CRCB's own calculation.

Fig. 36c. Impact of Top Actors on Odds of Winning (OW) Before and During the Orbán's Kleptocratic Regime




Note: with framework agreements; top actors: companies affiliated with the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy; results from robust regression estimations [variables included in the models: tops_eur (=eu[1]/(eu[0] + eu[1]), ltr (=lri[1]/(lri[0] + lri[1]), lnncv, sector, year]; OW (odds of winning): number of contracts or contract lots awarded to the company / (number of bids lost by the same company +1); N=18,294; Source: CRCB's own calculation.

Fig. 37a. Estimated Contribution of EU (including Hungarian) Taxpayers to the Orbán's Kleptocracy Considering 20%, 30% and 40% of Kleptocratic Rent (€ million), 2011–2025



Notes: EUR million; with framework agreements; the data differ slightly from those published in CRCB (2026), as (i) we defined contracts awarded to companies affiliated with the top players more restrictively, (ii) we expanded the group of top actors (with István Szeivold and János Mészáros), and input new companies associated with Lőrinc Mészáros, as well. Source: CRCB's own calculation

Fig. 37b. Estimated Contribution of EU (excluding Hungarian) Taxpayers to the Orbán's Kleptocracy Considering 20%, 30% and 40% of Kleptocratic Rent, (€ million), 2011–2025



Notes: EUR million; with framework agreements; the data differ slightly from those published in CRCB (2026), as (i) we defined contracts awarded to companies affiliated with the top players more restrictively, (ii) we expanded the group of top actors (with István Szeivold and János Mészáros), and input new companies associated with Lőrinc Mészáros, as well.
Source: CRCB's own calculation

9. Tables

Table. 1.1. Net Contract Value Awarded in Hungarian Public Procurement (€ million), 2011-2025

Years	Net contract value (€ million)							
	Total	Financed by the EU	Won by top actors	Value with high corruption risk	Won by top actors and financed by EU-funds	With high corruption risk and financed by EU-funds	Won by top actors or with high corruption risk	Won by top actors or with high corruption risk and financed by EU-funds
2011	2713.7	1553.8	145.4	745.1	112.8	361.6	846.3	457.6
2012	8766.6	5788.6	559.7	2143.8	529.1	622.4	2470.2	928.5
2013	14032.7	10467.3	1816.1	2604.3	1597.7	1133.6	4077.5	2455.3
2014	8856.1	4063.1	695.9	3227.2	601.6	1041.3	3703.4	1472.8
2015	26408.1	22158.8	569.3	2336.7	249.8	794.9	2815.3	981.9
2016	9148.8	3596.5	1514.8	2556.3	624.0	454.9	3954.9	1070.9
2017	16488.6	9109.5	4140.1	2854.4	2513.9	974.7	6815.1	3452.7
2018	11858.5	5374.7	1951.6	2846.9	945.4	625.4	4697.8	1570.1
2019	10882.3	3158.2	2320.2	2712.2	369.2	342.7	4588.9	710.9
2020	12766.1	3939.5	3226.3	3166.0	777.2	840.2	6040.2	1617.3
2021	21261.8	9292.4	4907.0	3204.8	2792.7	277.3	7666.9	3069.2
2022	13053.0	4293.7	2745.8	2570.5	896.8	221.2	5076.3	1100.7
2023	8433.1	2965.8	770.9	2352.9	264.6	265.8	2896.0	529.6
2024	13247.4	3210.4	2670.5	3407.9	462.9	1206.1	5456.0	1428.3
2025	20793.5	4054.9	2162.2	5020.8	219.1	671.6	6677.0	828.5
Total	198710.1	93027.3	30195.8	41749.9	12956.8	9833.5	67781.8	21674.2

Notes: with framework agreements, CRCB's own calculation.

Table. 1.2. Estimated Kleptocratic Rent (million €), 2011-2025

Years	Total estimated kleptocratic rent			Estimated kleptocratic rent financed by EU-funds		
	$\gamma = 0.2$	$\gamma = 0.3$	$\gamma = 0.4$	$\gamma = 0.2$	$\gamma = 0.3$	$\gamma = 0.4$
2011	141.0	195.3	241.8	76.3	105.6	130.7
2012	411.7	570.1	705.8	154.7	214.3	265.3
2013	679.6	941.0	1165.0	409.2	566.6	701.5
2014	617.2	854.6	1058.1	245.5	339.9	420.8
2015	469.2	649.7	804.4	163.6	226.6	280.5
2016	659.1	912.7	1130.0	178.5	247.1	306.0
2017	1135.9	1572.7	1947.2	575.4	796.8	986.5
2018	783.0	1084.1	1342.2	261.7	362.3	448.6
2019	764.8	1059.0	1311.1	118.5	164.1	203.1
2020	1006.7	1393.9	1725.8	269.5	373.2	462.1
2021	1277.8	1769.3	2190.6	511.5	708.3	876.9
2022	846.1	1171.5	1450.4	183.4	254.0	314.5
2023	482.7	668.3	827.4	88.3	122.2	151.3
2024	909.3	1259.1	1558.9	238.0	329.6	408.1
2025	1112.8	1540.9	1907.7	138.1	191.2	236.7
Total	11297.0	15642.0	19366.2	3612.4	5001.7	6192.6

Notes: with framework agreements, CRCB's own calculation.

Annex

A1. Definition of Variables Used

- [1] w : number of contracts awarded (winning bids);
- [2] ncv_i : Net value of the i -th contract awarded (winning bid) in EUR million;
Where if $0 = ncv_i$ then it is a missing value;
- [3] $cr_i [0,1]$: corruption risk indicator for the i -th contract awarded (winning bid); its value is
1, if there was no competition for the i -th contract (winning bid), one bid was received during the procedure, or
0, if several bids competed;
- [4] $crx_i [0,1]$: corruption risk indicator for the i -th contract awarded (winning bid); its value is
1, if there were no more than three bids for the i -th contract, or
0, if there were at least four bids;
- [5] $nbidx_i [1,...,5]$: competition intensity, its value is
1, if there was only one bid,
2, if the number of bids were from 2 to 3,
3, if the number of bids were from 4 to 7,
4, if the number of bids were from 8 to 16,
5, if the number of bids were from 17 to 31;
- [6] b_i : the number of valid bids submitted during the procedure for the i -th contract awarded;
- [7] $tops_{-i} [0,1]$: the i -th contract won by one of the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy (see Annex 3 and Annex 4) alone or as part of a consortium; its value is
1, if the i -th contract was awarded to one of the top actors of Orbán's kleptocracy, or
0, if the i -th contract was awarded to other Hungarian companies;
- [8] $lti_i [0,1]$: procedure type at the i -th contract; its value is
1, if procedure was not open at the i -th contract awarded, or
0, if procedure was open at the i -th contract awarded;
- [9] $eu_i [0,1]$: The type of funding its value is
1, if the i -th contract was financed by EU-funds, or
0, if the i -th contract was financed by Hungarian taxpayers;
- [10] $sector_i [1,..,8]$: industrial sector of the purchased good or service at the i -th contract;
- [11] $CR = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^w cr_i}{w}$, where $0 \leq CR \leq 1$;
- [12] $CRX = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^w crx_i}{w}$, where $0 \leq CRX \leq 1$;
- [13] $OW = \frac{w}{\sum_{i=1}^w b_i - w + 1}$ where $0 \leq OW \leq w$;
- [14] $NCV_CR1 = \sum_{i=1}^w ncv_i * cr_i$ where $0 \leq NCV_CR1 \leq \sum_{i=1}^w ncv_i$;
- [15] $lnNCV_i$: logarithm of net value (ncv_i) of the i -th contract awarded (winning bid) in EUR million;
- [16] $year_i$: the year of the Public Procurement Bulletin in which the i -th contract was announced.

All variables listed [1-16] can be interpreted in any group of contracts or bids.

A2. The Top Actors

A2.1. Ties Between Top Actors and Political Actors

Type of relationships	Actors	Top Actors
social relations, friendship	Viktor Orbán	Lőrinc Mészáros
social relations, friendship	Viktor Orbán	István Garancsi
kinship / family relationship	Viktor Orbán	István Tiborcz
social relations, friendship	Viktor Orbán	Lajos Simicska
social relations friendship	Viktor Orbán	László Szíjj
subordination and superordination	Viktor Orbán →	Antal Rogán
subordination and superordination	Viktor Orbán →	Péter Szijjártó
kinship / family relationship	Lőrinc Mészáros	Zsolt Homlok
kinship / family relationship	Lőrinc Mészáros	János Mészáros
social relations, friendship	Péter Szijjártó	László Szíjj
social relations, friendship	Péter Szijjártó	Gyula Balásy
social relations, friendship	Péter Szijjártó Antal Rogán	Tibor Kuna
social relations, friendship	Antal Rogán	Csaba Csetényi
social relations, friendship	Antal Rogán	Gyula Balásy
social relations, friendship	László Szíjj	Lőrinc Mészáros
social relations, friendship	István Tiborcz	Lajos Simicska
social relations, friendship	István Tiborcz	Endre Hamar
social relations, friendship	István Tiborcz	Attila Paár
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	László Szíjj
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	Zsolt Homlok
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	István Garancsi
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	Lajos Simicska
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	István Tiborcz
business relations	Lőrinc Mészáros	Gellért Jászai
business relations	István Tiborcz	Lajos Simicska
business relations	István Tiborcz	Endre Hamar
business relations	István Tiborcz	Attila Paár
business relations	István Tiborcz	Gellért Jászai
business relations	István Tiborcz	István Szeivolt

Notes: business relations: direct or indirect joint ownership or business transactions between owned companies or joint participation in a consortium for a public tender; names in bold: political actors and member of the Fidesz government; →: direction of subordination relationship;
Viktor Orbán: Prime Minister of Hungary and leader of the Fidesz political party;
Péter Szijjártó: Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary;
Antal Rogán: Minister of the Prime Minister's Cabinet Office.

These individuals are the top actors in Viktor Orbán's kleptocracy. A total of 63 companies are associated with these actors (see Annex 3), all of which have won at least one public procurement contract—either individually or as part of a consortium—between January 1999 and December 2025. Their personal ties to Orbán or the ruling Fidesz party are well-documented: (Anonimus, 2014; Easterly, 2014; Vorák, 2015; Dunai, 2018; Lambert, 2018a; Lambert, 2018b; Lambert, 2018c; Oroszi, 2018a; Oroszi, 2018b; Erdélyi, 2019; Lambert, 2019; Kelen-Alánt, 2019; Kovács, 2019; Tóth & Hajdu, 2021; Bódis, 2022; Brassai, 2022; Csanádi et al, 2022; Horn, 2022; Laki, 2022; Tóth & Hajdu, 2022; Tóth, 2022; Gyurkó, 2023; Wirth, 2023; Busi, 2024; Katus, 2024; Bicsérdi-Fülöp, 2025; Weiler & Kávai Horváth, 2025; Székely, 2025; Zajmi, 2025).

A3. List of Companies Affiliated with Top Actors

#	company name	tax number
1	4iG Plc. [Lőrinc Mészáros and Gellért Jászai (since 2019)]	12011069-2-51
2	Adept Enviro Ltd. [János Mészáros (since 2019)]	25749977-2-43
3	Agro-Felcsut Ltd. [János Mészáros]	23051344-2-07
4	Aranykorona Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros]	11843009-2-07
5	CLH Hűtés- és Klimatechnikai Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros (from June 2015 to September 2018), Attila Paár (from September 2018)]	10252019-2-42
6	CLH Klímateszervíz Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros (from June 2015 to September 2018), Attila Paár (from September 2018)]	24307466-2-42
7	Duna Aszfalt Ltd. [László Szíjj]	28733232-4-03
8	Elios Innovatív Energetikai Ltd. [István Tiborc]	14869497-2-41
9	E-OS Energiakereskedő Ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2009-2018)]	13857424-2-43
10	E-OS Közvilágítási Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2007-2018)]	14751433-2-41
11	Épkar Ltd. [Szeivolt István]	11266101-2-44
12	EUPRO Projektmenedzsment Ltd. [Endre Hamar]	14869497-2-41
13	Euro General Építő és Szolgáltató Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros and his family (since March 2015)]	22927800-2-08
14	Europublicity Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2019), Lőrinc Mészáros (2019-2020)]	13410007-2-41
15	Fejér B.A.L. Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros and his family]	25308673-2-07
16	Herceghalom Interat Ltd. [János Mészáros]	10980965-2-07
17	Heti Válasz Lap- és Könyvkiadó Szolgáltató Ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2013-2018)]	12661877-2-41
18	Híd-Tám Ltd. [János Mészáros]	12902765-2-13
19	Hódút Freeway Ltd. [László Szíjj]	14603170-4-03
20	Hódút Építő Ltd. [László Szíjj]	27836868-4-03
21	Homlok Építő Ltd. [Zsolt Homlok]	25811058-2-18
22	Homlok Építőipari Ltd. [Zsolt Homlok]	27187580-2-18
23	Invitech ICT Services Ltd. [Gellért Jászai (since December 2021)]	25836965-2-44
24	Közpép Építő- és Fémszerkezetgyártó Ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2018), László Szíjj (since 2019)]	10950676-4-44
25	Közpéphídorr Ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2018)]	13618504-2-43
26	Lounge Design Ltd. [Gyula Balásy]	22715544-2-44
27	Lounge Event Ltd. [Gyula Balásy]	23444030-2-44
28	Magyar Építő Ltd. [Laszlo Szíjj (from 2015 to June 2017) Attila Paár (since June 2017)]	10759358-2-44
29	Magyar Vakond Ltd. [László Szíjj]	22929486-4-03
30	Mahir Cityposter Ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2018)]	10935099-2-43
31	Mahir Kiallítás és Rendezvény Ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2018)]	10935013-2-42
32	Mahir Press Media Ltd. [Lajos Simicska (1999-2018)]	19673460-1-43
33	Market Építő Ltd. [István Garancsi]	14776355-2-44
34	Market Épületszervíz Ltd. [István Garancsi]	12254550-2-41
35	MBH Bank Plc. [Lőrinc Mészáros]	10011922-4-44
36	Mediaworks Hungary Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros (since 2017)]	24785725-2-44
37	Mészáros és Mészáros Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros]	27420322-2-07
38	Mészáros M1 Autókereskedő Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros]	25521685-2-07
39	Mészáros M1 Járműparkkezelő Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros]	32456448-2-07

40	Mészáros M1 Szervíz Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros]	23353880-2-07
41	MET Magyarország Ltd. [István Garancsi]	14927939-2-44
42	Mobil Adat Ltd. [István Garancsi]	24212573-2-41
43	Nemzet Lap- és Könyvkiadó Ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2018)]	11285160-2-42
44	Network 360 Reklámügynökség Ltd. [Csaba Csetényi]	23480197-2-41
45	New Land Media Ltd. [Gyula Balásy]	24670827-2-44
46	PBE Építő Ltd. (former PBE Energiamenedzsment kft.) [Endre Hamar, István Tiborc and Attila Paár]	14094565-2-13
47	Pegazus Trade Ltd. [János Mészáros]	11103200-2-42
48	Publimont Hirdetésszervező Ltd. [Lajos Simicska (2011-2019), Lőrinc Mészáros (2019-2020)]	10253948-2-41
49	R-KORD Építőipari Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros]	11454599-2-07
50	Sistrade Ltd. [Endre Hamar]	22934569-2-02
51	Trinity International Communications Ltd. [Tibor Kuna]	23076763-2-41
52	VAKOND Út- és Építőipari Ltd. [László Szíjj]	10510122-4-03
53	Vakond Via Építő és Szolgáltató Ltd. [László Szíjj]	14602849-4-03
54	Vasútvillamosító Ltd. [Zsolt Homlok]	10813267-2-42
55	V-Híd Építő Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros (since 2018)]	25302990-2-44
56	V-Híd Network Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros (since 2018)]	27295199-2-07
57	V-Híd Vagyonkezelő Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros (since 2018)]	25955402-2-44
58	Visual Europe Ltd. [Gyula Balásy]	25319721-2-13
59	Visual Europe Production Ltd. [Gyula Balásy]	13196781-2-13
60	Vívienvíz Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros (2015-2024)]	25146824-2-16
61	West Hungária Bau Ltd. [Attila Paár]	11469830-2-44
62	Young & Partners Kommunikációs és Tanácsadó Ltd. [Tibor Kuna]	14288148-2-41
63	ZAEV Építőipari Ltd. [Lőrinc Mészáros (since 2019)]	10738885-2-20

Source: CRCB

A4. HUF / EUR Exchange Rates by Year

Year	EUR 1 =
1999	HUF 251.43*
1999	HUF 252.80
2000	HUF 260.04
2001	HUF 256.69
2002	HUF 247.96
2003	HUF 253.51
2004	HUF 251.68
2005	HUF 246.56
2006	HUF 250.85
2007	HUF 251.31
2008	HUF 251.25
2009	HUF 280.58
2010	HUF 275.41
2011	HUF 279.21
2012	HUF 289.42
2013	HUF 296.92
2014	HUF 308.66
2015	HUF 309.90
2016	HUF 311.46
2017	HUF 309.21
2018	HUF 318.87
2019	HUF 325.35
2020	HUF 351.17
2021	HUF 358.52
2022	HUF 391.33
2023	HUF 380.98
2024	HUF 395.20
2025	HUF 397.91

Notes: *: EUR/HUF exchange rate in 1th January 1999; annual average exchange rates calculated from daily average exchange rates of the MNB (Central Bank of Hungary). Source of daily data: <https://www.mnb.hu/arfolyam-lekerdezes>

A5. Analyzed State Organizations and State-Owned Companies

num_id	id	name of contracting authority in the dataset
1	_nsz	nemzeti szinhaz kozhasznu nonprofit zrt. / nemzeti szinhaz nonprofit zrt. / nemzeti szinhaz zrt.
2	a_np	aggteleki nemzeti park
3	ab_fel	allami biztositasfelugyelet
4	ahh	allamhaztartasi hivatal
5	ajbh	alapveto jogok biztosanak hivatala
6	am	agrarminiszterium
7	ap_fel	allami penztarfelugyelet
8	apeh	ado- es penzugyi ellenorzesi hivatal / ado- es penzugyi ellenorzo hivatal
9	apt_fel	allami penz- es tokepiaci felugyelet
10	avh	alkotmanyvedelmi hivatal
11	b_fu	baranya megyei fejlesztési ugnokseg kft. / baranya megyei fejlesztési ugnokseg nonprofit kft.
12	b_np	bukki nemzeti park
13	bah	bevandorlasi es allampolgarsagi hivatal
14	bar_fel	baranya megyei kozlekedesi felugyelet
15	bar_kh	baranya megyei kormányhivatal / baranya varmegyei kormányhivatal
16	baz_kh	borsod-abauj-zemplen megyei kormányhivatal / borsod-abauj-zemplen varmegyei kormányhivatal
17	baz_mo	borsod-abauj-zemplen megyei onkormanyzata / borsod-abauj-zemplen varmegye onkormanyzata
18	bazfu	borsod-abauj-zemplen megyei fejlesztési ugnokseg / borsod-abauj-zemplen varmegyei fejlesztési ugnokseg
19	bazo_h	borsod-abauj-zemplen megye onkormanyzati hivatal / borsod-abauj-zemplen megyei onkormanyzati hivatal
20	bek_fel	bekes megyei kozlekedesi felugyelet
21	bek_kh	bekes megyei kormányhivatal / bekis varmegyei kormányhivatal
22	bekkto_h	bekes megye kepviselo-testulete onkormanyzati hivatal / bekis megyei onkormanyzati hivatal
23	bf_kh	budapest fovaros kormányhivatala
24	bf_np	balaton-felvideki nemzeti park
25	bifu	balatoni integracios es fejlesztési ugnokseg kozhasznu nonprofit kft.
26	bk_fh	bacs-kiskun megyei foldhivatal
27	bk_fu	bacs-kiskun megyei fejlesztési ugnokseg nonprofit kkft.
28	bkk_fel	bacs-kiskun megyei kozlekedesi felugyelet
29	bkk_kh	bacs-kiskun megyei kormányhivatal / bacs-kiskun varmegyei kormányhivatal
30	bkkk_h	bacs-kiskun megyei kozgyules hivatala
31	bkkmsz_h	bacs-kiskun megyei mezogazdasagi szakigazgatasi hivatal
32	bkko_h	bacs-kiskun megyei onkormanyzati hivatal

33	bm	belugyminiszterium
34	bm_bah	bm bevandorlasi es allampolgarsagi hivatal
35	bm_bk	bm beszerzesi es kereskedelmi rt
36	bm_brf	budapesti rendor-fokapitanysag
37	bm_heros	bm heros javito, gyarto, szolgaltato es kereskedelmi zrt.
38	bm_kanyvh	belugyminiszterium kozponti adatfeldolgozo nyilvantarto es valasztasi hivatal / belugyminiszterium adatfeldolgozo hivatal / kozponti adatfeldolgozo, nyilvantarto es valasztasi hivatal / kozponti nyilvantarto es valasztasi hivatal
39	bm_okf	bm orszagos katasztrofavedelmi foigazgatosag
40	bm_orf	bm orszagos rendor-fokapitanysag
41	bm_pvop	bm polgari vedelem orszagos parancsnoksag
42	bmh	bevandorlasi es menekultugyi hivatal
43	bnmb	babolna nemzeti menesbirtok
44	bth	budapesti turisztikai hivatal
45	bvkei	buntetes-vegrehajtas kozponti ellato intezmenye
46	cs_nsz	csokonai nemzeti szinhaz
47	cscs_kh	csongrad megyei kormányhivatal / csongrad-csanad megyei kormányhivatal / csongrad-csanad varmegyei kormányhivatal
48	csk_fel	csongrad megyei kozlekedesi felugyelet
49	darfu	del-alfoldi regionalis fejlesztési ugnokseg
50	dariu	del-alfoldi regionalis innovacios fejlesztési ugnokseg kht.
51	dd_np	duna-drava nemzeti park
52	ddrfu	del-dunantuli regionalis fejlesztési ugnokseg kht. / ddrfu
53	dh_k	diakhitel kozpont zrt.
54	dkmtefu	duna-koros-maros-tisza euroregios fejlesztési ugnokseg nonprofit kht. / duna-koros-maros-tisza euroregios fejlesztési ugnokseg nonprofit kht.
55	dku	digitalis kormányzati ugnokseg
56	dmu	digitalis magyarorszag ugnokseg
57	dtnk_k	design terminal nemzeti kreatívipari kozpont
58	eareu	eszak-alfoldi regionalis energia ugnokseg
59	earfiu	eszak-alfold regionalis fejlesztési es innovacios ugnokseg nonprofit kft. / innova eszak-alfold regionalis fejlesztési es innovacio ugnokseg nonprofit kft.
60	earfu	eszak-alfoldi regionalis fejlesztési ugnokseg kht.
61	eb_fel	egeszsegbiztositasi felugyelet
62	eb_hat	egyenlo banasmod hatosag
63	eek_h	egeszsegugyi engedelyzesi es kozigazgatasi hivatal
64	eem	emberi eroforrasok miniszteriuma
65	ehkeiu	energiahatekonysagi, kornyezetvedelmi es energia informacios ugnokseg
66	ekm	epitesi es kozlekedesi miniszterium
67	elt_e	eotvos lorand tudomanyegyetem
68	em	egeszsegugyi miniszterium
69	emra_h	eszak-magyarorszag regionalis allamigazgatasi hivatal
70	emrfu	eszak-magyarorszag regionalis fejlesztési ugnokseg / norda

71	emrk_h	eszak-magyarorszagi regionalis kozigazgatasi hivatal
72	ene_u	energia ugnokseg kozhasznu nonprofit kft.
73	eszanpi	europai szocialis alap nemzeti programiranyito iroda kht. / esza europai szocialis alap nemzeti programiranyito iroda tarsadalmi szolgaltato kht.
74	eszscsm	egeszsegugyi, szocialis es csaladugyi miniszterium
75	eszf_k	egeszseginformatikai szolgaltato es fejlesztési kozpont nonprofit kft.
76	eum	energiaugyi miniszterium
77	f_kh	fejer megyei kormányhivatal / fejer varmegyei kormányhivatal
78	fgynosz_k	forster gyula nemzeti orokseggazdalkodasi es szolgaltatasi kozpont
79	fh	foglalkoztatasi hivatal
80	fh_np	ferto-hansag nemzeti park
81	fk_fel	fovarosi kozlekedesi felugyelet / fovarosi kozlekedesi fofelugyelet
82	fm	foldmuvelésügyi miniszterium
83	fmm	foglalkoztatáspolitikai es munkaügyi miniszterium
84	fov_fh	fovarosi foldhivatal
85	fszh	foglalkoztatasi es szocialis hivatal
86	fvm	foldmuvelésügyi es videkfejlesztési miniszterium / fvm
87	gkm	gazdasagi es kozlekedési miniszterium
88	gm	gazdasagi miniszterium
89	gvh	gazdasagi versenyhivatal
90	gy_nsz	gyori nemzeti színház
91	gyism	gyermek-, ifjusagi es sportminiszterium
92	gyms_kh	gyor-moson-sopron megyei kormányhivatal / gyor-moson-sopron varmegyei kormányhivatal
93	gymsk_fel	gyor-moson-sopron megyei kozlekedési felugyelet
94	gyms_o_h	gyor-moson-sopron megye onkormanyzati hivatal / gyor-moson-sopron megyei onkormanyzati hivatal
95	h_fel	hirkozlesi felugyelet / hirkozlesi fofelugyelet
96	h_kh	heves megyei kormányhivatal / heves varmegyei kormányhivatal
97	h_np	hortobagy nemzeti park
98	hb_fh	hajdu-bihar megyei foldhivatal
99	hb_fu	hajdu-bihar megyei fejlesztési ugnokseg nonprofit kft.
100	hb_kh	hajdu-bihar megyei kormányhivatal / hajdu-bihar varmegyei kormányhivatal
101	hepa_meu	hepa_meu magyar exportfejlesztési ugnokseg
102	hhu	hungary helps ugnokseg nonprofit zrt.
103	hipa_nbu	hipa nemzeti befektetési ugnokseg / nemzeti befektetési ugnokseg
104	hknt	hegykozsegek nemzeti tanácsa
105	hm	honvedelmi miniszterium
106	hm_bbbh	hm beszerzési biztonsági es beruházási hivatal / hm biztonsági es beruházási beruházási hivatal
107	hm_be	hm budapesti erdogazdaság zrt.
108	hm_bgy	hm bessenyei gyorgy nonprofit kft.
109	hm_bh	hm beszerzési hivatal

110	hm_elv	hm elektronikai, logisztikai es vagyonkezelő rt.
111	hm_fhh	hm fegyverzeti es hadbiztosí hivatal
112	hm_flu	hm fejlesztési es logisztikai ügynökség
113	hm_ih	hm ingatlankezelési hivatal
114	hm_iu	hm infrastrukturális ügynökség
115	hm_r	hm recreatív kht. / hm rekreációs es kulturális közhasznú nonprofit kft.
116	hm_t	hm terkepeszeti kht.
117	hm_terh	hm terkepeszeti hivatal
118	hm_th	hm technológiai hivatal
119	hm_ve	hm veszpremi erdogazdaság zrt. / hm verga veszpremi erdogazdaság
120	hm_vh	hm vedelemgazdasági hivatal
121	hm_zgt	hm zrinyi geoinformációs es toborzástámogató közhasznú nonprofit kft.
122	hm_zk	hm zrinyi kommunikációs kht. / hm zrinyi kommunikációs szolgáltató nonprofit közhasznú kft. / hm zrinyi kommunikációs szolgáltató kht.
123	hm_ztk	hm zrinyi terkepeszeti es kommunikációs szolgáltató közhasznú nonprofit kft.
124	hmsz_h	heves megyei mezogazdasági szakigazgatási hivatal
125	hnr	hungarofest nemzeti rendezvényszervező kht. / hungarofest nemzeti rendezvényszervező nonprofit kft.
126	ho_h	heves megyei önkormányzati hivatal
127	hr_k	hun-ren központ
128	htm_kh	határon túli magyarok hivatala
129	htu	heves megyei területfejlesztési ügynökség
130	humda_mamfu	humda magyar auto-motorsport fejlesztési ügynökség
131	humda_mmfu	humda magyar mobilitás-fejlesztési ügynökség
132	i_hat	integritás hatóság
133	icsszem	ifjúsági, családugyi, szociális es esélyegyenlőségi miniszterium
134	ihm	informatikai es hírközlési miniszterium
135	im	igazságügyi miniszterium
136	imi_h	igazságügyi miniszterium igazságügyi hivatala
137	irm	igazságügyi es rendészeti miniszterium
138	ism	ifjúsági es sportminiszterium
139	ismmb_h	jusági es sportminiszterium miniszteri biztós hivatala
140	iszi_h	igazságügyi szakértői intézetek hivatala
141	itm	innovációs es technológiai miniszterium
142	jnsz_kh	jasz-nagykún-szolnok megyei kormányhivatal / jasz-nagykún-szolnok varmegyei kormányhivatal
143	jnszo_h	jasz-nagykún-szolnok megyei önkormányzati hivatal
144	jnsztu	jasz-nagykún-szolnok varmegyei területfejlesztési ügynökség nonprofit kft.
145	k_fel	közlekedési főfelügyelet
146	k_hat	közbeszerzési hatóság
147	k_np	kiskunsági nemzeti park
148	kdmfu	kdmfu közep-duna menti fejlesztési ügynökség

149	kdrfu	kozep-dunantuli regionalis fejlesztési ugnokseg kozhasznu nonprofit kft. / kozep-dunantuli regionalis innovacios ugnokseg nonprofit kft.
150	ke_h	kormanyzati ellenorzesi hivatal
151	ke_kh	komarom esztergom megyei kormányhivatal / komarom-esztergom varmegyei kormányhivatal
152	keh	koztarsasagi elnoki hivatal
153	kekhh	kozigazgatasi es elektronikus kozszolgaltatasok kozponti hivatala
154	keo_h	komarom-esztergom megyei onkormanyzat hivatala
155	kfiu	kormanyzati fejlesztési informatikai ugnokseg
156	khem	kozlekedesi, hirkozlesi es energiaugyi miniszterium
157	khm	kozlekedesi es hirkozlesi miniszterium
158	khvm	kozlekedesi, hirkozlesi es vizugyi miniszterium
159	kifu	kormanyzati informatikai fejlesztési ugnokseg
160	kih	kozigazgatasi es igazsagugyi hivatal
161	kim	kozigazgatasi es igazsagugyi miniszterium
162	kk	klebelsberg kozpont
163	kkm	kulgazdasagi es kulugyminiszterium
164	kknkkaa	kovacs katalin nemzeti kajak-kenu akademia alapitvany
165	kli_k	klebelsberg intezmenyfenntarto kozpont
166	km	kulugyminiszterium
167	km_np	koros-maros nemzeti park
168	knlls	kincsem nemzeti loverseny es lovas strategiai korlatolt felelossegu tarsasag
169	koh	kulturalis oroksegvedelmi hivatal
170	koszsz	kulturalis oroksegvedelmi szakszolgalat
171	kozv_m	kozlekedesi es vizugyi miniszterium
172	ksh	kozponti statisztikai hivatal
173	ktm	kozigazgatasi es teruletfejlesztési miniszterium
174	kuli_m	kulturalis es innovacios miniszterium
175	kvm	kornyezetvedelmi miniszterium
176	kvvm	kornyezetvedelmi es vizugyi miniszterium / kornyezetvedelmi- es vizugyi miniszterium
177	m_nsz	miskolci nemzeti szinhaz
178	maak_k	magyar allamkincstar allamadossag kezelo kozpont
179	mav	magyar allamvasutak / mav rt. / mav zrt.
180	mavp_k	mav rt. palyagazdalkodasi kozpont
181	mavsz_k	mav szolgáltato kozpont zrt.
182	mbfh	magyar banyaszati es foldtani hivatal
183	mcev	magyar cirkusz es variete nonprofit kft.
184	mddu	magyar divat & design ugnokseg nonprofit zrt.
185	meh	magyar energia hivatal
186	mekszh	magyar energetikai es kozmu-szabalyozasi hivatal
187	mgfu	magyar gazdasagfejlesztési ugnokseg
188	mh	miniszterelnoki hivatal
189	mhe_k	mh elhelyezesi kozpont

190	mhk_k	mh katonai kozlekedesi kozpont
191	mhonvedseg	magyar honvedseg
192	mhre_k	mh ruhazati ellato kozpont
193	mkeh	magyar kereskedelmi engedelyezesi hivatal
194	mkih	informacios hivatal / magyar koztarsasag informacios hivatala
195	mmkb_h	magyar millennium kormánybiztos hivatala
196	mnb	magyar nemzeti bank
197	mnb_bsz	mnb-biztonsagi szolgaltatasok zartkoruen mukodo reszvenytarsasag / mnb-biztonsagi zrt.
198	mnb_ekk	mnb-edulab kompetencia kozpont nonprofit kft.
199	mnb_i	mnb-ingatlan kft.
200	mndaf	magyar nemzeti digitalis archivum es filmintezet
201	mnfa	magyar nemzeti filmalap kozhasznu nonprofit zrt.
202	mnfzek	magyar nemzeti filharmonikus zenekar, enekkar es kottatar nonprofit kft. / magyar nemzeti filharmonikus zenekar, enekkar es kottatar kht.
203	mng	muemelek nemzeti gondnoksaga
204	mnl	magyar nemzeti leveltar
205	mnm	magyar nemzeti muzeum
206	mnmk_k	magyar nemzeti muzeum kozgyujtemenyi kozpont
207	mnv	magyar nemzeti vagyonkezo zrt.
208	msz_h	mezogazdasagi szakigazgatasi hivatal
209	msza_h	magyar szabadalmi hivatal
210	mszh	mezogazdasagi szakigazgatasi hivatal
211	mta	magyar tudomanyos akademia
212	mtaki_k	magyar tudomanyos akademia konyvtar es informacios kozpont
213	mtu	magyar turisztikai ugvnyokseg
214	muk_k	molekularis- ujjlenyomat kutato kozpont nonprofit kft.
215	mvh	mezogazdasagi es videkfejlesztési hivatal
216	mvm_d_i	mvm demasz
217	mvm_e_i	mvm emasz
218	mvm_ed_i	mvm egaz-degaz
219	mvm_f_i	mvm fogaz
220	mvm_i_i	mvm informatika
221	mvm_m_i	mvm matra
222	mvm_n_i	mvm net
223	mvm_nx_i	mvm next
224	mvm_p_i	mvm paks
225	mvm_z_i	mvm zold
226	n_kh	nograd megyei kormányhivatal / nograd varmegyei kormányhivatal
227	na_hat	nemzeti akkreditalo hatosag
228	naec_k	nemzeti artista- eloado es cirkuszmuveszeti kozpont nonprofit kft.
229	nai_hat	nemzeti adatvedelmi es informacioszabadsag hatosag
230	nai_k	nemzeti agrarkutatasi es innovacios kozpont

231	nakvi	nemzeti agrarszaktanacsadasi, kepzesi es videkfejlesztési intézet
232	nap	nemzeti autopalya rt. / nemzeti autopalya zrt.
233	nat	nemzeti akkreditáló testület
234	nau	nemzeti adatvagyron ugynokseg kft.
235	navh	nemzeti ado- es vamhivatal
236	nbeg_k	nemzeti biodiverzitas- es megorzési kozpont
237	nbu	nemzeti befektetési ugynokseg
238	ncsszi	nemzeti család- es szocialpolitikai intézet
239	ndk	nemzeti dohánykereskedelmi nonprofit zrt.
240	neba	nemzeti egészségbiztosítási alapkezelő
241	nebh	nemzeti emlékezet bizottságnak hivatala
242	nefi	nemzeti egészségfejlesztési intézet
243	neg	nemzeti energiagazdalkodási zrt.
244	neh	nemzeti élelmiszerlánc-biztonsági hivatal
245	nek	nemzeti eszközkezelő zrt.
246	nem	nemzeti erőforrás miniszterium
247	neu	nemzeti energetikai ugynokseg zrt.
248	nf_h	nemzeti fejlesztési hivatal
249	nf_hat	nemzeti fogyasztóvédelmi hatóság
250	nf_k	nemzeti fejlesztési központ
251	nfaksz	nemzeti oldalkezelő szervezet
252	nfesi	nemzeti fejlesztési es strategiai intézet nonprofit kft.
253	nffku	nffku / nemzetközi fejlesztési es forraskoordinációs ugynokseg zrt.
254	nffu	nemzetközi fejlesztési es forraskoordinációs ugynokseg
255	nfgm	nemzeti fejlesztési es gazdasági miniszterium
256	nfi	nemzeti filmintézet közhasznú nonprofit zrt.
257	nfm	nemzeti fejlesztési miniszterium
258	nfdpi	nemzeti fejlesztési programiroda nonprofit kft.
259	nfsi	nfsi / nemzeti fejlesztési es strategiai intézet nonprofit kft.
260	nfu	nemzeti fejlesztési ugynokseg
261	nfu_k	nemzeti földügyi központ
262	ngm	nemzetgazdasági miniszterium
263	ngth	nemzetgazdasági tervezési hivatal
264	nh_hat	nemzeti hírközlési hatóság
265	nhgkev	nemzeti hulladékgazdalkodási koordináló es vagyonekezelő zrt.
266	nih	nemzeti innovációs hivatal
267	niif_i	nemzeti információs infrastruktúra fejlesztési intézet
268	niifi	nemzeti információs infrastruktúra fejlesztési iroda
269	niksz	nemzeti infokommunikációs szolgáltató zrt.
270	nipuef	nemzeti ipari park üzemeltető es fejlesztő zrt.
271	niu	nemzeti innovációs ugynokseg zrt.
272	nk_a	nemzeti kulturális alap
273	nk_e	nemzeti közszolgálati egyetem

274	nk_hat	nemzeti kozlekedesi hatosag
275	nk_i	nemzeti kozigazgatasi intezet
276	nkap	nemzeti kulturális alapprogram
277	nkfi	nemzeti kutatási, fejlesztési és innovációs hivatal
278	nkg	nemzeti külgazdasági hivatal
279	nkh	nemzeti kommunikációs hivatal
280	nki	nemzeti koncessziós iroda
281	nkk	nemzeti közlekedési központ nonprofit zrt.
282	nkom	nemzeti kulturális örökség minisztérium
283	nkov	nemzeti kulturális örökség védelmi nonprofit kft.
284	nkp	nemzeti kataszteri program kht / nemzeti kataszteri program nonprofit kft.
285	nkth	nemzeti kutatási és technológiai hivatal
286	nku_i	nemzeti környezetügyi intézet
287	nkvee_k	nemzeti környezetvédelmi és energia központ nonprofit kft.
288	nm_i	nemzeti művelődési intézet nonprofit közhasznú kft.
289	nmbet	nemzeti menesztől és tanácsadás zrt.
290	nmf	nemzeti mobilfizetési zrt.
291	nmh	nemzeti munkaügyi hivatal
292	nmh_hat	nemzeti média- és hírközlési hatóság
293	nne_k	nemzeti népegészségügyi központ
294	nngy_k	nemzeti népegészségügyi és gyógyszerészeti központ
295	no_i	nemzeti örökség intézete
296	nog_fu	nogradai fejlesztési ügynökség nonprofit kft.
297	novf	nemzeti örökségvédelmi fejlesztési nonprofit kft.
298	nro	nemzeti reorganizációs nonprofit kft.
299	nrszh	nemzeti rehabilitációs és szociális hivatal
300	nsfemi	nemzeti sportfejlesztési és módszertani intézet
301	nsk	nemzeti sportközpontok
302	nspu	nemzeti sportuszodák
303	nsu	nemzeti sportügynökség
304	nszefi	nemzeti szakképzési és felnőttképzési intézet
305	nszek_k	nemzeti szakértői és kutató központ
306	nszfh	nemzeti szakképzési és felnőttképzési hivatal
307	nszi	nemzeti szakképzési intézet
308	nt_sz	nemzeti táncszínház kht. / nemzeti táncszínház nonprofit kft.
309	nth	nemzeti tokeholding zrt.
310	nudfsz	nemzeti utdíjfizetési szolgáltató zrt.
311	nunesszi	nemzeti utánpótlás-nevelési és sportszolgáltató intézet
312	nusz	nemzeti üzleti szolgáltató zrt.
313	nvi	nemzeti választási iroda
314	nvm	nemzeti vízművek zrt.
315	nvsz	nemzeti védelmi szolgálat
316	nydrfu	nyugat-dunántúli regionális fejlesztési ügynökség

317	nnyi	nemzeti nyomozo iroda
318	o_np	orsegi nemzeti park
319	oah	orszagos atomenergia hivatal
320	obh	orszagos birosagi hivatal
321	oh	oktatasi hivatal
322	ohu	orszagos hulladekgazdalkodasi ugynokseg
323	oif	orszagos iderendeszeti foigazgatosag
324	oith	orszagos igazsagszolgalatasi tanacs hivatala
325	okf	orszagos korhazi foigazgatosag
326	okm	oktatasi es kulturalis miniszterium
327	om	oktatasi miniszterium
328	om_h	orszagos meresugyi hivatal
329	omv_h	orszagos muemlekvedelmi hivatal
330	onk_m	onkormanyzati miniszterium
331	ontep	opusztaszeri nemzeti torteneti emlekpark kiemelten kozhasznu nonprofit kft
332	onybf	orszagos nyugdijbiztositasi foigazgatosag
333	ors_h	magyar orszaggyules hivatala / orszaggyules hivatala
334	orsb_h	orszaggyulesi biztos hivatala
335	otf_h	orszagos területfejlesztési hivatal
336	otfh	orszagos tisztóorvosi hivatal
337	otm	onkormanyzati es területfejlesztési miniszterium
338	ov_f	orszagos vizugyi foigazgatosag
339	p_kh	pest megyei kormányhivatal / pest varmegyei kormányhivatal
340	p_nsz	pecsi nemzeti szinhaz / pecsi nemzeti szinhaz nonprofit kft.
341	pk_fel	pest megyei kozlekedési felügyelet
342	pku	petofi kulturalis ugynokseg nonprofit zrt.
343	pm	penzugyminiszterium
344	pm_vpopbe_h	pm vam- es penzugyorseg orszagos parancsnoksag beruhazasi es elhelyezési hivatala / vam- es penzugyorseg orszagos parancsnoksag beruhazasi es elhelyezési hivatala
345	pm_vpopi_h	pm vam- es penzugyorseg orszagos parancsnoksag integrációs hivatala
346	psza_fel	penzugyi szervezetek állami felügyelete
347	rok_k	rendőrségi oktatási es képző központ
348	s_kh	somogy megyei kormányhivatal / somogy varmegyei kormányhivatal
349	smnszi	slachta margit nemzeti szocialpolitikai intézet
350	smo_h	somogy megyei onkormanyzati hivatal
351	smsz_h	somogy megyei mezogazdasági szakigazgatási hivatal
352	sz_fel	szerencsejatek felügyelet
353	sz_nsz	szegedi nemzeti szinhaz
354	szcsm	szocialis es családügyi miniszterium
355	szmm	szocialis es munkaügyi miniszterium
356	szszb_kh	szabolcs-szatmar-bereg megyei kormányhivatal / szabolcs-szatmar-bereg varmegyei kormányhivatal
357	szszbk_fel	szabolcs-szatmar-bereg megyei közlekedési felügyelet

358	szzsbmsz_h	szabolcs-szatmar-bereg megyei mezogazdasagi szakigazgatasi hivatal
359	szzsbtku	szabolcs-szatmar-bereg megyei területfejlesztési és környezetgazdalkodási ugnokseg nonprofit kft.
360	szzsfu	szabolcs-szatmar-bereg megyei fejlesztési ugnokseg kht.
361	sztf_hat	szabalyozott tevekenysegek felugyeleti hatosaga
362	sztmh	szellemi tulajdon nemzeti hivatala
363	t_kh	tolna megyei kormányhivatal / tolna varmegyei kormányhivatal
364	te_k	terrorelharitasi kozpont
365	tim	technologiai és ipari miniszterium
366	v_kh	veszprem megyei kormányhivatal / veszprem varmegyei kormányhivatal
367	vas_kh	vas megyei kormányhivatal / vas varmegyei kormányhivatal
368	vbu	vedelmi beszerzesi ugnokseg
369	veu	magyar vedelmi exportugynokseg zrt.
370	vit_k	varkapitanysag integralt területfejlesztési kozpont nonprofit zrt.
371	vpo	vam- és penzugyorseg
372	z_kh	zala megyei kormányhivatal / zala varmegyei kormányhivatal
373	ziitt_k	zalazone innotech innovacios és technologiai transzfer kozpont nonprofit kft.
374	ztu	zala megyei területfejlesztési ugnokseg kozhasznu nonprofit kft. / zalai területfejlesztési ugnokseg kozhasznu nonprofit kft.

A6. Some of the Billboards from the Orbán Government's Propaganda Campaigns

A6.1.

Implicitly anti-Semitic campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (1).



(‘Let’s not let Soros have the last laugh’)

Photograph: Attila Kisbenedek/AFP/Getty Images

Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/12/george-soros-upset-by-anti-semitic-campaign-against-him-in-hungary>

A6.2.

Implicitly anti-Semitic campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (2).



Source: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/29/hungary-begins-new-official-hate-campaign>

A6.3.

Implicitly anti-Semitic campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (3).

Anti-EU campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (1).



(‘You have a right to know what Brussels is up to!’)

Source:

https://index.hu/kulfold/eurologus/2019/03/05/vegre_kiderult_mire_keszul_brusszel_europai_tanacs_napirendje/

A6.4.

Anti-EU campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (2).



('Stop Brussels! National Consultation 2017'; the handwritten text: 'But they'll send the money, right?')

Source: <https://english.atlatszo.hu/2022/04/12/hungary-had-to-repay-nearly-huf-20-billion-due-to-irregularities-in-eu-funded-projects/>

A6.5.

Anti-EU campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (2).



Fotó: FERENC ISZA/AFP

(‘The sanctions from Brussels are ruining us!’)

Source: <https://444.hu/2022/10/21/a-belga-miniszterelnok-szerint-mukodnek-az-oroszország-elleni-szankciok>

A6.6a-b.

Implicitly anti-Semitic campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (4).

Anti-EU campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (3).



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Source: <https://www.ksat.com/news/world/2023/11/23/an-anti-european-union-billboard-campaign-in-hungary-turns-up-tensions-with-the-orban-government/>



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(‘Let’s not dance to their tune!’)

<https://www.ksat.com/news/world/2023/11/23/an-anti-european-union-billboard-campaign-in-hungary-turns-up-tensions-with-the-orban-government/>

A6.7.

Anti-EU campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (4).

Anti-Ukrainian campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (1).



„I did not give him permission to do that!” A photo taken on June 3, 2025, shows a pedestrian walking past billboards with posters that are part of a campaign by the Hungarian government with the lettering ‘They would admit Ukraine into the EU, but we would pay the price! Vote no!’ in Budapest. The Hungarian government in a letter asks citizens to vote on Ukraine’s membership of the European Union. The posters show European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (R) and President of the European People’s Party (EPP) Manfred Weber (photo by AFP/Attila Kisbenedek)

Source: <https://www.valaszonline.hu/2025/06/10/volodymyr-zelenskyy-ukraine-russia-war-vladimir-putin-viktor-orban-kyiv-interview/>

A6.8.

Anti-EU campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (5-8).



(‘Does Brussels make you angry?’; the handwritten text: ‘Brussels is a city. You’re the one who’s making me angry, Viktor!’)

Source: https://hvg.hu/360/20250814_hvg-Munk-Veronika-Itt-az-EU-s-vakcina-a-media-bajaira-de-erosebb-a-betegseg-mediaszabadsag-rendelet

A6.9.

Anti-EU campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (5-8).



(‘Does Brussels make you angry?’; ‘Is George Soros launching another attack?’; ‘Are you worried about your child being exposed to sexual propaganda?’; ‘Does illegal immigration outrage you?’)

Source:

https://www.reddit.com/r/hungary/comments/of6qo0/m%C3%A9g_nincs_szombat_de_a_korm%C3%A1ny_ezekkel_plak%C3%A1tolt/

A6.10.

Anti-EU campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (9).



('Brussels' puppets want to raise taxes')

Photograph: Attila Kisbenedek/AFP/Getty Images.

Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/23/hungary-election-campaign-rival-rallies-viktor-orban-peter-magyar>

A6.11.

Anti-EU campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (10).

Anti-Ukrainian campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (2).



('Let's not let them make decisions over our heads!')

Source: <https://www.dw.com/en/hungary-orban-ukraine-smear-campaign/a-72479041>

A6.12.

Anti-EU campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (11).

Anti-Ukrainian campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (3).



Photograph: Bernadett Szabó/Reuters

Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/27/hungarys-viktor-orban-seeking-to-drum-up-votes-by-doing-down-ukraine>

A6.13.

Anti-Ukrainian campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (4).
Implicitly anti-Semitic campaign of Orbán Government in Hungary (5).



(‘Let’s not let Zelensky have the last laugh. National Petition. Fill it out online!’)
Source: <https://telex.hu/belfold/2026/03/02/ne-hagyjuk-zelenszkij-nevessen-a-vegen-hirdetes-nemzeti-peticio>



(Top left: ‘They are the risk. The Fidesz is the safe choice. 12 April.’)

Source: <https://hu.euronews.com/2026/03/24/egyutt-kezbesitenek-szavazolapot-es-orban-miniszterelnoki-kampanylevelet-a-levelszavazokna>

A6.14.

Some Billboards of anti-EU campaign of Orbán government in Hungary, 2016-2025



Source: <https://telex.hu/english/2024/05/10/for-ten-years-the-hungarian-government-has-used-billboards-to-proclaim-that-a-city-constantly-wants-to-harm-hungary>

A7. List of CRCB publication on Political Favoritism, Cronyism and Kleptocratic System in Hungary 2016-2026

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- [10] Tóth, I. J., & Hajdu, M. (2021). *Haveri cégek az Orbán-rendszerben: árbevétel, profit, hozzáadott érték és osztalékfizetés. Magyarországon 2005–2018 között nagy összegű közbeszerzési szerződéseket nyerő cégek mérlegadatainak*

elemzése. (*Crony companies in the Orbán regime: net turnover, profit, value-added, and dividend payments. Analysis of balance sheet data of companies winning large public procurement contracts in Hungary from 2005 to 2018.*) CRCB. http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/crcb_wp_2021_2_220314.pdf

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A8. List of Contracts Analyzed

See at <https://www.crcb.eu/?p=4033> the attached CSV file.