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	<title>CRCB &#187; political favoritism</title>
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		<title>Why is it Necessary for Hungary to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office?</title>
		<link>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=3725</link>
		<comments>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=3725#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Sep 2025 05:49:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tóth István János]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Presentations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[corruption risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hungary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[kleptocracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political favoritism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public procurement]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[&#160; September 24, 2025 &#160; Tóth, I. J. (2025, September 24). Why is it Necessary for Hungary to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office? Some Empirical Evidence and Considerations [Presentation]. European Parliament, PETI Public Hearing, Brussels, Belgium. https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3725 Presentation at PETI Public Hearing ‘How could Hungary’s accession to the European Public Prosecutor&#8217;s Office help to unlock EU funds [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<p>September 24, 2025</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Tóth, I. J. (2025, September 24). Why is it Necessary for Hungary to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office?<br />
 Some Empirical Evidence and Considerations [Presentation]. European Parliament, PETI Public Hearing, Brussels, Belgium. https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3725</p>
<p>Presentation at PETI Public Hearing ‘How could Hungary’s accession to the European Public Prosecutor&#8217;s Office help to unlock EU funds for Hungary&#8217;, September 24, 2025, 14:30-16:00; Brussels, European Parliament.</p>
<p>The <a class='ecae-link' href='http://www.crcb.eu/?p=3725'>read more</a></p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Mégis miért lehetünk optimisták?</title>
		<link>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=3627</link>
		<comments>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=3627#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Feb 2025 10:33:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tóth István János]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Presentations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[corruption risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cronyism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hungary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[kleptocracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[odds of winning]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political favoritism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public procurement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Viktor Orban]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.crcb.eu/?p=3627</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#160; February 25, 2025 &#160; Mégis miért lehetünk optimisták? Előadás a CEU Bibó István Szabadegyetemen. (PDF) &#160; Suggested citation: &#160; Tóth, I. J. (2025, február 25). Mégis miért lehetünk optimisták? (Why Can We Still Be Optimistic?) [Presentation] CEU Bibó István Free University, read more]]></description>
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<p>February 25, 2025</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Mégis miért lehetünk optimisták? Előadás a CEU Bibó István Szabadegyetemen. (<a href="http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2025_ceu_bibo_szabadegyetem_250225_02.pdf" target="_blank">PDF</a>)</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Suggested citation:</p>
<p>&nbsp;<br />
Tóth, I. J. (2025, február 25). <i>Mégis miért lehetünk optimisták? (</i><i>Why Can We Still Be Optimistic?) </i>[Presentation] CEU Bibó István Free University, <a class='ecae-link' href='http://www.crcb.eu/?p=3627'>read more</a></p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Two Communication Companies in the Hungarian Public Procurement Market 2012-2023</title>
		<link>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=3530</link>
		<comments>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=3530#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Feb 2024 13:39:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tóth István János]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research Notes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Short Papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[corruption risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cronyism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hungary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political favoritism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public procurement]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.crcb.eu/?p=3530</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#160; February 19, 2024 &#160; Research Notes: 2024:1 (PDF) The analyzed database (CSV) &#160; Suggested citation: Tóth, I. J. read more]]></description>
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<p>February 19, 2024</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Research Notes: 2024:1 (<a href="http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/2024_research_notes_01_190224_04.pdf">PDF</a>)</p>
<p>The analyzed database (<a href="http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/2024_research_notes_01_190224_01.zip">CSV</a>)</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Suggested citation:</p>
<p>Tóth, I. J. <a class='ecae-link' href='http://www.crcb.eu/?p=3530'>read more</a></p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Haveri cégek az Orbán rendszerben: árbevétel, profit, hozzáadott érték és osztalékfizetés</title>
		<link>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2967</link>
		<comments>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2967#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Dec 2021 11:11:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tóth István János]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Working Papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cronyism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[empirical analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hungary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political corruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political favoritism]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2967</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#160; December 29, 2021 &#160; &#160; Össszefoglalás &#160; A tanulmányban 2004 és 2018 között legnagyobb közbeszerzési szerződéseket elnyerő cégek mintáján azt vizsgáljuk, hogy egyes cégtulajdonosoknak a 2010-ben hivatalba lépett magyar miniszterelnökkel és kormánya egyes tagjaival való rokoni vagy baráti kapcsolatai milyen hatással lehettek cégeik árbevételére, hozzáadott értékére, profitjára és a cégtulajdonosoknak az osztalékfizetéssel kapcsolatos döntéseire. [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<p>December 29, 2021</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Össszefoglalás</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>A tanulmányban 2004 és 2018 között legnagyobb közbeszerzési szerződéseket elnyerő cégek mintáján azt vizsgáljuk, hogy egyes cégtulajdonosoknak a 2010-ben hivatalba lépett magyar miniszterelnökkel és kormánya egyes tagjaival való rokoni vagy baráti kapcsolatai milyen hatással lehettek cégeik árbevételére, hozzáadott értékére, profitjára és a cégtulajdonosoknak az osztalékfizetéssel kapcsolatos döntéseire. <a class='ecae-link' href='http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2967'>read more</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Political favoritism in public tenders in Hungary. Analysis of the odds of winning</title>
		<link>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2925</link>
		<comments>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2925#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Nov 2021 11:44:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tóth István János]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Working Papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cronyism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[empirical analysis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hungary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political corruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political favoritism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public procurement]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2925</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#160; November 30, 2021 &#160; Tóth, I. J. and Hajdu, M. 2021. Political favoritism in public tenders in Hungary. Analysis of the odds of winning. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2021:1. Budapest: CRCB. The paper investigates the crony system in Hungary based on data of more than 227,000 public tenders from 2005 to 2020. The paper’s novelty [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<p>November 30, 2021</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Tóth, I. J. and Hajdu, M. 2021. Political favoritism in public tenders in Hungary. Analysis of the odds of winning. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2021:1. Budapest: CRCB.</p>
<p>The paper investigates the crony system in Hungary based on data of more than 227,000 public tenders from 2005 to 2020. The paper’s novelty is the analysis of odds of winning of crony and ordinary companies in public procurement that is a new approach to measure the strength of <a class='ecae-link' href='http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2925'>read more</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Orban&#8217;s cronies in the Hungarian public tenders in construction, 2005-2020</title>
		<link>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2876</link>
		<comments>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2876#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Aug 2021 09:21:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tóth István János]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research Notes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hungary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political favoritism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public procurement]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2876</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#160; August 2, 2021 &#160; Two figures on the impact of political favoritism in the Hungarian public procurement (XLSX) &#160; read more]]></description>
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<p>August 2, 2021</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Two figures on the impact of political favoritism in the Hungarian public procurement (<a href="http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/2021_hpp_0520_construction_210802_1134.xlsx">XLSX</a>)</p>
<p>&nbsp; <a class='ecae-link' href='http://www.crcb.eu/?p=2876'>read more</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Cronyism in Hungary. Empirical analysis of public tenders 2010-2016</title>
		<link>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1336</link>
		<comments>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1336#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Feb 2018 20:06:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tóth István János]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Presentations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[corruption risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cronyism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hungary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intensity of competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political favoritism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public procurement]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1336</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#160; February 21, 2018 &#160; Presentation at the conference &#8220;János Kornai 90th birthday &#8220;, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, 21-22 February 2018 &#160; Abstract &#160; In this paper, we use a public procurement database that contains data from more than 230,000 public tenders from 1997 to 2017. The analysis is based on data from 126,330 [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<p>February 21, 2018</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Presentation at the conference &#8220;János Kornai 90th birthday &#8220;, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest,<br />
21-22 February 2018</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Abstract</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In this paper, we use a public procurement database that contains data from more than 230,000 public tenders from 1997 to 2017. The analysis is based on data from 126,330 public procurement contracts from 2010 to 2016. The focus of the study is public tenders (without framework agreements) awarded to companies <a class='ecae-link' href='http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1336'>read more</a></p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>How does the Kleptocratic State Work in Hungary?</title>
		<link>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1293</link>
		<comments>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1293#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jan 2018 14:41:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tóth István János]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research Notes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Short Papers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[corruption risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cronyism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intensity of competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political favoritism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public procurement]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1293</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#160; January 26,  2018 &#160; In this research note, we use the public procurement database built by CRCB, which contains data from more than 200,000 public tenders from 1998 to 2017. The analysis is based on data from 126,330 public procurement contracts from 2010 to 2016. The focus of the analysis is on public tenders [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<p>January 26,  2018</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In this research note, we use the public procurement database built by CRCB, which contains data from more than 200,000 public tenders from 1998 to 2017. The analysis is based on data from 126,330 public procurement contracts from 2010 to 2016. The focus of the analysis is on public tenders (without framework agreements) won by companies related to cronies and family members of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán: Lőrincz Mészáros, István Garancsi, István <a class='ecae-link' href='http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1293'>read more</a></p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Analysing Corruption as Black Holes – A Study on Hungarian Public Procurement</title>
		<link>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1136</link>
		<comments>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1136#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Sep 2017 17:31:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tóth István János]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Presentations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[corruption risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intensity of competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political favoritism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public procurement]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1136</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#160; June 22, 2017 &#160; Presentation for a meeting in the building of the EU Commission, Brussels. The presentation deals with three issues. (1) It presents the analytical framework of corruption risks and competititon intensity of public tenders used by CRCB;  (2) it deals with the results of report &#8220;Intensity of Competition, Corruption Risks and [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<p>June 22, 2017</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Presentation for a meeting in the building of the EU Commission, Brussels. The presentation deals with three issues. (1) It presents the analytical framework of corruption risks and competititon intensity of public tenders used by CRCB;  (2) it deals with the results of report &#8220;Intensity of Competition, Corruption Risks and Price Distortion in the Hungarian Public Procurement – 2009-2016&#8243; made by CRCB for the European Commission; (3) and it demonstrates some <a class='ecae-link' href='http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1136'>read more</a></p>
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		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Rent Extraction and the Rule of Law. The Case of Hungarian Residence Bonds’ Law</title>
		<link>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=885</link>
		<comments>http://www.crcb.eu/?p=885#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2015 13:50:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Tóth István János]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research Notes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political corruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political favoritism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rent extraction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rule of law]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.crcb.eu/?p=885</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#160; This research note examines the history and background of the Hungarian Residence Bonds’ Law. We conclude that the residence bond legislation is an example of the violation of the rule of law, of its connection with rent-seeking, and of possible appearance of political corruption. This case is a clear manifestation of what form, what [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<p>This research note examines the history and background of the Hungarian Residence Bonds’ Law. We conclude that the residence bond legislation is an example of the violation of the rule of law, of its connection with rent-seeking, and of possible appearance of political corruption. This case is a clear manifestation of what form, what special means, and what consequences political favoritism can have and can operate with in a given <a class='ecae-link' href='http://www.crcb.eu/?p=885'>read more</a></p>
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