November 9, 2017
A rablóállam nyomában: magyar közbeszerzések empirikus elemzése 2009-2016. Előadás a Budapest Science Meetup-on (PDF)
Abstract
In the presentation, we examined the effect of friendship and family ties with the Hungarian Prime Minister (Viktor Orbán) on the intensity of competition in public tenders won by companies owned by his close friends and family members. The analysis is based on more than 151,000 Hungarian public procurement tenders from 2009 to 2016. Using OLS, ordered logit, and propensity score matching, we estimate the effect of friendship and family ties on the intensity of tender competition. The results indicate that family and friendship ties have a significant negative impact on the intensity of competition, even after controlling for sector, time, EU funding, procedure type, and tender size. Thus, for the owners of Hungarian companies, friendship with Orban or membership in his family pays off.
The presentation (in Hungarian, PDF)
Suggested citation:
Tóth, I. J., & Hajdu, M. (2017, november 9). A rablóállam nyomában: magyar közbeszerzések empirikus elemzése 2009-2016 (In the Footsteps of the Kleptocratic State: An Empirical Analysis of the Hungarian Public Procurement Between 2009 and 2016) [Conference Presentation]. Budapest Science Meetup, Budapest, Hungary. https://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/science_meetup_2017_tij_hm_presentation_171109.pdf