March 8, 2019
CRCB. 2019. The EU funds, Viktor Orbán and the performance of firms owned by Lőrinc Mészáros, the Hungarian gas fitter, in the Hungarian public tenders 2005-2018. Budapest: CRCB.
Based on the empirical analysis of the Hungarian public tenders we pointed out that the EU funding has perverse effects in Hungary: it helps to reduce the intensity of competition, to increase the level of corruption risk and the weight of price distortion, and it generated the growth of the estimated direct social loss due to weak competition and high level of corruption risks from 2009 to 2016. The analysis on public tenders won by read more
November 9, 2017
A rablóállam nyomában: magyar közbeszerzések empirikus elemzése 2009-2016. Előadás a Budapest Science Meetup-on (PDF)
Abstract
In the presentation, we examined the effect of friendship and family ties with the Hungarian Prime Minister (Viktor Orbán) on the intensity of competition in public tenders won by companies owned by his close friends and family members. The analysis is based on more than 151,000 Hungarian public procurement tenders from 2009 read more
30 May 2017
In these short papers we analyse the effect of friendship and family ties with the Hungarian Prime Minister (Viktor Orban) on the competitive intensity of public tenders won by companies owned by his close friends and family members. The analysis is based on more than 151,000 Hungarian public procurement tenders in the period of 2009-2016. Using OLS and ordered logit estimations, we estimate the effect of the friendship and family ties on the competitive intensity of tenders. The results point out read more