July 1, 2025
Tóth, I. J. (2025). EU Taxpayers’ Contribution to Building the Orbán Kleptocracy. CRCB Research Notes, 2025:2, CRCB.
Research Notes: 2025:2 (PDF - revised version[26.03.2026]) read more
December 29, 2021
Össszefoglalás
A tanulmányban 2004 és 2018 között legnagyobb közbeszerzési szerződéseket elnyerő cégek mintáján azt vizsgáljuk, hogy egyes cégtulajdonosoknak a 2010-ben hivatalba lépett magyar miniszterelnökkel és kormánya egyes tagjaival való rokoni vagy baráti kapcsolatai milyen hatással lehettek cégeik árbevételére, hozzáadott értékére, profitjára és a cégtulajdonosoknak az osztalékfizetéssel kapcsolatos döntéseire. read more
November 30, 2021
Tóth, I. J. and Hajdu, M. 2021. Political favoritism in public tenders in Hungary. Analysis of the odds of winning. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2021:1. Budapest: CRCB.
The paper investigates the crony system in Hungary based on data of more than 227,000 public tenders from 2005 to 2020. The paper’s novelty is the analysis of odds of winning of crony and ordinary companies in public procurement that is a new approach to measure the strength of read more
November 6, 2021
Tesztelés, politikai korrupció és Covid-19 halálozás (Testing, political corruption and Covid-19 mortality)
Előadás a “Munkagazdaágtani kutatások 2021″ konferencián Szirákon (Presentation in the conference ”Labor Economics Research in Hungary 2021″, Szirak, Hungary) (PDF)
Suggested citation:
Tóth, I. J. (2021, November 5). Tesztelés, politikai korrupció és Covid-19 halálozás (Testing, Political Corruption and read more
2021. június 8.
Tóth I. J. 2021. Tesztelés, politikai korrupció és Covid-19 halálozás. [Testing, political corruption and Covid-19 mortality. ] CRCB Research Notes: 2021:2, Budapest: CRCB. https://bit.ly/3cqeHsn
Abstract
The paper deals with the impact of political (grand) corruption and government measures against the pandemic on the Covid-19 mortality rate using data of EU27 and OECD countries. The share of the positive tests within all tests is considered an indicator of government measures’ impact. We use the data of the World Bank and Our World in Data. The political corruption is measured by the 2019 read more
May 30, 2019
CRCB. 2019. An Explanatory Model on the Reorganization of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and on the Expropriation of its Research Institutes. CRCB Research Notes: 2019:6, Budapest: CRCB.
This short analysis deals with a possible interpretation scheme of the real objectives of the Hungarian government with the forced transformation of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) and the destitution of the network of its research institutes in 14 points. With this read more
November 9, 2017
A rablóállam nyomában: magyar közbeszerzések empirikus elemzése 2009-2016. Előadás a Budapest Science Meetup-on (PDF)
Abstract
In the presentation, we examined the effect of friendship and family ties with the Hungarian Prime Minister (Viktor Orbán) on the intensity of competition in public tenders won by companies owned by his close friends and family members. The analysis is based on more than 151,000 Hungarian public procurement tenders from 2009 read more
September 18, 2017
The head of CRCB participated as an expert in the consultation with the Commission of Budgetary Control of the European Parliament on Monday, September 18th, in Budapest, and presented the CRCB’s research results on corruption risks, intensity of competition, and the phenomenon of political favouritism in Hungarian public procurement.
The presentation: (PDF)
The handout: (PDF)
Data publication. The list of public tenders won by Orban’s close friends and read more
This research note examines the history and background of the Hungarian Residence Bonds’ Law. We conclude that the residence bond legislation is an example of the violation of the rule of law, of its connection with rent-seeking, and of possible appearance of political corruption. This case is a clear manifestation of what form, what special means, and what consequences political favoritism can have and can operate with in a given read more