Tóth, I. J. és Hajdu, M. 2021. Haveri cégek az Orbán rendszerben: árbevétel, profit, hozzáadott érték és osztalékfizetés. Magyarországon 2005-2018 között nagy összegű közbeszerzési szerződéseket nyerő cégek mérlegadatainak elemzése. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2021:2. Budapest: CRCB.
A tanulmányban 2004 és 2018 között legnagyobb közbeszerzési szerződéseket elnyerő cégek mintáján azt vizsgáljuk, hogy egyes cégtulajdonosoknak a 2010-ben hivatalba lépett magyar read more
Tóth I. J. and Hajdu, M. 2021. Political favoritism in public tenders in Hungary. Analysis of the odds of winning. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2021:1. Budapest: CRCB.
The paper investigates the crony system in Hungary based on data of more than 227,000 public tenders from 2005 to 2020. The paper’s novelty is the analysis of odds of winning of crony and ordinary companies in public procurement that is a new approach to measure the strength of political favoritism and read more
2021. június 8.
Tóth I. J. 2021. Tesztelés, politikai korrupció és Covid-19 halálozás. [Testing, political corruption and Covid-19 mortality. ] CRCB Research Notes: 2021:2, Budapest: CRCB. https://bit.ly/3cqeHsn
Abstract
The paper deals with the impact of political (grand) corruption and government measures against the pandemic on the Covid-19 mortality rate using data of EU27 and OECD countries. The share of the positive tests within all tests is considered an indicator of government measures’ impact. We use the data of the World Bank and Our World in Data. The political corruption is measured by the 2019 data of the WEF EOS read more
May 30 2019
CRCB. 2019. An explanatory model on the reorganization of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and on the expropriation of its research institutes. May 30 2019. CRCB Research Notes: 2019:6, Budapest: CRCB.
This short analysis deals with a possible interpretation scheme of the real objectives of the Hungarian government with the forced transformation of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) and the destitution of the network of its research institutes in 14 points. With this analysis the read more
9 November 2017
Budapest Science Meetup, Library of the Hungarian Academy of Science, 7pm
In the presentation we dealt with the effect of friendship and family ties with the Hungarian Prime Minister (Viktor Orban) on the intensity of competition of public tenders won by companies owned by his close friends and family members. The analysis is based on more than 151,000 Hungarian public procurement tenders in the period of 2009-2016. Using OLS and ordered logit estimation and propensity score read more
18 September 2017
The head of CRCB participated as an expert in the consultation with the Commission of Budgetary Control of European Parliament on Monday September 18th in Budapest and presented the CRCB’s research results on corruption risks, intensity of competition and the phenomenon of political favouritism in Hungarian public procurement.
The presentation (pdf)
The handout (pdf)
Data publication. The list of public tenders won by Orban’s close friends and family members with indicators read more
This research note examines the history and background of the Hungarian Residence Bonds’ Law. We conclude that the residence bond legislation is an example of the violation of the rule of law, of its connection with rent-seeking, and of possible appearance of political corruption. This case is a clear manifestation of what form, what special means, and what consequences political favoritism can have and can operate with in a given read more