"When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be."
Lord Kelvin

Research Notes

Competitive intensity and family business

May 30th 2017

In these short papers we analyse the effect of friendship and family ties with the Hungarian Prime Minister (Viktor Orban) on the competitive intensity of public tenders won by companies owned by his close friends and family members. The analysis is based on more than 151,000 Hungarian public procurement tenders in the period of 2009-2016. Using OLS and ordered logit estimations, we estimate the effect of the friendship and family ties on the competitive intensity of tenders. The results point read more

The detection of overpricing at EU funded public procurement in Hungary

 

September 7 2016

The analysis of first digits of contract prices indicates that the contract prices of all Hungarian public procurement fits into the theoretical distribution for the whole period. But there are crucial differences in price distortion among the contract prices in each year. Price distortion was increasing throughout the whole period; while in 2009 and 2010 contract prices fitted well into the theoretical distribution, after those years the ratio of price distortion got read more

Competitive Intensity and Corruption Risks in the Hungarian Public Procurement 2009-2015

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August 20 2016
István János Tóth &  Miklós Hajdu. 2016. Competitive Intensity and Corruption Risks in the Hungarian Public Procurement 2009-2015. CRCB Short Papers/2016:1

This short paper examines data from Hungarian public procurement in the period 2009-15. The data from 127,776 contracts were used for the analysis. The analysis focuses on information regarding the competitive intensity, price distortion, and corruption risks. We also analyze the performance of EU funded projects read more

Rent Extraction and the Rule of Law. The Case of Hungarian Residence Bonds’ Law

 

This research note examines the history and background of the Hungarian Residence Bonds’ Law. We conclude that the residence bond legislation is an example of the violation of the rule of law, of its connection with rent-seeking, and of possible appearance of political corruption. This case is a clear manifestation of what form, what special means, and what consequences political favoritism can have and can operate with in a given read more

No public procurement corruption in Hungary? Analysis of the decisions of the Hungarian Courts 2009-2014

 

This research note examines court orders issued in and after 2009 in Hungary. The aim of the analysis was to identify crimes related to corruption in public procurements in order to inspect the validity of the CRCB’s composite corruption risks indicator. A court order was examined if it met the following criteria: it was issued in 2009 or later, it was about corruption related crimes and it contained the word “közbeszerzés” (“public procurement”), “pályázat” (“tender”) or “tender” read more

How much money did Közgép Ltd win in 2013?

Four online portals tried to estimate in the beginning of 2014 the total amount of money that ’Közgép’ group, owned by former close friend (Lajos Simicska) of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, won in public procurement in 2013. The four sources (Portfolio.hu, Átlátszó, K-Monitor, Hír24) calculated four different sums. There was more than half a billion Euro difference between the highest and the lowest estimates. Given that public procurement records are open to the public, it is evidently read more