Tóth, I. J. and Hajdu, M. 2021. Political favoritism in public tenders in Hungary. Analysis of the odds of winning. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2021:1. Budapest: CRCB.
The paper investigates the crony system in Hungary based on data of more than 227,000 public tenders from 2005 to 2020. The paper’s novelty is the analysis of odds of winning of crony and ordinary companies in public procurement that is a new approach to measure the strength of political favoritism and investigate crony read more
November 4, 2021
Tóth, I. J. 2021. The EU Subsidies and the Crony Companies in Hungary. Statistical Analysis of Public Tenders 2011-2020. Budapest: CRCB
Tables and figures (xlsx) read more
May 26, 2020
New Trends in Corruption Risk and Intensity of Competition in the Hungarian Public Procurement from January 2005 to April 2020. Flash Report 2020:1. Budapest: CRCB
This report examines Hungarian public procurement data in the period between 2005 and 2020. Data from 248,404 contracts were used for the analysis, which focuses on information about corruption risk, the intensity of competition and political favouritism.
The results show that in the first four months of 2020, corruption risk in Hungarian read more
April 26, 2020
Crony System in Hungary
This video presents some new results of an ongoing research project of the CRCB.
The research project is supported by Hungarian citizens and Hungarian companies.
September 12, 2019
Toth, I. J. – M. Hajdu. 2019. Cronyism in Hungary. An empirical analysis of public tenders 2010-2018.
Presentation in the workshop of IWE HAS
The slides of the presentation: read more
May 30 2019
CRCB. 2019. An explanatory model on the reorganization of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and on the expropriation of its research institutes. May 30 2019. CRCB Research Notes: 2019:6, Budapest: CRCB.
This short analysis deals with a possible interpretation scheme of the real objectives of the Hungarian government with the forced transformation of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) and the destitution of the network of its research institutes in 14 points. With this analysis the read more
27 April 2018
István János Tóth – Klára Ungár. 2018. The Models of Rent-seeking and Cronyism in the Hungarian Energy Market. The Analysis of the Hungarian Government – MVMP – MET Case. Budapest: CRCB
In this paper, we analyze a regulatory decision of 2011 made by the Hungarian government as regards the Hungarian energy (gas) market and its developments. Ultimately, this regulation was clearly favorable to a private company (the MET Hungary AG and its successor the METI AG) originally read more
21 February 2018.
Presentation at the conference “János Kornai 90th birthday ” at Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest,
21-22 February 2018
In this paper, we use the public procurement database which contains data from more than 230,000 public tenders from 1997 to 2017. The analysis is based on data from 126,330 public procurement contracts from 2010 to 2016. The focus of the analysis is public tenders (without framework agreements) won by companies related to cronies and read more
István János Tóth – Miklós Hajdu: How does the Kleptocratic State Work in Hungary? A research note based on Hungarian public procurement data. CRCB, Budapest, January 2018.
26 January 2018
In this research note, we use the public procurement database built by CRCB, which contains data from more than 200,000 public tenders from 1997 to 2017. The analysis is based on data from 126,330 public procurement contracts from 2010 to 2016. The focus of the analysis is public tenders (without framework agreements) won by companies related to cronies and read more
24 December 2017
Before the issuers publish their calls for tenders, they have to calculate the estimated price of the procurement. This calculation can be based on their experience from previous tenders and on the results of market research. The price drop between the estimated value and the actual contract price can be regarded as a proxy for measure the intensity of competition. The higher competition between the bidders will result in more intense price competition what should lead to lower read more
18 September 2017
The head of CRCB participated as an expert in the consultation with the Commission of Budgetary Control of European Parliament on Monday September 18th in Budapest and presented the CRCB’s research results on corruption risks, intensity of competition and the phenomenon of political favouritism in Hungarian public procurement.
The presentation (pdf)
The handout (pdf)
Data publication. The list of public tenders won by Orban’s close friends and family members with indicators read more