"When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be."
Lord Kelvin

Short Papers

Bangladesh, Zambia and Hungary. Data publication practice of the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority

February 19th, 2018

In this research note we briefly analyse the data publication standard used by the Hungarian Public Procurement Authority regarding its official website. We compare the Hungarian protocol with the case of Zambia and Bangladesh concerning the accessibility of contract award notices. This type of document contains the most important information on public tenders. These pieces of information (the number of bidders, the contract value, the estimated value, the issuer name, the winner name) read more

How does the Kleptocratic State Work in Hungary?

István János Tóth – Miklós Hajdu: How does the Kleptocratic State Work in Hungary? A research note based on Hungarian public procurement data. CRCB, Budapest, January 26 2018.

January 26th  2018

In this research note, we use the public procurement database built by CRCB, which contains data from more than 200,000 public tenders from 1997 to 2017. The analysis is based on data from 126,330 public procurement contracts from 2010 to 2016. The focus of the analysis is public tenders (without framework agreements) won by companies related to cronies read more

Public tenders of Hungarian hospitals on the standard dissection table of the economic analysis

January 24th 2018

István János Tóth – Miklós Hajdu: Public tenders of Hungarian hospitals on the standard dissection table of the economic analysis. Analysis of intensity of competition, corruption risks and price distortion of Hungarian public procurement. Budapest: CRCB, January, 2018.


In the following short paper, we analyse the contracts of a Hungarian EU-funded programme (KEOP – 5.6.0/E/15) involved in an ongoing investigation of the Hungarian Competition Authority (HCA). The investigation was started for suspect of collusion and among the suspects involved are both Hungarian owned firms and read more

Brief analysis on the cronyism in Hungary

December 24th 2017

Before the issuers publish their calls for tenders, they have to calculate the estimated price of the procurement. This calculation can be based on their experience from previous tenders and on the results of market research.  The price drop between the estimated value and the actual contract price can be regarded as a proxy for measure the intensity of competition. The higher competition between the bidders will result in more intense price competition what should lead to lower read more

Competitive intensity and family business

May 30th 2017

In these short papers we analyse the effect of friendship and family ties with the Hungarian Prime Minister (Viktor Orban) on the competitive intensity of public tenders won by companies owned by his close friends and family members. The analysis is based on more than 151,000 Hungarian public procurement tenders in the period of 2009-2016. Using OLS and ordered logit estimations, we estimate the effect of the friendship and family ties on the competitive intensity of tenders. The results point read more

The detection of overpricing at EU funded public procurement in Hungary


September 7 2016

The analysis of first digits of contract prices indicates that the contract prices of all Hungarian public procurement fits into the theoretical distribution for the whole period. But there are crucial differences in price distortion among the contract prices in each year. Price distortion was increasing throughout the whole period; while in 2009 and 2010 contract prices fitted well into the theoretical distribution, after those years the ratio of price distortion got read more

Competitive Intensity and Corruption Risks in the Hungarian Public Procurement 2009-2015

August 20 2016
István János Tóth &  Miklós Hajdu. 2016. Competitive Intensity and Corruption Risks in the Hungarian Public Procurement 2009-2015. CRCB Short Papers/2016:1

This short paper examines data from Hungarian public procurement in the period 2009-15. The data from 127,776 contracts were used for the analysis. The analysis focuses on information regarding the competitive intensity, price distortion, and corruption risks. We also analyze the performance of EU funded projects read more