Tag Archives: political favoritism

Why is it Necessary for Hungary to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office?

 

September 24, 2025

 

Tóth, I. J. (2025, September 24). Why is it Necessary for Hungary to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office?
Some Empirical Evidence and Considerations [Presentation]. European Parliament, PETI Public Hearing, Brussels, Belgium. https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3725

Presentation at PETI Public Hearing ‘How could Hungary’s accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office help to unlock EU funds for Hungary’, September 24, 2025, 14:30-16:00; Brussels, European Parliament.

The read more

Mégis miért lehetünk optimisták?

 

February 25, 2025

 

Mégis miért lehetünk optimisták? Előadás a CEU Bibó István Szabadegyetemen. (PDF)

 

Suggested citation:

 
Tóth, I. J. (2025, február 25). Mégis miért lehetünk optimisták? (Why Can We Still Be Optimistic?) [Presentation] CEU Bibó István Free University, read more

Haveri cégek az Orbán rendszerben: árbevétel, profit, hozzáadott érték és osztalékfizetés

 

December 29, 2021

 

 

Össszefoglalás

 

A tanulmányban 2004 és 2018 között legnagyobb közbeszerzési szerződéseket elnyerő cégek mintáján azt vizsgáljuk, hogy egyes cégtulajdonosoknak a 2010-ben hivatalba lépett magyar miniszterelnökkel és kormánya egyes tagjaival való rokoni vagy baráti kapcsolatai milyen hatással lehettek cégeik árbevételére, hozzáadott értékére, profitjára és a cégtulajdonosoknak az osztalékfizetéssel kapcsolatos döntéseire. read more

Political favoritism in public tenders in Hungary. Analysis of the odds of winning

 

November 30, 2021

 

Tóth, I. J. and Hajdu, M. 2021. Political favoritism in public tenders in Hungary. Analysis of the odds of winning. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2021:1. Budapest: CRCB.

The paper investigates the crony system in Hungary based on data of more than 227,000 public tenders from 2005 to 2020. The paper’s novelty is the analysis of odds of winning of crony and ordinary companies in public procurement that is a new approach to measure the strength of read more

Cronyism in Hungary. Empirical analysis of public tenders 2010-2016

 

February 21, 2018

 

Presentation at the conference “János Kornai 90th birthday “, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest,
21-22 February 2018

 

Abstract

 

In this paper, we use a public procurement database that contains data from more than 230,000 public tenders from 1997 to 2017. The analysis is based on data from 126,330 public procurement contracts from 2010 to 2016. The focus of the study is public tenders (without framework agreements) awarded to companies read more

How does the Kleptocratic State Work in Hungary?

 

January 26,  2018

 

In this research note, we use the public procurement database built by CRCB, which contains data from more than 200,000 public tenders from 1998 to 2017. The analysis is based on data from 126,330 public procurement contracts from 2010 to 2016. The focus of the analysis is on public tenders (without framework agreements) won by companies related to cronies and family members of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán: Lőrincz Mészáros, István Garancsi, István read more

Analysing Corruption as Black Holes – A Study on Hungarian Public Procurement

 

June 22, 2017

 

Presentation for a meeting in the building of the EU Commission, Brussels. The presentation deals with three issues. (1) It presents the analytical framework of corruption risks and competititon intensity of public tenders used by CRCB;  (2) it deals with the results of report “Intensity of Competition, Corruption Risks and Price Distortion in the Hungarian Public Procurement – 2009-2016″ made by CRCB for the European Commission; (3) and it demonstrates some read more

Rent Extraction and the Rule of Law. The Case of Hungarian Residence Bonds’ Law

 

This research note examines the history and background of the Hungarian Residence Bonds’ Law. We conclude that the residence bond legislation is an example of the violation of the rule of law, of its connection with rent-seeking, and of possible appearance of political corruption. This case is a clear manifestation of what form, what special means, and what consequences political favoritism can have and can operate with in a given read more